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Fault detection and identification (FDI) are important problems in process 
engineering. Early detection and precise identification of process faults is essential to 
prevent off-spec products and also in many cases to prevent serious accidents. A 
majority of the methods proposed in the literature employ a single monolithic 
monitoring strategy. But the sheer size and complexity of modern chemical plants 
make it difficult to apply these monolithic strategies. The core objective of this thesis 
is to achieve improved FDI performance by combing multiple FDI methods. Various 
types of multiple FDI methods based approaches consisting of homogeneous (of same 
types) or heterogeneous (of different types) methods are explored and developed in 
this thesis. 
First, an immune system inspired negative selection algorithm (NSA) based 
approach for fault detection is proposed, wherein a collection of hyper-spherical 
shaped detectors are generated with varying centre and radius to cover only the non-
self (abnormal) space while the self (normal) space remains unoccupied. The 
proposed approach is a generic one and can be applied for monitoring and fault 
diagnosis of both continuous as well as batch and transient operations since it does not 
assume any specific statistical distribution of the underlying data. Furthermore, a 
scheme to estimate the self radius, an important parameter for generating the detectors 
in NSA, directly from the training data is also proposed. 
Next, we discuss the role of variable selection in improving the monitoring 
performance of PCA. We demonstrate that reduced models based on only a small 
number of important variables, called key variables, that contain useful information 
about a fault can significantly improve the performance. This set of key variables is 
fault specific. We also propose a metric to estimate the monitoring performance of a 
 vii 
subset of variables for a fault. The proposed metric can be used to easily identify the 
key variables of a fault.  
Then, based on these insights, we propose two reduced PCA model based 
monitoring schemes to achieve adequate monitoring performance for all the faults that 
may occur in a process. First, we propose a stochastic optimization-based method to 
identify an optimal set of key variables to be used in a reduced PCA model to achieve 
improved detection accuracy for all known process faults. Then, we also propose a 
scheme to integrate the results from various fault-specific reduced PCA models where 
each reduced model uses only the key variables of a fault in order to enable a process 
to be monitored for a variety of faults and to obtain superior overall monitoring 
performance.  
Next, both flat and hierarchical organizations of FDI methods are studied. In 
flat architecture, the scopes of all the FDI methods are same and all of them supervise 
the entire process. The effectiveness of utility-based voting and evidence-based 
weighted voting, Bayesian, and Dempster-Shafer decision fusion strategies for 
combining FDI methods organised in Flat architecture are evaluated. Here, the main 
emphasis is given on the situations where the individual FDI methods are highly 
diverse, with strong disagreement among them and the overall performance of each 
FDI method is inadequate. 
A hierarchically distributed FDI scheme is also proposed. In hierarchical 
architecture different FDI methods are deployed to supervise the process process at 
different levels of process hierarchy, such as equipment level, section level, unit level. 
Results from such hierarchical FDI methods cannot be combined suitably through 
voting or Bayesian based fusion scheme. A  Dempster-Shafer evidence theory based 
 viii 
decision fusion strategy is proposed to combine the outputs from Hierarchical FDI 
methods in an efficient manner. 
All these developments discussed above have been tested extensively using 
various case studies – simulated CSTR-distillation column, lab scale distillation 
column, simulated CSTR, simulated fed-batch operation, the Tennessee Eastman 
challenge problem. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Abnormal Event Management (AEM) involves the timely detection of a fault, 
diagnosing its causal origins and then taking appropriate supervisory control decisions 
and actions to bring the process back to a normal, safe operating state. A fault could 
arise from the departure of an observed variable from the acceptable range. Process 
abnormality or fault such as high temperature in reactor or low product quality could 
occur due to a failed coolant pump or controller. A basic failure such as in the above 
example could lead to an abnormal event. Abnormalities or faults which occur in the 
process have to be detected, diagnosed, and corrected. Fault detection and diagnosis 
therefore forms the first and perhaps the most important step in AEM.  
Quick and correct detection and identification of process faults are extremely 
important for efficient, economic and safe operation of chemical process. Undetected 
process faults may lead to poor quality off-spec products, resulting in poor plant 
economy and sometimes even catastrophic consequences like accidents, and injury to 
plant personnel. As chemical plants and refineries grow in complexity, detection, 
diagnosis and correction of abnormal situations becomes increasingly difficult for 
plant personnel. Successful detection and identification of process faults at an early 
stage while the plant is still in a controllable region can increase the success rate of 
fault recovery during operations and prevent costly accidents, and unnecessary 
shutdowns. From an economic point of view, Nimmo (1995) reported that 
approximately 20 billion dollars of annual losses in U.S. is due to poor Abnormal 
Event Management; Laser (2000) reported its impact on British economy at 27 billion 
dollars. Industrial statistics also show that minor accidents are very common, 
 2 
occurring on a day-to-day basis, causing injuries, illness to plant personnel and 
costing investors billions of dollars every year. Therefore, process faults or 
abnormalities have to be detected and identified as soon as they occur due to their 
severe impact on quality, safety and economics.  
The severe consequences of abnormal events on quality, safety and economics 
offer the motivation for this PhD thesis, which strives for timely detection and 
diagnosis of faults in large-scale complex chemical processes. The main area of 
investigation for major part of this thesis centers on combining the results of multiple 
Fault Detection and Identification (FDI) methods suitably to achieve superior FDI 
performance.  
  
1.2 Need for multiple FDI methods based process monitoring 
approach 
The area of fault detection and diagnosis is one of the most important aspects 
in process engineering. This area has received considerable attention from both 
industry and academia due to the economic and safety impact involved. FDI in 
chemical process industries has been an active area of research for over three decades 
(Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003a,b,c). A majority of the methods proposed in the 
literature employ a single monolithic monitoring strategy based on principal 
components analysis (PCA), artificial neural-networks (ANN), self-organizing maps 
(SOM), qualitative trend analysis (QTA), signal processing methods or first principles 
models. But the sheer size and complexity of modern chemical plants make it difficult 
to apply these monolithic strategies. Furthermore, each FDI method has its own 
advantages and weaknesses (Dash et al. 2000, Venkatasubramanian et al. 2003c) in 
practical applications. Thus, a FDI method that works well under one circumstance 
might not work well under another when different features of the underlying process 
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come to the fore. It is clearly difficult to design a perfect FDI method that efficiently 
monitors a large-scale, complex industrial process in all likely scenarios. Hence, there 
is a strong motivation for developing systems that rely on collaboration between 
multiple FDI methods so as to bring together their strengths and overcome their 
individual shortcomings. 
A similar philosophy is now widely practiced in the pattern recognition and 
classification literature. A judicious and meaningful combination of multiple 
classifiers generally outperforms a single one (Xu et al. 1992, Ho et al. 1994, Kiittler 
et al. 1998, Polikar 2006). The strategy in such multiple classifier systems is therefore 
to create many classifiers, and combine their decisions such that the combination 
improves upon the performance of a single classifier. Distributed monitoring and 
diagnosis have received a lot of attention in recent years for monitoring optical 
networks (Stanic and Subramaniam, 2008; Stanic et al., 2010), computer networks 
(Khanna et al., 2007), sensor networks (Hsin and Liu, 2002), pipeline systems (Jin 
and Eydaghi, 2008), etc. particularly in situations where single, centralized, 
monolithic monitoring strategies are not suitable. In distributed monitoring, instead of 
relying on a single method, multiple methods are deployed to supervise the system. 
Therefore, the monitoring responsibility is shared among various monitoring methods 
and no single method is solely responsible for monitoring the entire system.  
There exists little work in the literature regarding the application of multiple 
FDI methods for fault detection and identification in chemical processes. Despite the 
obvious promise of multi-classifier systems to process monitoring and fault diagnosis, 
their potential remains largely unexplored. The principal objective of this thesis is to 
achieve improved monitoring performance by combing the results from multiple FDI 
methods in large-scale modern chemical processes.  
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1.3 Organization of the thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a detailed review 
of important concepts and literature necessary for the development of new FDI 
methodologies presented in this thesis is provided. In this chapter, first a concise 
review of the state-of-art in process monitoring, and fault detection and diagnosis 
techniques is discussed. A concise literature review on feature selection, a related 
topic widely studied in the pattern recognition literature for improving classification 
performance is also provided. Based on this discussion it is understood that a single 
centralized monolithic monitoring strategies are not always well suited for detecting 
and identifying faults in large-scale, complex, modern chemical plants. Then a review 
of multiple classifiers systems (MCS), used in pattern recognition, fault classification 
and data mining literature is presented, wherein multiple pattern classifiers of the 
same type (homogeneous) or different types (heterogeneous) are deployed either in 
flat or hierarchical architecture. Next, a popular immune system inspired principle 
called negative selection algorithm (NSA) which is used to generate multiple 
homogeneous detectors with varying parameters is described. After this, various 
decision fusion schemes for combining the results from different classifiers are 
discussed.   
In Chapter 3, an overview various multiple FDI method based approaches is 
presented. This chapter provides an organization scheme for the various developments 
reported in the subsequent chapters.  
In Chapter 4, a FDI scheme for online monitoring and fault diagnosis of 
chemical processes based on Immune-System Inspired negative selection algorithm 
(NSA) is proposed, in which a collection of hyper-spherical detectors are generated in 
the complementary (non-self) space through NSA and these multiple detectors are 
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then employed for process monitoring. Each hyper-spherical detector is defined by 
two parameters – centre and radius. These two parameters are different for each 
detector. The proposed FDI framework is applicable to both continuous and batch 
processes or transient operations. The effectiveness of the proposed method for 
monitoring and fault diagnosis of both continuous as well as batch processes and 
transient operations is demonstrated through various case studies. A comparative 
study of FDI performance of the proposed framework with that of traditional PCA 
based approach is also reported. 
Selection of key variables for improving the monitoring performance of PCA 
based model is discussed in Chapter 5. First, it has been shown theoretically with 
illustrative examples that a PCA model with only a small number of key variables of a 
fault can provide significant improvement in monitoring that fault. This set of key 
variables is fault specific. Then, a metric is proposed to systematically evaluate the 
monitoring performance of any set of variables for a fault directly from the training 
data of normal and that fault operations. This metric can be used to effectively obtain 
a small number (2 or 3) of key variables of a fault by complete enumeration. The 
excellent ability of the proposed metric in identifying the right key variables is 
demonstrated through the benchmark Tennessee Eastman Challenge problem. 
Based on the insights in Chapter 5, we propose two reduced PCA model based 
monitoring schemes in Chapter 6 to achieve adequate monitoring performance for all 
the faults that may occur in a process. First, we propose a stochastic optimization-
based method to identify an optimal set of key variables to be used in a reduced PCA 
model to achieve improved detection accuracy for all known process faults. Then, we 
also propose a scheme to integrate the results from various fault-specific reduced PCA 
models where each reduced model uses only the key variables of a fault in order to 
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enable a process to be monitored for a variety of faults and to obtain superior overall 
monitoring performance. The efficacy of both the monitoring schemes is 
demonstrated through the benchmark Tennessee Eastman Challenge problem. 
In Chapter 7, popular utility-based and evidence-based decision fusion 
strategies have been explored for combining the results of multiple heterogeneous 
FDI methods such as EKF, PCA, ANN, SOM, Expert systems, organized in a flat 
architecture. Two case studies – (i) continuous lab scale distillation column and (ii) 
Tennessee Eastman process are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of various 
decision fusion strategies. Their relative strengths and weakness under different 
situations are also discussed. 
Chapter 8 describes a framework for hierarchically distributed fault detection 
and identification in chemical processes, wherein the process is decomposed 
hierarchically into sections and subsections based on process flow diagram and 
multiple hierarchical FDI methods of different types are deployed to monitor the 
process at various levels of abstraction, i.e., at the sections and subsections of the 
process. The results from such hierarchical FDI methods cannot be combined through 
conventional voting or Bayesian based fusion scheme - as the results contain mutually 
non-exclusive fault classes at different levels of granularity. An adaptation of the 
Dempster-Shafer evidence theory to combine such diagnostic results at different 
levels of abstraction is proposed. The key benefits of this scheme - improved 
diagnostic performance compared to individual FDI methods, robust localization of 
even novel faults, and a coherent explanation of the entire plant's state are 
demonstrated through two case studies. 
Finally, the summary of this research work and conclusions are presented in 
Chapter 9. The key research areas for further extension are also identified.  
 7 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction to Process Monitoring, Fault Detection and Diagnosis 
The aim of AEM is timely detection, diagnosis, and correction of abnormal or 
fault conditions. The term fault is generally defined as a departure from an acceptable 
range of an observed variable or a calculated parameter associated with a process 
(Himmelblau, 1978). This defines a fault as a process abnormality or symptom, such as 
high temperature in a reactor or low product quality and so on. The underlying cause(s) 
of this abnormality, such as a failed coolant pump or a controller, is (are) called the 
basic event(s) or the root cause(s). The basic event is also referred to as a malfunction 
or a failure. The types of faults occurring in industrial systems include process 
parameter changes, disturbance parameters changes, actuator problems and sensor 
problems (Kesavan and Lee, 1997, Venkatsubramaniam et al., 2003a). Catalyst 
poisoning and heat exchanger fouling are examples of process parameter changes. A 
disturbance parameter change can be an extreme change in concentration of process 
feed stream or in the ambient temperature. An example of an actuator problem is a 
sticking valve, and a sensor producing biased measurements is an example of a sensor 
problem. To ensure that the process is operating smoothly and satisfying its 
performance specifications, the faults in the process need to be detected, diagnosed, 
and removed as soon as they occur. Definitions for some of the important terms used 
widely in process monitoring and fault diagnosis literature are first established. 
Monitoring is a continuous real-time task of determining the conditions in a 
physical system. It consists of recording information, recognizing changes and 
detecting abnormalities in the systems behavior (Iserman and Balle, 1997). The goal of 
process monitoring is to ensure smooth operation of the process by recognizing 
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anomalies in the behavior. It not only provides the plant operator and maintenance 
personal information about the current status of the process, but also assists them to 
make appropriate remedial actions to mitigate the effect of abnormal process behavior. 
The obvious results of proper process monitoring are minimum process downtime, 
improved safety of plant operations, and reduced manufacturing costs. 
Fault detection, fault identification, fault diagnosis, and process recovery are 
the four procedure associated with AEM. There appears to be no standard terminology 
for these procedures. The terminology varies across disciplines. The definition of fault 
detection is fairly consistent, while a variety of overlapping definitions is used for fault 
identification and fault diagnosis. The terminology given by Raich and Cinar (1996) is 
adopted here.  Fault detection is determining whether a fault has occurred. Early 
detection may provide invaluable warning on emerging abnormal events and 
appropriate actions can then be taken to avoid serious process upsets. Fault 
identification is identifying the observation variables most affected by the fault or the 
variables most responsible for the fault. The purpose of fault identification is to focus 
the plant operator‘s and engineer‘s attention on the subsystem(s) where the fault most 
likely occurred, so that the effect of fault can be eliminated in a more efficient manner. 
Fault diagnosis is determining which fault occurred, in other words, determining the 
cause of observed out-of-control status. Isermann (1995) more specifically defines 
fault diagnosis as determining the type, location, magnitude, and the time of the fault. 
The fault diagnosis procedure is essential to the counteraction and mitigation of the 
fault. Process recovery, is removing the effect of the fault. A widely used term in the 
literature is the Fault Detection and Identification (FDI) method, which is a process 
monitoring method that contains both fault detection and diagnosis stages. Timely 
detection and diagnosis of faults result in reduced process downtime, improved 
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operations safety and higher business efficiency. FDI methods seek to automate this to 
a large extent. 
Each FDI method uses a priori process behaviour knowledge in the form of a 
model (developed offline) and online process measurements to compute residuals 
whose exceeding a predefined threshold indicates an abnormality. Fig. 2.1 depicts the 
general principle behind process monitoring.  Features in the online measurements and 
the residuals could also indicate the possible root cause of the abnormality. 
Figure 2.1: General framework of process monitoring and diagnosis system 
2.2 Desirable characteristics of a FDI method 
The performance of a process monitoring method is determined by the number 
of false positive and false negative results it gives and the number of samples required 
for developing the behaviour model. In order to compare various process monitoring 
and diagnosis methods, it is first useful to identify a set of desirable characteristics that 
such a system should possess. Then the different methods may be evaluated against 
such a common set of requirements or standards. The following are the set of desirable 



















Early detection and diagnosis: Early and accurate diagnosis is an important and 
highly desirable attribute. However, quick diagnosis and tolerable performance during 
normal operation are two conflicting goals (Willsky, 1976). A system that is designed 
to detect a failure (particularly abrupt changes) quickly will be sensitive to noise and 
can lead to frequent false alarms during normal operation, which can be disruptive. 
Isolability:  Isolability refers to the ability of the diagnostic system to discriminate 
between different failures. The diagnostic system should be able to assign correct fault 
class to an abnormal process state with high recognition rate (accuracy). 
Robustness: One would like the diagnostic system to be robust to various noise and 
uncertainties. Its performance should degrade gracefully instead of failing totally and 
abruptly. This implies that the thresholds should be tuned conservatively. However, 
this can affect performance. 
Novelty Identifiability: One of the minimal requirements of a diagnostic system is to 
be able to decide, given current process conditions, whether the process is functioning 
normally or abnormally, and if abnormal, whether the cause is a known malfunction or 
an unknown, novel, malfunction. This criterion is known as novelty identifiability. 
Adaptability: Processes change and evolve due to changes in external inputs or 
structural changes due to retrofitting and so on. The operating conditions change not 
only due to disturbances, but also due to changes in other conditions such as changes 
in production quantities, or quality of raw material, etc. In order to be useful and 
practical, the diagnostic system should be adaptable to changes. 
Explanation facility: In addition to being able to identify the source of malfunctions, a 
diagnostic system should also provide explanations on how the fault originated and 
propagated to the current situation. This requires ability to reason about cause and 
effect relationship in a process. A system justifying its recommendations can help the 
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operator evaluate and act using his/her experience. One would like the diagnostic 
system to not only justify why certain hypotheses were proposed but also why certain 
others were not. 
Ease of development: The amount of effort required to develop a reasonable model for 
the system is an important issue. For fast and easy deployment, the modeling effort 
should be as minimal as possible. 
Reasonable storage and computational requirement: There is a trade-off between the 
computational complexity and system performance. Fast on-line decisions would 
require algorithms and implementations, which are less computationally complex, but 
might necessitate high storage requirements. A reasonable compromise between these 
two competing requirements is desirable. 
Multiple Fault Identifiability: The ability to identify multiple faults is an important 
but a difficult requirement. It is a difficult problem due to the interacting nature of 
most faults. In a general nonlinear system, the interactions would usually be 
synergistic and hence a diagnostic system may not be able to use the individual fault 
patterns to model the combined effect of the faults. On the other hand designing 
separately for various multiple fault combinations would be computationally 
prohibitive for large processes. 
2.3 FDI methods 
Numerous computer-aided methods have been developed for process monitoring 
and diagnosis over the years. Since all process monitoring and diagnosis methods 
require a priori knowledge about the process and its behaviours, one scheme of 
classifying them is based on the source of such knowledge. The knowledge may be 
from fundamental understanding of the process using first principles, also referred to 
as deep, causal or fundamental knowledge based methods. This is developed usually 
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from understanding about the physico-chemical behaviours like mass, energy, 
conservative equations, reaction kinetics, thermodynamics etc. Alternately, the a priori 
domain knowledge may be gathered from past experience with the process, referred to 
as shallow, compiled, evidential or process history-based knowledge. Thus monitoring 
and diagnosis methods could be broadly classified into two major categories – (1) 
fundamental knowledge based methods and (2) evidential knowledge or process 
history-based methods. These two forms of knowledge about a process could be 
represented in either qualitative or quantitative schemes (refer to Table 2.1). 
Quantitative methods use mathematical equations, while qualitative methods solely 
rely on discrete qualitative elements (such as high, low, increasing, decreasing, etc) to 
represent behaviour. Thus, all process monitoring and diagnosis methods can be 
classified based on the source of knowledge and its representation into any of the four 
grids shown in Table 2.1. Some of these methods in each of the four categories are 
described in detail next. 
Table 2.1: Classification of FDI methods 
 
Trend-based: QTA  
Expert Systems 
Fuzzy Logic 
Signed Directed Graphs  
Fault Trees 
Expert Systems 
Statistical: PCA, PLS, 
FDA 
Pattern recognition: ANN, 
SOM 
































2.3.1 Fundamental knowledge based quantitative methods  
Quantitative methods are also referred to as analytical methods in literature 
(Chiang et al., 2001, Venkatasubramanian et al. 2003a). Based on the measured 
variables analytical methods generate residuals using detailed dynamic mathematical 
models. The residuals are the outcomes of consistency checks between the plant 
observations and the behavior as encoded in the mathematical model. The residual will 
be non-zero due to faults, disturbances, noise, and/or modeling errors. In the preferred 
situation, residuals or their transformations will be relatively large when faults are 
present, and small in the presence of other variations. In this case the presence of faults 
can be detected by defining appropriate thresholds. In any case, an analytical method 
will arrive at a diagnostic decision based on the values of the residuals. 
The three main ways to generate residuals are parameter estimation, observers 
or Kalman filters and parity relations (Frank et al., 1996). For parameter estimation, 
the residuals are the difference between the nominal parameters and the estimated 
model parameters. Deviations in the model parameters serve as the basis for detecting 
and diagnosing faults. 
The Kalman filter or observer-based method reconstructs the outputs of the 
system from the measurements or a subset of the measurements. The difference 
between the measured outputs and the estimated outputs is used as the vector of 
residuals. Unlike open-loop observers that use only inputs, closed-loop 
observers/filters, such as Kalman filters, make use of both the input as well as output 
measurements. Closed-loop filters are therefore inherently more stable and do not 
require accurate knowledge of the process initial conditions. The Kalman filter is one 
of the most widely used tools for state and parameter estimation in stochastic systems 
and is based on minimizing the least square error criterion of the estimates. In Bhagwat 
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et al. (2003), a multi-linear model-based fault detection scheme was proposed based on 
decomposition of operation of a non-linear process into multiple locally linear regimes. 
Kalman filters were used for state estimation and residuals generation in each regime. 
Analysis of residuals using thresholds, faults maps, and logic-charts enabled on-line 
detection and isolation of faults. 
Parity relation checks the consistency of the mathematical equations of the system 
with the measurements. 
2.3.2 Fundamental knowledge based qualitative methods 
In qualitative model equations input-output relationships are typically 
expressed in terms of qualitative functions. The process monitoring and diagnosis 
methods based on qualitative models can be obtained through causal modeling of the 
system, a detailed description of the system or through fault-symptom analysis. Causal 
analysis techniques are based on the cause-effect modeling of fault-symptom 
relationships. Qualitative relationships in these causal models can be obtained from the 
first principles. Causal analysis techniques like signed directed graphs (Tsuge et al., 
1985), fault tree, qualitative physics are based on fundamental process knowledge and 
use a qualitative framework for diagnosing faults. 
A signed directed graph (SDG) is a qualitative model that incorporates the 
cause-and-effect of deviations from normal operations. In directed graph, nodes 
represent process variable values and directed arcs represent the relationship between 
them. The directed arcs have a positive (+) or negative (-) sign attached to them and 
also lead from the ‗cause‘ nodes to the ‗effect‘ nodes. Sometimes nodes also depict 
process variables or events (system fault, component failure, or subsystem failures). A 
node takes the value of 0 when its measured variable is within its normal range, a 
value of ‗+‘ when its measured variable is larger than a high threshold, or when its 
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measured variable is smaller than the low threshold. Arcs take values of + and ‗–‘ 
representing whether the cause and effect change in the same direction or the opposite 
direction, respectively.  
A SDG of a gravity flow tank system (see Fig. 2.2(a)) is depicted in Fig. 2.2(b). 
The following faults are considered in this example: (i) Leak in Stream 0, (ii) Leak in 
Stream 1, (iii) Leak in tank, and (iv) Valve stuck in closed position. In this example, 
when ―Leak in Stream 1‖ occurs, h will decrease. Therefore, a – sign is assigned to the 
arc which connects these two nodes. To determine root cause during fault the 
deviations are propagated from the effect nodes to cause nodes via consistent arcs until 
one or more root nodes are identified. In the above gravity flow tank example, consider 
the case where the observed symptoms are that the liquid level h is increasing, while 
the output flow rate Fout is decreasing. These symptoms indicate that the nodes Fin, h, 
and Fout take the values of 0, +, and -, respectively. Based on SDG shown in 




Figure 2.2: (a) A gravity flow tank system with three measured variables: input flow 
rate Fin, output flow rate Fout, and height of liquid level in tank h. (b) A signed directed 
graph for the gravity tank system with symptoms h is increasing, while Fout is 
decreasing 
 
2.3.3 Evidential knowledge based quantitative methods 
In evidential knowledge based methods the availability of large amount of 
historical process data replaces fundamental knowledge in determining process 
behavior. There are different ways in which this data can be transformed and presented 
as a priori knowledge to a diagnostic system. This extraction process can be either 
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The quantitative process history-based methods essentially formulate the 
diagnostic problem-solving as a pattern recognition problem. The goal of pattern 
recognition is the classification of data points to in general, pre-determined classes. 
Statistical methods use knowledge of a priori class distributions to perform 
classification. Neural networks on the other hand assume a functional form for the 
decision rule. 
2.3.3.1 Principal Component Analysis 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is the most widely used statistics based 
data-driven technique for monitoring industrial systems (Nomikos and MacGregor, 
1994; MacGregor and Kourti, 1995). It is a dimensionality reduction technique that is 
capable of treating high dimensional, noisy and correlated data by projecting it onto a 
lower dimensional subspace that explains the most pertaining features of the system.  
Let nXmX  represent the data matrix. where n designates the number of 
samples (observations) and m denotes the number of variables  mn  . The matrix X is 
decomposed in terms of a new set of independent variables, the principal components, 
which are linear combination of original variables and are defined to be orthogonal to 
each other. PCA relies on eigenvalue decomposition of the covariance of X in order to 
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 where, ma    
where,   nXaa TtttT  ;,...,, 21 is the matrix of principal component scores, which 
extracts the correlative information of the samples.   mXaa PpppP  ;,...,, 21  is the 
matrix of principal component eigenvectors or principal component loadings, which 
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abstracts the correlative information of the original variables and mnE   is the 
residual matrix, which is the difference between original data and the reconstruction. 
Due to the high degree of correlation among the variables, one often finds that the 
anterior a principal component can explain the main variation in the original data 
variables. Therefore, PCA projects the training data matrix nXmX    into lower 
dimensional PC score matrix T as 
                                              
nXaTXPT  ;  (2.3) 
Hence the dimensionality is greatly reduced which allows the dominant process 
variability to be visualized with a single plot. Fault detection using PCA or its variants 
is usually performed by monitoring the squared prediction error (SPE) and/or 
Hotelling‘s 2T  statistic. The former measures the random variation of an online 
sample xi from the PCA model, for example, that associated with measurement noise 
while the latter measures the variation of the sample within the PCA model. The 
process is considered normal if QSPEi  , where Q denotes the upper control limit 
for confidence level 1  based on a standard normal distribution (Jackson, 1991). 
The threshold ( Q ) can be applied to define the normal variations due to random noise, 
and a violation of the threshold (i.e., QSPEi  ) would indicate that the random noise 
has changed significantly. An upper control limit 2T similar to Q can also be derived 
for the 2T  statistic. A violation of 2T  statistic threshold (i.e.,
22
TTi  ) would indicate 
that the systematic variations are out of control since the 2T  statistic measures the 
systematic variations in the process. A fault is flagged when the 95% or 99% 
confidence limits of T
2
 statistic and/or SPE value is violated. For fault diagnosis, a 
fault reconstruction scheme is used wherein separate models are developed for each 
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fault class. The PCA model that shows an in-control status during abnormal operations 
is considered to flag the right class of fault.  
One of the shortcomings of PCA based methods is that they suffer from an 
inability to explain their results, i.e. they cannot identify the root cause or describe the 
fault propagation pathways. PCA based methods just monitor and detect the abnormal 
behaviour. Recently, PCA based method has been extended with additional statistical 
analysis such as LAMDA clustering (Villez et al., 2007) or case-based reasoning 
(Ordonez, 2008) to perform the root cause analysis of the abnormal behaviour in 
Sequential Batch reactor (SBR) processes.  
2.3.3.2 Artificial Neural Network 
The artificial neural network (ANN) is a nonlinear mapping between input and 
output variables consisting of a set of interconnected neurons arranged in layers. 
Neural networks have been used successfully for classification and nonlinear function 
approximation problems. Neural network based process monitoring and diagnosis 
method uses the relationship between data patterns and fault classes without modeling 
the internal process states or structure explicitly. The three-layer feedforward ANN 
shown in Fig. 2.3 is the most popular. The network consists of three components: an 
input layer, a hidden layer, and an output layer. Each layer contains neurons (also 
called nodes). Each neuron in the hidden layer is connected to all input layer neurons 
and output layer neurons. No connection is allowed within its own layer and the 
information flow is in one direction only. 
One common way to use a neural network for fault diagnosis is to assign the 
input neurons to online measurements and the output neurons to the process state 
indicators (i.e., normal as well as known process faults). Therefore, the number of 
input neuron becomes equal to the number of process variables to be monitored while 
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the number of output neurons is equal to the number of different classes in the training 
data. i.e., normal and known fault classes.  The output pattern corresponding to the 
normal conditions and the faults is denoted by a vector. For example, the vector [1 0 
0 …] is the output pattern for normal condition, the vector [0 1 0 0…] is the output 
pattern for fault class 1, and so on. During online fault detection and diagnosis phase, 
the measurement is projected on to the trained neural network to map the online 
sample to the process states (normal and known process faults). Among the various 
output nodes, the one with the largest value is considered to indicate the process state 
if its value close to 1. 
 
Figure 2.3: A 3-layered feedforward Artificial Neural Network 
2.3.4 Evidential knowledge based qualitative methods 
In qualitative process history based methods the feature extraction is solely in 
terms of qualitative elements, such as: high, low, medium, normal or increasing, 
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decreasing, constant or +1, 0, -1 etc. Qualitative trend analysis is an example of 
qualitative process history based method. The variation of a process variable with time 
is called the trend of that variable. Trend analysis involves hierarchical representation 
of variable trends, extraction of trends, and their comparison (estimation of similarity) 
to infer the state of the process. A trend is represented as a sequence (combination) of 
these seven primitives. The trend of a process variable is demarcated into simple 
shapes called atoms. The trend analysis approach is based on monitoring the ordered 
set of atoms that abstract the trend of each process variable. During each state, the 
variables in the process exhibit a typical trend. So, the normal operation of the plant 
would have a specific trend signature for different variables. When a fault occurs, 
process variables vary from their nominal values and ranges, and exhibit trends that are 
characteristics of the fault. Hence, different faults can be mapped to their characteristic 
trend signatures. 
An expert system is a computer program that mimics the cognitive behaviour 
of a human expert in a particular domain. In general, plant operators and engineers 
have vast experience in operating the process and they gather comprehensive 
knowledge over the time from their experience regarding the nuances when 
disturbances/faults occur in the underlying process. The knowledge can be abstracted 
in terms of a set of logical if-then-else rules. The rule based expert system consists of a 
knowledge base, essentially a large set of if-then-else rules and an inference engine 
which searches through the knowledge base to derive conclusions from given facts.  
In the expert systems the knowledge representation scheme is largely qualitative. 
The knowledge base of an expert system may contain evidential knowledge based on 
heuristics, causal knowledge based on first principles or combination of the two. 
Therefore, depending on its knowledge base, an expert system could be an evidential 
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knowledge-based qualitative method or could be a fundamental knowledge-based 
qualitative method or a hybrid. 
Monitoring performance of the data-driven techniques depends largely on the 
quality and quantity of the data used to build the monitoring model. Modern chemical 
plants contain a large number of mass- and heat-integrated unit operations and 
thousands of process variables are measured regularly. Not all the measured variables 
are however equally important for process monitoring. Usually, only a small subset of 
the recorded variables carries essential information about the faults that can affect the 
process and is hence more useful for developing a monitoring model. A brief literature 
review on feature selection, a related topic widely studied in the pattern recognition 
literature to improve the classifiers performance is provided next.    
2.4 Feature Selection 
In classical pattern recognition, patterns are generally represented as a vector of 
feature values. The selection of a subset of features can have a considerable impact on 
the resulting classification performance (Jain and Zongker, 1997; Raymer et al., 2000). 
It has been shown experimentally that irrelevant and noisy features unnecessarily 
increase the complexity of the classification problem and can degrade performance 
(Na et al., 2002; Zio et al 2006). As a result, feature selection methods have become an 
important pre-processing step in automated pattern recognition (Jain and Zongker 1997; 
Lee and Landgrebe, 1997; Biem et al., 1997; Raymer et al 2000), exploratory data 
analysis (Mao and Jain, 1995), and data mining (Raymer et al., 2000). 
Feature selection techniques study how to identify and select informative 
(discriminative) features for building classifiers that can interpret data better. Feature 
selection can reduce the computational cost by reducing data dimensionality, increase 
classification speed and accuracy, and improve the comprehensibility of the classifier 
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models by eliminating redundant and irrelevant (probable noise) features.  It has to be 
noted that feature selection is different from feature extraction (or dimensionality 
reduction) which creates new features by combining the original features. In general 
terms, feature extraction refers to the task of finding a mapping that reduces the n-
dimensional data being transformed onto a m-dimensional space, where m < n (Zio et 
al., 2006). All n original features are used for obtaining the m-dimensional transformed 
data. On the other hand, feature selection maintains the original meaning of the 
selected features. Thus, feature selection is a special case of feature extraction where 
by  mn   irrelevant features are discarded and only the m most informative ones are 
retained. Feature selection and extraction have many functions in common. Both can 
be used to project data onto lower dimensional space for subsequent visualization, 
clustering, and other exploratory data analysis (Raymer et al., 2000).  
Feature selection algorithms can be divided into two categories: filter-based and 
wrapper-based methods (Zio et al., 2006; Tan et al., 2008). Filter-based methods 
utilize the intrinsic properties of the data to select subsets of features as a 
preprocessing step, independently of the chosen classifier. Basically, they discard 
irrelevant and /or redundant features before the construction of the classifier. This is 
independent of the specific learning algorithm used in the classification. Features are 
assessed by their relevance or discriminant powers with regard to the targeted classes. 
Feature ranking approaches score or rank features by certain criterion and use the 
rankings as the basis for selection. These are particularly attractive because of their 
simplicity, scalability, and good empirical success (Tan et al., 2008). Computationally, 
feature ranking is efficient since it requires only the computation of a score for each 
feature and sorting them. Based on the scores, subsets of significant features can be 
selected to build a classifier. Some feature selection methods use criteria based on 
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statistics, such as χ2 statistics (Liu and Setiono, 1995), T statistics (Liu et al., 2002), F 
statistics (Peng et al., 2005), signal-to-noise  statistic (Golub, 1999), Fisher criteria 
(Furey et al., 2000), information gain (Liu 2004), mutual information (Guyon and 
Elissseeff, 2003; Peng et al., 2005), and entropy-based measures (Dash and Liu, 1999; 
Liu et al.,2005). A common drawback of many feature ranking methods is that they 
implicitly assume that features are orthogonal (i.e., uncorrelated) to each other and 
assess features in isolation. Features are ranked on the basis of their individual 
predictive capabilities. Mutual information such as redundancy or complementariness 
among features is ignored. In fact, top-ranked features might be strongly correlated so 
that using two or more of them may not provide any added benefit. This is common in 
chemical processes where variables are connected through mass and energy integration. 
In addition, a feature which is insignificant according to some feature ranking or 
selection measurement can provide a significant performance improvement when 
grouped with other features (Srinivasan and Qian, 2007). These issues of redundancy 
and multivariate prediction limit the application of feature ranking algorithms in large-
scale chemical processes. 
Wrapper-based methods select a subset of the features according to the 
classification performance of the chosen classifier, and hence consider the mutual 
dependency among features (Hamdani et al., 2011). They allow simultaneous feature 
selection and classifier training to produce the optimal combination of features and 
classifiers for a particular classification problem. GAs (Goldberg, 1989) has been 
widely used in wrapper-based feature selection to efficiently explore the combinatorial 
solutions space (Li et al., 2011). Oh et al. (2004); Tan et al. (2008); Zhu & Guan, 
(2004) demonstrated that the solutions identified by GA were more efficient in terms 
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of achieving maximum classification accuracy than other classical feature selection 
methods.  
Wrapper-based approaches generally outperform filter-based methods in terms of 
prediction accuracy since the former ensure the selection of features more suitable for 
the classification algorithm used, whereas the latter completely ignore the effects of 
the selected feature subspace on the performance of the classifier. Filter-based 
approaches are generally computationally more efficient since they avoid the 
additional steps of classifier learning and evaluating the performance of the learned 
classifier which are computationally expensive. However, since the feature selection 
step is usually performed in the offline phase prior to classifier training, the increase in 
computational cost is not a critical issue. Improved prediction accuracy clearly 
outweighs computational consideration. Hence, in Chapter 6 of this thesis, a wrapper-
based approach is used to select the most relevant, informative variables for PCA 
based process monitoring. 
2.5 Advantages and disadvantages of various FDI methods 
The success of quantitative model based approach depends largely on the 
accuracy of the model. It is difficult to apply the analytical approach to large-scale 
systems (i.e., systems containing a large number of inputs, outputs, and/or states) 
because development of detailed mathematical models for large-scale systems are 
expensive and time consuming. In addition to difficulties related to modeling they do 
not support an explanation facility (i.e., provide explanation on how the fault 
originated and propagated to the current situation) owing to their procedural nature. 
The types of models the analytical approaches can handle are limited to linear and 
some very specific nonlinear models. For a general nonlinear model, linear 
approximations can prove to be poor and hence the effectiveness of these methods 
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might be greatly reduced. Moreover, when a large-scale process is considered, the size 
of the bank of filters can be very large increasing the computational complexity. 
The main advantage of the analytical approach is the ability to incorporate 
physical understanding of the process into the process monitoring scheme. When 
detailed mathematical models are available, the analytical methods can outperform the 
data driven methods. The quantitative model-based approaches such as observers have 
been used extensively in mechanical and aeronautical engineering applications. 
However, they have very little impact in process industries. This might be due to the 
following reasons: 
i)  Chemical processes are inherently nonlinear in nature. While the theory of linear 
quantitative model-based approaches is quite mature, the design and 
implementation for nonlinear models is still an open issue. 
ii) Most of the quantitative approaches are based on input-output models and if the 
models are restricted to linear domain, the advantages of a model-based approach 
over a simple statistical approach such as PCA might be minimal. Hence, it is 
easier to implement a PCA-based detection approach than a model-based approach. 
iii) Model-based approaches have been predominantly restricted to sensor and actuator 
failures. 
Causal models are also a very good alternative when the quantitative models 
are not available but the functional dependencies are understood. One of the 
advantages of qualitative methods based on deep knowledge is that they can provide 
an explanation of the path of propagation of a fault. This is indispensable when it 
comes to decision-support for operators. However, the major disadvantage is the 
generation of spurious solutions. These methods suffer from the resolution problems 
resulting from the ambiguity in qualitative reasoning. When quantitative information is 
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available partially, one could use the order-of-magnitude analysis or interval-calculus 
to improve the resolution of purely qualitative methods. However, the impact of 
qualitative model-based approaches in terms of applications has been minimal. Many 
of the academic demonstrations of these models have been on very simplistic systems 
and implementing them for industrial systems is hindered with problems related to 
computational complexity and generation of spurious solutions. 
From industrial application viewpoint, the maximum number of fault 
diagnostic applications in process industries are based on process history based 
approaches. This is due to the fact that process history based approaches are easy to 
implement, requiring very little modeling effort and a priori knowledge. Among the 
process history based approaches, statistical approach such as PCA have been well 
studied and applied. The reason for this might be that with the current state-of-art in 
applications, detection seems to be a bigger concern than detailed diagnosis. Hence, 
statistical approaches that are easy to develop and which perform very well on fast 
detection of abnormal situations have been successful in industrial applications. There 
are some limitations, however, to methods which are based solely on historic process 
data. It is the limitation of their generalization capability outside of the training data. 
Development procedure of process history data based methods by itself does not 
explicitly take into account the idea of multiple fault identifiability whereas with an 
observer-based approach one could explicitly include multiple fault identifiability in 
the design stage. 
Rule-based expert systems can be used where fundamental principles are 
lacking, where there is an abundance of experience but not enough detail is available 
to develop accurate quantitative models. The main advantage of expert system is the 
ease of development and transparent reasoning. However, in all the applications, the 
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limitations of an expert system approach are obvious. Knowledge-based systems 
developed from expert rules are very system specific, their representation power is 
quite limited, and they are difficult to update (Rich & Venkatasubramanian, 1987). 
From the above discussion it is quite clear that although many process fault 
detection and diagnosis approaches have been proposed, each method has its own 
advantages and weaknesses (Dash et al. 2000, Venkatasubramanian et al. 2003c). 
Table 2.2 (Venkatsubramanian et al., 2003a) gives a comparison of various FDI 
methods in terms of their desirable characteristics. A check mark indicates that the 
particular method (column) satisfies the corresponding desirable property (row) and a 
cross indicates that the property is not satisfied while a question mark indicates that the 
satisfiability of the desired property is case dependent. Consider PCA as an example, 
PCA performs multivariate analysis by projecting high dimensional data onto a lower 
dimensional subspace that explains the most pertinent features, as measured by the 
variance in the data. PCA based FDI methods can quickly detect the faults based on 
violation of limit derived from Hotteling‘s T2 and/or Q statistics. These also provide 
means for fault identification and novel fault detection. PCA based approaches are also 
robust to noise present in the data. Due to procedural nature of PCA model 
development, they lack explanation facility and adaptability properties. Since PCA 
models are developed solely from process history data, the modeling requirements are 
minimal and it is quite easy to develop a PCA model from historic data. Further, once 
a PCA model is obtained, the on-line computations are simple Hotteling‘s T2, and Q 
statistics evaluations and hence the on-line computational complexity is minimal. The 
PCA model development procedure by itself does not explicitly take into account the 
idea of multiple fault identifiability. This can be contrasted with an observer-based 
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approach where one could explicitly include multiple fault indentifiability in the 
design stage. 





QTA PCA ANN 
Quick detection & 
diagnosis 
      
Isolability       
Robustness       
Novelty identifiability       
Adaptability       
Explanation facility       
Modelling requirement       
Storage & computation       
Multiple fault identifiably       
2.6 Hybrid methods 
It is quite clear from Table 2.2 that none of these FDI methods have all the 
desirable characteristics. Each method has its own advantages and weaknesses. Thus, a 
FDI method that works well under one circumstance might not work well under 
another when different features of the underlying process come to the fore. It is clearly 
difficult to design a perfect FDI method that efficiently monitors a large-scale, 
complex industrial process in all likely scenarios. Hence, there is a strong motivation 
for developing systems that rely on collaboration between multiple FDI methods so as 
to bring together their strengths and overcome their individual shortcomings. Some of 
these methods can complement one another resulting in better diagnostic systems. 
Integrating these complementary features is one way to develop hybrid methods that 
could overcome the limitations of individual solution strategies. Hence, hybrid 
approaches where different methods work in conjunction to solve parts of the problem 
are attractive.  
As an example, fault explanation through a causal chain is best done through 
the use of digraphs, whereas, fault isolation might be very difficult using digraphs due 
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to the qualitative ambiguity and analytical model-based methods might be superior. 
Hence, hybrid methods might provide a general, powerful problem-solving platform. 
There has already been some work on hybrid architectures. The two-tier approach by 
Venkatasubramanian and Rich (1988) using compiled and model-based knowledge is 
one of the earliest examples of a hybrid approach. The strength of expert systems is 
their ability to mimic human reasoning on solving fault diagnosis problems and the 
weakness is the knowledge acquisition bottleneck. On the other hand, the strength of 
neural networks is their ability to recognize patterns based on training examples and 
weakness is their lack of ability to explain the results. Hence, a hybrid method which 
combines an artificial neural network and an expert system could provide better 
performance than using either of the individual components. For example, a combined 
neural network and expert system tool was developed and its effectiveness was 
demonstrated for transformer fault diagnosis (Wang et al, 1998, 2000).  
2.7 Multiple Classifiers based approaches  
In the last two decades Multiple Classifiers Systems (MCS) have been 
extensively used in the pattern recognition and classification literature for solving 
complex and difficult classifications problems. The strategy in such multiple classifier 
systems is to create many classifiers, and combine their decisions such that the 
combination improves upon the performance of a single classifier. A judicious and 
meaningful combination of multiple classifiers generally outperforms a single one (Xu 
et al. 1992, Ho et al. 1994, Kittler et al. 1998, Polikar 2006). A similar philosophy can 
also be gainfully exploited in the field of fault detection and identification as well 
where the multiple FDI approaches can be combined in order to achieve improved 
diagnostic performance.  
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Distributed monitoring and diagnosis have received a lot of interest in recent 
years for monitoring optical networks (Stanic and Subramaniam, 2008; Stanic et al., 
2010), computer networks (Khanna et al., 2007), sensor networks (Hsin and Liu, 2002), 
pipeline systems (Jin and Eydaghi, 2008) etc. particularly in situations where single, 
centralized, monolithic monitoring strategies are not suitable. In distributed monitoring, 
instead of relying on a single FDI method, multiple methods are deployed to supervise 
the system. Therefore, the monitoring responsibility is shared among various FDI 
methods and no single method is solely responsible for monitoring the entire system. A 
concise literature review on (MCS) is provided next. 
2.7.1 Multiple classifier systems 
Multiple classifier based systems, also known as committee of classifiers, 
mixture of experts, or ensemble based systems have been shown to outperform single-
classifier systems in a broad range of applications and under a variety of scenarios 
(Polikar, 2006). A system consisting of multiple classifiers can be obtained either by 
using classifiers of same type (multiple homogeneous classifiers) or by using 
completely different types of classifiers (multiple heterogeneous classifiers). In a 
multiple classifier system, the homogeneous or heterogeneous classifiers can be 
organized either in a flat or hierarchical architecture. A multiple classifier based 
systems can be achieved where each of the classifiers, either homogeneous or 
heterogeneous, solve the same original classification problem. Such a MCS based 
scheme can be called flat since the scope of all the classifiers (homogenous or 
heterogeneous) are the same, i.e., the same multi-class pattern recognition problem. 
For a fault detection and identification problem involving M-classes, where a class 
could be normal or any known fault class, each FDI method in a flat distributed 
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monitoring system assigns an input sample (x) to one of the M known classes. i.e., 
    ik CxE       i=1,2,3,..,M;   k=1,2,3,..K    (2.4) 
where,  xEk  is the class assigned by the k
th
 FDI method.  
On the other hand, a complex classification problem can be decomposed into 
multiple simple classification problems based on class hierarchy of the objects to be 
classified. Then multiple classifiers, either homogeneous or heterogeneous, can ne 
deployed across the class hierarchy to solve each of these simple classification 
problems. Such MCS based schemes are called hierarchical classifier since these 
classifiers are organised in hierarchical manner based on class hierarchy. In the 
hierarchical classifier approach, the set   consisting of all M classes is first 
partitioned into disjoint subsets often referred to as ‗meta-class‘. The meta-classes are 
further partitioned recursively until each meta-class is reduced to one of the M original 
classes. The resulting hierarchical tree has M-leaf nodes, one for each class. The most 
appropriate classifier that best discriminates the resulting meta-classes is necessary. 
For this, a classifier is associated with each non-leaf (root and inner) node in the 
taxonomic hierarchy which assigns an input sample (x) into one of its child nodes jC . 
i.e.,    
   ijjC CCwhereCxE i   (2.5) 
In the above equation,  xE
iC
denotes the class assigned by the classifier associated 
with node iC . The classifiers deployed at the various levels of hierarchy can be either 
homogeneous or heterogeneous in nature. These classifier systems are called 
hierarchical or tree-structured and follow the same hierarchy as the classes. 
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2.7.1.1 Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Classifiers organized in flat architecture 
The main rationale for combination of multiple flat classifiers is that the 
classifiers (homogeneous or heterogeneous) can often compliment one another and 
hence classification performance can be improved as a result of combination. The 
intuition is that if each classifier makes different errors, then a suitable combination of 
these classifiers can reduce the total error. This implies that we need classifiers whose 
decision boundaries are adequately different from one another so that there is low 
correlation among them. Such a set of flat classifiers is said to be diverse. 
Generating diverse classifiers 
Classifier diversity can be achieved in several ways. One way is to use different 
training datasets to train multiple classifiers of the same type. i.e., multiple 
homogeneous classifiers are developed using various subsets of the training data. This 
approach is best suited for unstable classifiers such as neural networks and decision 
trees in which a small change in the training dataset can lead to significant changes in 
the classifier performance. Multiple training datasets are often obtained through 
resampling techniques, such as Boosting or Bagging where training data subsets are 
generated by drawing randomly, usually with replacement (Polikar, 2006). Another 
approach to achieve diversity is to use different training parameters for different 
classifiers of same type (homogeneous classifiers). For example, a series of multilayer 
perceptron (MLP) neural networks can be trained by using different weight 
initializations, number of layers/nodes, error goals, etc. Adjusting such parameters 
allows one to control the instability of the individual classifiers, and hence contribute 
to their diversity. Diversity among the classifiers can also be achieved by training the 
individual homogeneous classifiers using different features or different subsets of the 
available features (Ho, 1998). Alternatively, heterogeneous classifiers such as 
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multilayer perceptron (MLP) neural networks, linear discriminant analysis, k-nearest 
neighbor classifiers, and support vector machines can be used for providing diversity. 
The heterogeneous classifiers use different training methods or algorithm and are 
expected to have decision boundaries significantly different from one another. 
2.7.1.2 Measures of diversity 
Several measures have been defined for quantitative assessment of inter-
classifier diversity such as measurement of degree of inter-classifier correlation, Q-
statistic, compound diversity or generalized diversity (Kuncheva and Whitaker, 2001; 
Roli et al., 2001). The Kappa statistic, pK , is widely used as a measurement to 
quantify inter-classifier agreement (Cohen, 1960). The Kappa statistic is a pair-wise 
measure defined between two classifiers and is based on the calculation of the 
difference between the observed agreement and the agreements expected by chance. 











  (2.6) 
where op is the observed proportion of agreement between the two classifiers, and 
cp is the proportion of agreement expected by chance. The standard error for an 











   (1.7) 
where, S is the total number of samples. The value of pK  is bounded in [-1, 1] (Haley 
and Osberg, 1989; Ben-David, 2008). Different values of Kappa correspond to 
different potency of agreements. A commonly used benchmark for interpretation of 
Kappa statistic is shown in Table 2.3 (Landis and Koch, 1977), where 1pK  
represents the case of perfect agreement for all cases, while 0pK  signifies 
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agreement by chance. 0pK  indicates agreement less than chance, possibly a 
systematic disagreement between the two classifiers (Viera and Garrett, 2005).  In 
Chapter 7 of this thesis, the Kappa statistic is used since its quantitative value can also 
be readily interpreted in qualitative terms. 
Table 2.3: Interpretation of Kappa value (Landis and Koch, 1977) 
Kappa Value Interpretation 
<0.00 Less than chance agreement 
0.00-0.20 Slight agreement 
0.21-0.40 Fair agreement 
0.41-0.60 Moderate agreement 
0.61-0.80 Substantial agreement 
0.81-1.00 Almost perfect agreement 
 
2.7.1.3 Hierarchical classifiers 
A hierarchy is an arrangement of items (objects, categories, etc.) in which the items are 
represented as being ‗above‘, ‗below‘, or ‗at the same level as‘ one another. Almost 
every real-world system is arranged hierarchically (Kulish, 2002).  
Hierarchies can be broadly classified into two main types: Subsumptive and 
Compositional. In a subsumptive hierarchy (also known as ‗taxonomic‘ or ‗IS-A‘ 
hierarchy) a lower-level object ‗is a‘ type of the higher class. For example, in the 
Linnaean hierarchy, animals are sub-classified as: Animals  Mammals  Primates 
Homo H.sapiens. That is, a human ‗is a‘ primate, a primate ‗is a‘ mammal, and a 
mammal ‗is a‘ animal. In hierarchical classification schemes, the top-down approach is 
most widely used for generating the subsumptive or taxonomic hierarchy. Various 
learning methods such as Naïve Bayes (Kumar et al., 2002), SVM (Schwenker, 2001), 
ANN (Simon et al., 2002) have been successfully adopted for hierarchical 
classification.  
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Although both homogenous and heterogeneous classifiers can be deployed at 
the various levels of hierarchy in a hierarchical or tree structured classifiers system, 
typically only same type of classifiers (homogeneous) are used most widely in pattern 
recognition literature. Eslamloueyan (2011) proposed hierarchical neural networks 
organized into two levels for isolating the faults in a complex chemical process. They 
used a top-down approach for decomposing the fault patterns into a taxonomic 
hierarchy. In the first step, the fault patterns space was divided into sub-spaces using 
fuzzy C-means clustering. For each sub-space, a special neural network was trained to 
diagnose the faults of that sub-space. A supervisor network was also developed to 
decide which one of the diagnostic neural networks should be triggered. The 
subsumptive hierarchy can also be built via a bottom-up approach (Kumar, 2000). It is 
similar to an agglomerative clustering, in which the closest clusters in the current set 
are merged at each stage until all data points are merged. 
A compositional hierarchy on the other hand is an ordering of the parts that 
make up a system. In other words, the system is ‗composed‘ of these parts (Prasad et 
al., 1998). The compositional hierarchy of a human body can be represented as: 
Human body Organs  Tissues  Cells Molecules  Atoms. Chemical processes 
are commonly decomposed as a compositional hierarchy into sections and subsections 
and further into equipments, instruments based on the process flow diagram and 
knowledge of operating objectives and procedures (Srinivasan et al., 2005c; Prasad et 
al., 1998). For example, a chemical plant ‗is composed of‘ catalytic cracking, crude 
distillation, and vacuum distillation units.  
Faults as well as identification methods can be organized following the 
compositional hierarchy of the process. Hierarchical neural network classifiers have 
been proposed (Bercraft et al., 1992; Othman et al., 2002; Rusinov et al., 2007) 
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consisting of a top-level neural network that examines the overall process and 
identifies the section in which the fault originates. Each of the lower level neural 
networks is trained to classify the faults in that particular section. Such a strategy 
narrows the diagnostic focus and isolates faults. One advantage of this strategy is the 
system‘s ability to degrade gracefully in novel fault situations. When the system is 
unable to diagnose the actual cause of the fault, rather than giving a diagnosis of 
‗unknown‘, or a misclassification, it would narrow the focus to a particular plant 
section, or unit operation and thus help the operators to complete the diagnosis and 
take appropriate corrective actions. 
Given a system with a large number of input features and many classes, a 
hierarchical approach to partitioning classes has an extra benefit because the number of 
features required to realize a specific classification may be much lower than that 
required to classify the entire dataset into M classes simultaneously. Hierarchical 
classifiers deploy a divide-and-conquer-strategy and have been shown to provide 
higher classification accuracies compared to conventional single classifier or multiple 
flat classifiers (Kumar et al., 2002; Schwenker, 2001; Simon et al., 2002; Chen et al., 
2004; Cheong et al., 2004; Autio, 2006; Srinivasan et al., 2005b). 
As discussed before in section 2.7.1.1, the diversity in an ensemble system 
consisting of multiple homogeneous classifiers can be achieved by varying the 
parameters, wherein the key parameters of each classifier in the ensemble are different 
from the others. In this thesis, immune system inspired negative selection algorithm 
(NSA) is used to generate multiple homogeneous detectors with varying parameter. 
Each hyper-spherical shaped detector generated through NSA is represented by two 
parameters – centre and radius. These two parameters of each detector are different 
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from the others. In the next section, NSA, one popular immune inspired principle in 
AIS is reviewed.  
2.7.2 Artificial Immune System  
The immune system, particularly those of vertebrates is a complex system 
comprising of interacting cells, organs, and mechanisms, whose purpose is to protect 
the host body against danger. It possesses the ability to detect foreign substances 
(pathogens such as virus and bacteria) that enter the body and to respond to them. The 
immune system is primarily faced with the problem of recognizing pathogens. The 
pathogens themselves cannot be directly recognized by the components of the immune 
system; rather, some portions of the pathogen, called antigens are recognized. Like 
pathogens, cells and molecules of the organism also possess antigens; these self-
antigens need to be differentiated from non-self ones. Lymphocytes are white blood 
cells specialized in recognition of pathogens. They are of two main types – B-cells and 
T-cells. These cells possess receptors on their surfaces for recognizing antigenic 
patterns. Pattern recognition occurs at the molecular level wherein the shape of the 
receptors has to match the shape of the antigen. The binding of the receptor with the 
antigen triggers an immune response by producing antibodies that attack the pathogen. 
Each type of antibody is unique and defends the body against one specific type of 
antigen. Ultimately, it removes the infection from the body. From an information-
processing perspective, the natural immune system is a parallel and distributed 
adaptive system. It learns to recognize relevant patterns, remember patterns that have 
been seen previously, and construct pattern detectors efficiently for solving recognition 
and classification tasks.  
There is a striking similarity between the natural immune system (NIS) in 
vertebrates and fault detection and identification system in engineered systems such as 
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chemical plants. The former protects the organism from threat of various pathogens 
such as bacteria, viruses while the latter helps safeguard against disturbances and 
failures. Both seek to maintain system stability in a constantly changing environment. 
Drawing from this similarity, artificial immune system (AIS) is a new artificial 
intelligence methodology that is increasingly attracting much attention for monitoring 
engineered systems. Like other biologically-inspired techniques such as artificial 
neural networks and genetic algorithms, artificial immune system (AIS) has emerged 
as a framework where principles and processes of the natural immune system are 
abstracted and applied in a variety of applications in science and engineering.  In 
artificial immune systems, some of the characteristics of NIS are exploited in order to 
design computational systems capable of detecting novel patterns or the anomalous 
behaviour.  
A comprehensive discussion on various AIS based algorithms along with their 
applications in diverse fields can be found in Dasgupta (2006), Ji et al. (2003), and de 
Castro and Timmis (2002). Freitas and Timmis (2007) provide an extensive review of 
the current literature on AIS for data mining, focusing on classification and anomaly 
detection. Two immunological principles are widely used in AIS – clonal selection (de 
Castro et al., 2000; White and Garrett, 2003; de Castro and von Zuben, 2002) and 
negative selection. In the latter, algorithms have been inspired by the natural immune 
system‘s ability to distinguish between the body‘s own cells (self cells) and foreign 
cells (non-self cells), as discussed next. 
2.7.2.1 Negative Selection Algorithm 
The immune system uses a negative selection mechanism to train T-cells to 
recognize antigens (non-self) and to prevent them from recognizing the body‘s own 
cells (self). Both T-cells and B-cells are produced in the bone marrow; however T-cells 
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pass a negative selection procedure thereafter and only those that do not match the self 
proteins of the body are released while the remaining ones are destroyed. Such 
censoring of the T-cells can prevent the immune system from attacking the body‘s own 
proteins. This negative selection mechanism is also suited for monitoring any system 
against anomaly or abnormal behaviour.  
The basic mechanism of a Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) is to generate a 
collection of detectors, called a detector set, in the complementary (non-self) space that 
can classify new samples as self or non-self. In a NSA, normal samples are considered 
as self. Traditional statistical and pattern recognition algorithms store descriptions 
(models) of the normal samples. The interesting aspect of NSAs is that they store a 
description of the non-self space, i.e., patterns that are unknown to the system. The 
NSA proposed by Forrest et al. (1994) is shown schematically in Fig. 2.4. In the first 
phase, a set of detectors are generated through the following steps: 
1. Randomly generate detectors and put them in a set C. 
2. Determine the affinity (i.e., distance) of all detectors in C with all samples of 
the self set S. 
3. If the affinity of a detector in C with at least one sample of S is greater than or 
equal to a given affinity threshold  then the detector recognizes (matches) the 
self-sample and has to be eliminated (negatively selected); else, the detector 
belongs to the non-self set and is introduced into the detector set D. 
In the second phase, the system is monitored by comparing new samples with the 
detectors in D. If a new sample activates a detector (affinity   , the sample is 
deemed to be abnormal.  
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Figure 2.4: Negative Selective Algorithm (Forrest et al., 1994) 
 
The essential characteristic of the NSA is that the target concept ―learned‖ by the 
algorithm is a single class, the complement of the self set. So it is particularly 
applicable to classification problems where large amount of self samples are available 
but non-self samples are either unavailable or very rare. It is not appropriate in 
situations where the number of self samples is small and sparse. Since it was first 
conceived, the NSA has been used extensively for anomaly detection (Dasgupta, 1996; 
hang and Dai, 2005; Sing, 2002), intrusion detection (Kim and Bentley, 2001; 
Hofmeyr and Forrest, 2000; Dasgupta and Gonzalez, 2002) novelty detection 
(Dasgupta and Forrest, 1996; Dong et al., 2006), pattern recognition (Lee and Sim, 
2004; Markowaska and Kordas, 2008), adaptive control (Krishnakumar and 
Neidhoefer, 1999) and fault detection in electrical (Branco et al., 2003), aeronautical 
(Dasgupta et al., 2004), and mechanical (Tailor and Crone, 2003; Gao et al., 2008a) 
systems. Capturing the normal region, also called positive selection has also been 
studied in literature (Stibor et al., 2005a,b; Stibor and Timmis, 2007; Dasgupta and 
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Nino, 2000). Comparative studies in literature report that both negative and positive 
selections are by and large equivalent.  
The performance of a NSA depends heavily on the number of detectors. The 
efficiency of detector generation and accuracy of detection is affected by non-self 
space coverage or detector coverage, defined as the fraction of non-self space covered 
by the generated detectors. Poor detector coverage will lead to lower detection rate and 
higher false negatives. On the other hand, if the generated detectors occupy some 
portion of the self-space, the number of false alarm would increase. The detector 
generation process should be efficient to completely cover the entire non-self space by 
the generated detectors without covering any portion of the self-space. This implicitly 
depends on the underlying representation scheme. 
Selecting a suitable representation scheme is a critical element while applying 
NSAs. Binary representation was originally used for both the data and the detectors 
(Forrest et al., 1994). In these cases, r-contiguous bits, Hamming distance, and other 
matching rules were used to calculate the affinity of a sample with a detector. While 
binary representation is the simplest, it is often incapable of capturing the semantics of 
complex spaces. Further a large number of detectors are needed to guarantee better 
coverage. These limitations motivated real-valued representations. A Real-valued 
negative selection algorithm (RNSA) that used real-valued representation to 
characterize the self / non-self space has been proposed (Gonzalez et al., 2002). Each 
self sample was represented as a J-dimensional vector with self-radius rs. The concept 
of self-radius allows other points not in the self-set to be considered as self to enable 
generalization beyond the training samples. Using the self-samples, the RNSA 
generated a set of fixed-sized detectors that cover the non-self space. The detectors 
where trained by an iterative process where in the detector positions are updated based 
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on two goals: (i) move the detectors away from self points, and (ii) keep the detectors 
separated in order to maximize the non-self space coverage. Various modifications to 
RNSA have been proposed (Gonzalez et al., 2003; Gonzalez and Dasguta, 2003; 
Amaral et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2008b,c).  
Some limitations of RNSA are (i) the issues of holes wherein the portions of non-
self space remain uncovered by the generated detectors (Ji and Dasgupta, 2005), (ii) 
Curse of dimensionality since the search space (and hence the number of detectors 
necessary) grows exponentially with the number of dimensions (Stibor et al., 2005b; Ji 
and Dasgupta, 2006), and (iii) reliable estimation of non-self space coverage (Ji and 
Dasgupta, 2005). In order to efficiently achieve maximum coverage of non-self space 
with a limited number of detectors, Ji and Dasgupta (2009) proposed variable-sized 
detectors or V-detectors in RNSA. 
V-detector 
The basic idea of the V-detector algorithm is to generate a set of variable sized 
detectors from the set of self samples (S).  A V-detector d = (cd, rd) is a hyper-sphere 
with center dc  and a detection radius dr as shown in Fig. 2.5. If a sample falls 
within a detector, it is classified as non-self.  
 
Figure 2.5: Two self points with self radius rs and centers at cs and sc (hollow circles) 








Consider each self sample in the training dataset S  also as a hyper-sphere 
 ss rcs ,  with center sc  and a self-radius sr  pre-specified by the user. Both the 
self sample and the center of the detector are assumed to be contained in some 
bounded real space such as the J-dimensional unitary hypercube  [0, 1]J. The V-
detector algorithm in Fig. 2.6 then generates a detector set D through the following 
steps: 
1) Randomly choose a point a within  [0, 1]J. 
2) Check whether a matches any self sample (cs). If a match is found, a is discarded 
and we go back to (1). Repeat until a non-self point is found. This point is 
considered as a candidate point c . 
 c a  , if s







minarg  (2.20) 
where, a
nsp
 is the nearest point to a in the self dataset S and is the Euclidean 
distance. 
3) Check whether c  is covered by any of the detectors already generated.  
 Ddrcc dd   (2.21) 
If so, repeat from (1) until an uncovered candidate point is found.  
4) A new detector d   with centre at the candidate point c and a detection radius r  
so that it does not conflict with any self samples is then added to the detector set D. 
 nspccr    
  ,d c r    
  D D d  (2.22) 
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5) Detector coverage is then estimated by sampling n random points from the non-self 
space and finding out the number of points nx that are covered by D. The Z score 












where, p is the target non-self space coverage. If Z Z , the Z score of standard 
normal distribution at significance level of α, and the non-self space coverage is 
claimed to be adequate; else, Steps (1) to (4) are repeated until the target coverage, p is 
achieved or the maximum number of detectors  maxT  is reached i.e., maxTD  . 
The hypothesis testing in Step 5 above relies on the central limit theorem, 
hence the approximation of normal distribution is valid only when the sample size n is 




















Figure 2.6: V-detector generation algorithm (Ji and Dasgupta, 2009) 
An example of V-detectors in 2-dimensional space is shown in Fig. 2.7. Fig. 
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through the V-detector algorithm with 99.9% coverage are shown in Fig. 2.7b. It is 
quite evident from this figure that almost entire non-self (complementary) space can be 
efficiently covered by 5000 generated V-detectors.  The effectiveness of the V-detector 
algorithm for anomaly detection has been illustrated with various synthetic (Ji and 
Dasgupta, 2009) as well as real data sets, such as-Fisher‘s Iris data set, biomedical test 
data set, ball bearing data (Ji and Dasgupta, 2005; Ji and Dasgupta, 2004a,b), KDD 
cup data set (Ji and Dasgupta, 2006), dental image data (Ji et al., 2006). Despite the 
obvious promise of AIS and specifically V-detector algorithm, their potential in 
process monitoring and fault diagnosis remains largely unexplored. There remains 
little work in literature (with the notable exception of Wang and Zhao, 2008) regarding 
the application of the NSA for fault detection and identification in chemical processes 












Figure 2.7: (a) Self samples (black dots) in 2-dimensional space; (b) Training data 
(black dots) and generated V-detectors (grey) with 99.9% coverage 
 
The second key component in multiple classifier systems (both flat and 
hierarchical) is to combine the decisions of individual classifiers in such a way that the 
correct decisions are amplified and incorrect ones cancelled out. A suitable decision-
fusion scheme is therefore necessary which combines the results from various FDI 
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methods and resolves any conflicts among them. Several decision fusion strategies are 
available for this purpose as discussed next. 
2.7.3 Decision fusion strategies 
Approaches for decision fusion can be broadly classified as utility-based and 
evidence-based methods. Utility-based methods provide the simplest way to fuse 
decisions. These methods do not utilize any prior knowledge or evidence from 
previous predictions, but are based on some aggregating techniques which evaluate the 
combined utility functions generated from each classifier. Methods based on utility 
techniques include simple average, voting techniques, and their variants. In contrast to 
utility-based techniques, evidence-based approaches use a priori information from 
previous performance of each classifier to combine the decisions. Two main 
approaches that form the backbone of many evidence-based approaches in the pattern 
recognition literature are the Bayesian and the Dempster-Shafer methods. 
The closed-world assumption (Smets, 2007) is considered quite often in evidence-
based decision fusion strategies (Niu et al., 2008, Parikh et al., 2001, 2003). In closed-
world assumption all the known M classes  MCCC ,...,, 21 are regarded as being a 
complete description of the world. Hence, the existence of some unknown class, 1MC  
which is not in M known classes is not considered. Throughout this thesis, the closed-
world assumption is considered to combine the results of individual classifiers through 
evidence-based fusion strategies. 
2.7.3.1 Voting based fusion 
Voting has been a popular form of utility-based decision fusion. In voting-
based fusion, the class assigned by a classifier is considered as a vote for that class. 
There are three major versions of voting, where the winner is the class (i) on which all 
classifiers agree (unanimous voting); (ii) predicted by at least one more than half the 
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number of classifiers (simple majority); or (iii) that receives the highest number of 
votes, whether or not the sum of those votes exceeds 50% (plurality voting or just 
majority voting). The most popular one is the majority vote in which the class voted by 
most of classifiers will be regarded as winner and the input assigned to that class. 
Applications of majority voting techniques to combine classifiers can be found in 
Lam and Suen (1997), Rahman and Fairhurst (2000), and Lin et al. (2003). A 
comprehensive review of majority voting and its variants for combining multiple 
classifiers in character recognition has been presented in Rahman et al. (2002) and 
Kuncheva (2005). Although quite simple, there are certain drawbacks associated with 
the voting based method. Voting methods treat all the classifiers equally without any 
consideration of the classifier‘s characteristics or performance. But under certain 
circumstances one classifier may outperform others and should be given more weight. 
In this work, weighted voting, Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer based fusion strategies 
are employed in order to overcome this difficulty. All these fusion methods use 
previous performance of each classifier to combine their outputs.  
2.7.3.2 Weighted voting based fusion 
In weighted voting, usually, a weight is assigned for each classifier, or 
sometimes the classifier-predicted class combination based on the performance on the 
training dataset or even a separate validation dataset. In weighted voting method, 
usually a weight is assigned to each classifier, for instance proportional to its 
classification accuracy on a training dataset. The class-specific performance of a 
classifier can be captured in a confusion matrix that is usually constructed by testing 
the classifier performance on separate validation datasets or on training datasets (Xu et 
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The rows in this confusion matrix stand for the actual classes: C1, C2,…, CM, 
while the columns indicate the classes assigned by the k
th
 classifier. An element kijN , in 
the confusion matrix, represents the input samples from class iC  that are assigned to 
class jC by classifier k. 
A detailed discussion of weighted voting can be found in Littlestone and 
Warmuth (1994). Benediktsson and Kanellopoulos (1999) used a weighting based 
approach to combine the classification results from multiple neural network and 
statistical models. The weights of the individual classifier reflected the reliability of 
the sources and were optimized in order to improve the combined classification 
accuracy during training. Tsoumakas et al. (2005) combined weighted voting with the 
classifier selection step so that only results from a subset of the classifiers were used 
for fusion. Such selective fusion was shown to be a generalization of weighted voting. 
2.7.3.3 Bayesian probability theory based fusion 
Bayesian technique is a popular evidence-based method for decision fusion and 
conflict resolution among multiple classifiers. It estimates the posteriori probability of 
a class from the a priori knowledge of class-specific performance of each individual 
classifier. The Bayes rule is used to calculate the posteriori probability. The final 
predictions are then made based on the estimated value of posteriori probability.  
Bayesian decision fusion strategy has been successfully applied in diverse fields 
ranging from pattern recognition (handwritten digit/ character recognition, image 
recognition), to medical diagnosis and machine fault diagnosis (fault diagnosis in 
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transformer, induction motor). Zheng et al. (2005) used Bayesian-based fusion to 
integrate results from different image processing approaches for diagnosing diseases. 
Foggia et al. (1999) studied the best tradeoff between error-rate of Bayesian 
combination and rejection of sample (i.e., not assigning it a class) and proposed a 
threshold-based rejection criterion. McArthur et al. (2004) combined k-means 
clustering, back-propagation neural-network, and user written rules based on Bayesian 
approach to diagnose faults in a power transformer. For fault diagnosis of an induction 
motor Niu et al. (2008) used a Bayesian decision fusion scheme to combine the results 
of classifiers based on support vector machines, linear discriminant analysis , k-
Nearest neighbors, and adaptive resonance theory—Kohonen neural network. 
2.7.3.4 Dempster-Shafer Evidence theory based fusion 
The Dempster-Shafer (D-S) evidence or belief theory is a mathematical theory 
of evidence based on belief functions and plausible reasoning (Dempster, 1968; Shafer, 
1976). It is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory and provides more 
flexibility in dealing with uncertainty and ignorance. The basic concepts of D-S 
evidence theory are briefly described next. 
Consider a simple classification problem where the results (class) can be C1, C2 
or C3. The set  321 ,, CCC  is called the frame of discernment. The possible 
assignments by a classifier for a sample could be the power set 2  , i.e., the set 
containing all the subsets of  including itself and the null set  . Thus for this 
example              ,,,,,,,,,,2 323121321 CCCCCCCCC . For any sample, if a 
classifier is always able to identify a class, its results can be considered to be atomic 
and will be member of the set       321 ,, CCC . In this situation, there is no imprecision 
in the class assignment. On the contrary, if there are samples for which the classifier is 
unable to assign a specific class but can only rule out some classes to which that 
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sample does not belong, then the response from the classifier can be considered to be a 
set with multiple classes as members, for example 21,CC . Such compound results can 
be considered as imprecise. Bayesian technique allows probability to be assigned only 
to atomic hypothesis while D-S theory allows compound hypotheses as well. 
In D-S theory, there are three principal functions: 
1. Basic probability assignment (BPA) function or mass function, m 
2. Belief function, Bel and 
3. Plausibility function, Pl 
The BPA is a critical element of D-S theory and does not refer to probability in 
the classical sense. For any subset A of 2 , the BPA, represented as m(A), defines a 


















  (2.9) 
The mass of the empty set  m  as defined above is zero, i.e., no evidence is 
assigned to the impossible event. The fact that no mass can be assigned to the empty 
set  expresses the closed world assumption in which the frame of discernment  is 
regarded as being a complete description of the world. Hence evidence pointing to 
some hypothesis not in  is not allowed. The masses of the remaining elements of the 
power set 2 , the total evidence of a source sum up to one. The subsets A with m(A) > 
0 are called focal elements of m. 
In D-S theory, BPAs can be assigned not only to atomic hypothesis iC  but 
also to sets A  of atomic hypotheses. The basic probability assignment m(A) 
specifies the degree of belief that is assigned exactly to the set A . It makes no 
additional assertion about any subset of A. In particular, in contrast to Bayesian 
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probability theory, D-S does not require the basic probability assignment of each 
element of the frame of discernment  to be specified explicitly. If A is a non-atomic 
hypothesis, m(A) reflects ignorance or partial knowledge as it is not possible to further 
subdivide the belief in A among its subsets. The mass m(A) specifies the belief 
supporting A. It could support any subset of A given further information, but the 
available information justifies only the support of A. 
Belief (Bel) and plausibility (Pl) functions are derived from BPA, and are 
defined as follows: 
The total belief level committed to A,  102: Bel  is defined as the sum of BPAs of 
all the subsets (B) of A, i.e. B A  
 






So in the simple 3-class example above: 
            2,12121, CCmCmCmCCBel    (2.11) 
The difference between m(A) and Bel(A) is that m(A) measures the assignment 
of belief only to A, while Bel(A) measures the total assignment of belief to A and all its 
subsets.  
The plausibility function is defined as the sum of all the BPAs of B that 
intersect A., i.e.  AB  
 






Therefore, in the above example, 
                     32132312,12121 ,,,,, CCCmCCmCCmCCmCmCmCCPl 
 (2.13) 
The relationship between Bel and Pl is 
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where, ( A  ) is the negation of hypothesis A. 
Both imprecision and uncertainty can thus be represented by Bel and Pl. In 
Bayesian theory, the uncertainty of an event is expressed through a single value, the 
probability that the event will occur, and it is assumed that there is no imprecision in 
the measurement. In D-S theory, the belief value of hypothesis A is interpreted as the 
minimum uncertainty value, and its plausibility value as the maximum uncertainty 
value of A. Thus D-S theory provides an explicit measure of the extent of uncertainty 
as the length of the interval [Pl(A) Bel(A)]. In the above example, although the sample 
is initially assigned to 21,CC  when further information about the sample becomes 
available, its assignment can be changed from  21,CC  to  2C . At that point, for that 
sample: 
         222 CmCPlCBel   (2.15) 
and both imprecision and uncertainty are eliminated. If BPAs are assigned only to 
simple atomic hypotheses (m(A)=0 for |A|>1), then the three functions BPA, Bel and 
Pl become equal. 
The vacuous basic probability assignment mvac is used to represent the extreme 
case of total ignorance. It is specified by   1vacm and    AAmvac ,0 . Thus 
for all subsets A  the corresponding beliefs are all zero and the corresponding 
plausibilities are all equal to one and the resulting belief intervals are [0 1] for all 
subsets A . If an event iC is known to be definitely true,   1iCm  and 
   iCAAm ,0 . If an event A  is known to be definitely false this is 
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represented by assigning a basic probability assignment m(A) corresponding to the 
belief   1ABel or plausibility   0APl . 
Multiple sources that provide different assessments for the same frame of 
discernment can be combined within the framework of D-S theory. The basic 
probability assignments km and lm  of two independent sources can be combined via 
the orthogonal sum lklk mmm , which is given by: 
 
     















   0, lkm  
where  is a measure of the conflict between the two sources and given by: 








  (2.17) 
  
The orthogonal sum lk mm   only exists if 1 and the result mk,l is then a 
combined basic probability assignment. If 1 , then the two sources are said to be 
totally contradictory. 
The operator   is commutative and associative. Thus the orthogonal sum can 
be generalized to combine evidence from multiple sources by sequentially using Eq 
(2.16). The combination of K sources is defined as: 
 












m m m m
m m m m
m m m
   
    
   
 (2.18) 
The combined basic probability assignment m1,2,...,K exists if at least two of the 
K sources are not totally contradictory.  
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Major advantages of the Dempster-Shafer evidence theory are (i) the possibility 
to discriminate between ignorance and uncertainty, i.e., a lack of knowledge caused by 
unknown objects can be distinguished from situations where several alternatives are 
almost equally likely, (ii) the ability to explicitly represent evidence at different levels 
of abstraction by assigning evidence to sets, and (iii) the possibility to combine 
information from multiple sources and to extract an indication of conflict between the 
individual sources. It allows for only representing the actual knowledge without 
enforcing more detailed propositions in case of ignorance.  
D-S theory has therefore been widely used in various fields including pattern 
recognition (Rogova, 1994; Xu et al., 1992; Polikar, 2006), machine fault detection 
and diagnosis (Basir and Yuan, 2007; Rakar et al., 1999; He et al., 2001; Yang and 
Kim, 2006), medical diagnosis (Straszecka, 2006; Jones et al., 2002), process fault 
diagnosis (Ghosh et al., 2011a,b), and geographic information systems (Malpacia et al., 
2007) for combining evidences from multiple sources. Recently, the D-S evidence 
theory has been used for fusing the results of hierarchical classifiers. Fay et al. (2006)
 
used a D-S theory based approach to combine the outputs of hierarchical neural 
network classifiers and demonstrated its superiority over the conventional decision tree 
combination method. A similar approach was adopted by Jingyuan et al. (2007) to 
combine hierarchical Support Vector Machine classifiers for fault diagnosis in analog 
circuits. Fusion of multi-level decisions utilizing an evidence theory based method is 
proposed by Mercier et al. (2005). In this method, an ensemble of classifiers is used, 
where each classifier provides decision in a hierarchical decision space, i.e. their 
decisions can either be a single class, a set of classes, or a rejection. This approach was 
used for combining the outputs from several postal address readers taking into account 
the hierarchical structure of addresses (Mercier et al., 2005). 
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There are several other decision fusion strategies including Borda count which 
takes the rankings of the class supports into consideration; behavior knowledge space 
(Huang 1993, 1995) which uses a lookup table that lists the most common correct 
classes for every possible class combinations given by the classifiers; decision 
templates (Kuncheva 2001) which compute a similarity measure between the current 
decision profile of the unknown instance and the average decision profiles of instances 
from each class. A detailed overview of various decision fusion strategies is available 
in Kuncheva (2005).  
Nomenclature 
A,B,C Any subset of 2
 
a  Random point in  J-dimensional unitary hypercube  [0, 1]J 
nspa  Nearest self set point of a in J-dimensional unitary hypercube H 
 ABel  Belief committed to hypothesis A 
 
KBel ,,2,1   Combined belief of K FDI methods 
C Set of all candidate detectors 
Cj j
th





 class of fault identified by k
th
 FDI method 
CM
k Confusion matrix for kth FDI method 
Cj j
th
 class of fault  
cd Center of detector d  JH ]1,0[  
c  Center of a candidate detector d   JH ]1,0[  
cs Center of self sample s  
 dd rcd ,  Detector with centre at cd and detection radius rd 
 ,d c r    A candidate detector with centre at c  and detection radius r  
D Set of valid detectors 
 xE
iC
 Classification results of the classifier associated with node iC  in 
the class hierarchy for sample x 
Ek(x) Classification results of k
th
 classifier for sample x 
 xE K,,2,1   Combined classification results of K FDI methods for sample x 
 Amk  BPA assigned to hypothesis A by k
th
 FDI method 




 FDI methods‘ 
results 
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Km ,,2,1   Combined BPA of K FDI method 
k
jiN ,  Element of CM
k
, = number of samples belonging to class ‘i’ that 
are classified as class ‘j’ by kth FDI method 
n Sample size used for statistical hypothesis testing 
nx Number of points covered by the generated detectors 
p Target non-self space coverage 
rd Detection radius of detector d 
rs Self-radius 
r  Detection radius of a candidate detector d 
 
S Set of self samples  
 ss rcs ,  Self sample with centre at cs and self-radius rs 
T Total number of detectors 
Tmax Maximum number of detectors to be generated 
nn
ix  Nearest neighbour point of a data vector xi in the pre-processed 
training dataset 
Z Z-score used in statistical hypothesis testing 




  Significance level for statistical hypothesis testing 
ε Affinity threshold 
  Null or empty set 
  BPA that the combination assigns to the null subset,    
 MCCC ,,, 21   Frame of discernment containing all the known M classes 
 kMkkk kCCC ,...,, 21
 
Frame of discernment of k
th
 FDI method  




Chapter 3 Overview of the thesis 
 
The core objective of this thesis is to achieve improved FDI performance by 
combing multiple FDI methods. A system consisting of multiple FDI methods can be 
obtained either by using FDI methods of the same type (homogeneous FDI methods) 
or by using completely different types of FDI methods (heterogeneous FDI methods). 
Fig. 3.1 depicts different multiple FDI method based approaches involving both 
homogeneous as well as heterogeneous methods and various decision fusion strategies 
used to combine their outputs. 
3.1 Homogeneous FDI methods 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the diversity among FDI methods has to be high in 
order to obtain maximum benefit from multiple methods based system. In the 
homogeneous case, the shape of the decision boundary of each FDI method is same. 
For example, each model in an ensemble consisting of multiple PCA models has an 
ellipsoidal decision boundary. In this case, since the shape of the decision boundary of 
each method is the same, the diversity among the methods can be obtained if the size, 
location, orientation in space, dimensionality of decision boundary of each method is 
different from those of the others. This can be achieved by three different ways as 
discussed below:  
(i) by training each method with different training dataset such as in bagging, 
boosting, stacking. 
(ii) by varying the key parameters that define the decision boundary in each 
method. For example, a multiple PCA models can be obtained where the 
parameters i.e., the axes lengths, centre, and orientation of ellipsoidal 
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decision boundary of each model are different. We call this scheme of 
generating multiple homogeneous methods as parameter based scheme. 
(iii) by using different features or different subsets of available features in 
developing each method. For example, one can have multiple PCA models 
where each of the models has an ellipsoidal decision boundary located in 
different subspaces of the feature space. We call this scheme of generating 
multiple homogeneous methods as feature based scheme. 
In this thesis, both the parameter and feature based schemes for generating 
multiple homogeneous FDI methods are explored and studied. Chapter 4 of thesis 
presents a parameter based scheme for developing multiple homogeneous detectors, 
wherein a collection of hyper-spherical shaped detectors generated through immune 
inspired negative selection algorithm (NSA) are used for fault detection and diagnosis. 
The multiple hyper-spherical shaped detectors, generated in this way, have different 
centre and radius parameters. That is, each detector has its own centre and radius that 
are different from the others. A simple AND logic is required to combine the outputs 
of such multiple hyper-spherical detectors, in which a sample is classified as fault 
(non-self) if it falls within the detection radius of any detector, otherwise it is 
classified as normal (self). The effectiveness of the proposed approach for monitoring 
and fault diagnosis of both continuous and batch processes is demonstrated through 
various case studies.  
The importance of variable (feature) selection for improving the performance 
of PCA based monitoring method is illustrated in Chapter 5. In this Chapter, it has 
been demonstrated that a reduced PCA model comprising only a selected subset of 
measured variables provides superior monitoring performance over the full model 
with all the measured variables. Usually, different subsets of variables are affected by 
62 
 
the different faults. So, a reduced PCA model comprising a particular subset of 
variables can yield excellent performance only for the fault(s) that affect the selected 
variables, but have poor performance for other faults that have no effect on the 
selected variables. Based on these insights a feature based scheme for generating 
multiple PCA is proposed in Chapter 6, wherein each PCA models uses different 
subset of variables (features). Here, each model is a specialist to detect only a certain 
fault, but cannot detect all the known faults and each has negligibly small (~0) false 
alarm rate. The outputs from such multiple monitoring models are combined through 
simple AND logic, in which a sample is classified as normal if all the models assign it 
as normal; otherwise it is classified as abnormal. An ensemble of such reduced PCA 
models is shown to provide superior monitoring performance compared to a single 
PCA model.   
3.2 Heterogeneous FDI methods 
On the other hand, each FDI method in a system with multiple heterogeneous 
methods uses different learning algorithms. Therefore, the shape of decision boundary 
of each method is expected to be significantly different from the others. For example, 
a PCA based method provides an ellipsoidal decision boundary, while a Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) has a hyper-plane decision boundary, and an artificial neural 
network gives a non-linear arbitrary shaped decision boundary. Thus, the diversity 
among various methods in an ensemble of multiple heterogeneous methods arises 
from the dissimilar shapes and sizes of various decision boundaries. These 
heterogeneous FDI methods can be organized either in a flat or in a hierarchical 
architecture. In the flat architecture, scopes of all the FDI methods are same; all of 
them work at the same level and supervise the entire process, whereas in hierarchical 
architecture, different FDI methods supervise the process at different levels of the 
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process hierarchy. Multiple heterogeneous FDI methods with both flat as well as 
hierarchical architectures are studied in this thesis. 
In Chapter 7 this thesis, the benefits of the multiple heterogeneous FDI 
methods organized in a flat architecture are evaluated. Here, the relative benefits of 
utility-based voting and evidence-based weighted voting, Bayesian, and Dempster-
Shafer decision fusion strategies are studied. The results from two case studies show 
that in situations where no single FDI method offers adequate performance, evidence-
based fusion strategies such as weighted voting, Bayesian, and Dempster-Shafer 
based fusion can provide significant improvement in performance. 
A hierarchically distributed fault detection and diagnosis scheme for chemical 
processes is proposed in Chapter 8 wherein the process is decomposed hierarchically 
into sections and subsections based on process flow diagram. Multiple hierarchical 
FDI methods at varying levels of granularity are deployed to monitor the various 
sections and subsections of the process. The FDI methods deployed at the various 
levels of process hierarchy are heterogeneous in nature. The results from such 
hierarchical FDI methods contain mutually non-exclusive fault classes and such 
results cannot be combined suitably through voting or Bayesian based fusion scheme. 
An adaptation of the Dempster-Shafer evidence theory to combine these diagnostic 
results at different levels of abstraction is proposed. The key benefits of this scheme 
as demonstrated through two case studies are improved diagnostic performance 
compared to individual FDI methods, robust localization of even novel faults, and a 




Figure 3.1: Overview of various multiple FDI method based approaches discussed in this thesis 
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Chapter 4  An Immune-system Inspired 
Approach to Process Monitoring 
and Fault Diagnosis  
4.1 Introduction 
Artificial immune system is a new artificial intelligence methodology that is 
increasingly attracting much attention for monitoring engineered systems. In an 
artificial immune system (AIS), principles and processes of the natural immune 
system are abstracted and applied in solving real world problems. One immune-
inspired principle is Negative Selection, whereby the natural immune system 
distinguishes between the body’s own (self) cells and foreign (non-self) cells. In this 
chapter, this principle is applied for process monitoring and fault diagnosis. In the 
proposed approach, samples from a given state (such as normal or known fault) are 
considered as self. The proposed approach uses these samples to develop a description 
of the non-self space in the form of a collection of hyper-spherical shaped detectors. 
This representation is in contrast to traditional statistical and pattern recognition 
algorithms that store descriptions of the space occupied by the normal samples. The 
centre and radius parameters of each hyper-spherical detector are different from those 
of the others. Multiple hyper-spherical detectors, generated is this way, are then used 
for process monitoring. The proposed FDI approach is a generic one and can be 
applied for monitoring and fault diagnosis of both continuous as well as batch 
processes and transient operations since it does not require that the underlying data 
stems originates from a specified statistical distribution. The remainder of this chapter 
is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, the immune system inspired approach to 
process monitoring and fault diagnosis is proposed. The effectiveness of the proposed 
FDI approach for fault diagnosis of both continuous and transient operations is 
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demonstrated through various case studies in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. A comparison of 
the performance with traditional PCA-based approaches is also reported. 
4.2  Negative Selection Algorithm based Process Fault Detection and 
Identification 
There remains little work in literature (with the notable exception of Wang and 
Zhao, 2008) regarding the application of the NSA for fault detection and 
identification in chemical processes in real-time. In this chapter, we study the 
effectiveness of V-detector algorithm, a new negative selection algorithm proposed by 
Ji and Dasgupta (2009), for fault detection and identification in chemical processes. 
We also propose a scheme to estimate the self-radius parameter for V-detectors from 
the training sample.  
 
The proposed FDI approach is based on generation of multiple sets of V-detectors 
where each detector-set corresponds to a known process state (normal or known fault). 
Once trained, each of these detector-sets can perform binary classification and 
determine whether a new sample belongs to its corresponding process state. These 
detector-sets are used for online fault detection and identification. Like other data-
driven methods the proposed approach involves two phases – (i) offline detector 
generation phase, and (ii) online fault detection and identification phase as described 
below. 
4.2.1 Offline detector generation phase 
In off-line detector generation phase, N+1 detector sets are generated. First, 
raw data corresponding to normal process operations (S0) are collected from the plant 
historian. The process data corresponding to various known fault conditions (S1, S2, .., 
SN) are also obtained. After preprocessing S0, the V-detector algorithm is used to 
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generate a detector set DS0 corresponding to normal operation. This detector set is 
used to monitor the process. The process data corresponding to each fault state are 
similarly preprocessed and V-detector algorithm applied to generate a separate 
detector set that would identify that fault as self. These N fault detector sets are used 
for online fault identification. The offline detector generation phase is schematically 
presented in Fig. 4.1. During this phase, data preprocessing, and estimation of self-
radius are important aspects. 
Data preprocessing is performed to map the raw plant data to a J-dimensional 
real-valued space in unitary hypercube  [0, 1]J. Usually, the raw data obtained 
from plant historian are in the form of 2-dimensional matrix, ˆ I JX  , where I 
designates the number of samples (observations) and J denotes the number of 
variables. Typically, each sensor can measure a variable only within a pre-specified 
calibration range. In other words, each sensor has a maximum and minimum value 
within which it can operate correctly. In this work, we use this calibration range of the 












,   (4.1) 
where,  jiX ,ˆ  is the element in the ith row and jth column of raw data matrix 
JIX ˆ .  jiX ,  is its normalized value that lies in a unit hypercube  [0,1]J. 
jMin  and jMax are the minimum and maximum measurable range of the j
th
 sensor.  
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Figure 4.1: Schematic of offline detector generation phase 
In the case of continuous processes, the above data preprocessing step can be 
applied directly. Data from batch processes and process transitions are temporal in 
nature. To capture the time-varying behavior within each run, the raw data may be 
present in a 3-dimensional matrix  KJLX ˆ where L is number of runs, J is number 
of variables and the K is the number of samples in each run. The 3-D matrix has to be 
unfolded for training an online process monitoring system (Nomikos and MacGregor, 
1994). We use time-wise unfolding where the 3-dimensional matrix Xˆ is converted to 
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a 2-dimensional matrix of size JLK by placing each of the vertical slices from Xˆ of 
size JI  one below another. The normalization scheme in Eq. (4.1) above is then 
applied to this unfolded 2-d matrix.  
4.2.2.1 Estimation of Self-radius (rs) 
The V-detector algorithm requires a number of parameters to be pre-specified 
by the user – p , , maxT , and sr . Among these, the sample’s self-radius sr  enables 
generalization beyond the training set and considers other points in the vicinity of the 
sample to be also considered as self elements. In Ji and Dasgupta (2009) the 
performance of V-detector algorithm was reported with some pre-specified values of 
rs. No rational for selection of suitable rs has been provided. The performance of V-
detector algorithm is sensitive to this parameter. A large self-radius usually leads to 
incomplete coverage of non-self space, resulting in low true positive rate and high 
false negative rate. On the other hand, a small self-radius would lead to high false 
positive rate and low true negative rate since the resulting detectors could occupy the 
interstices between the samples in the self space. Hence, a systematic way to estimate 
it would be useful.   
In this work, the rs is estimated directly from the training data. The Euclidean 
distance between each point in the training dataset and its nearest neighbor is 

















minarg  (4.3) 
where, nnix  is the nearest neighbour of xi 
J 1  and is the Euclidean distance. It 
is self-evident that Eq. (4.2) results in the smallest self-radius required to ensure that 
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there are no interstices between the samples and enforce a continuous self-space. For 
validation, the proposed scheme for estimating self-radius has been applied to various 
real datasets, such as benchmark Fisher’s Iris data set, biomedical test data set, 
Wisconsin breast cancer data set etc. to generate the V-detector sets. In most of these 
cases, the V-detector sets generated with the proposed self-radius estimation scheme 
show excellent classification performances in the testing phase with high overall 
recognition rate (>95%), high true positive rate (>95%) and low false positive rate 
(<10%). Therefore, the proposed scheme leads to a reliable estimate of self-radius and 
obviates trial-and-error. 
4.2.2 Online fault detection and identification phase  
In online testing phase, the detector set DS0, generated from the training data 
corresponding to normal process operation is used for process monitoring. The other 
detector sets DS1, DS2, …, DSN are used for fault diagnosis. First, the online sample 













where, jxˆ  is the raw measurement of the j
th
 sensor and jx is its normalized value. x is 
then projected on DS0. If it activates a detector, then the sample is classified as a non-
self, and the process is considered to be in an abnormal state. x  is said to activate a 
detector d = (cd, rd) in DS0 if the Euclidean distance between the centre (cd) of d and 
x is less than d’s detection radius, i.e., 
 d dx c r   (4.5) 
Fig. 4.2 illustrates this concept of activation of detectors in a 2-dimensional 
space. The light grey area represents the self region, and the dark grey circles are the 
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generated detectors covering the non-self region. When an online sample (such as the 
white sample in Fig. 4.2) falls within the detection radius of at least one detector, it is 
classified as non-self and an abnormality is flagged; samples (such as the cross signed 
one) that do not activate any detectors are classified as self (and the process is 
considered normal). Using this, the process state is monitored based on x as follows: 




d dx c r d DS
x




Abnormality is flagged if the sample activates at least one detector in DS0, otherwise 
the process is considered to be normal.  
 
Figure 4.2: Detector activation during online phase 
 
The approach used here to identify the right class of fault is the fault 
reconstruction scheme, which is practiced quite extensively in literature for fault 
diagnosis (Johnson and Wichern, 1992; Raich and Cinar, 1996; Yue and Qin, 2001). 
In the fault reconstruction based diagnosis scheme separate models are developed for 
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Sample (non-self) Hole Sample (self) 






each fault class. The model that shows an in-control status during abnormal 
operations is considered to flag the right class of fault. Upon detection of an 
abnormality, the sample is then projected on the fault detector sets (DS1, DS2,…, DSN). 
A fault is conclusively identified when a detector set (say DS1) identifies the sample 
as self while the other detector sets flag it as non-self. If the sample remains 
unidentified by all the fault detector sets, then a novel fault is considered to have 
occurred. Fig. 4.3 shows the schematic representation of online fault detection and 
identification phase.  
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Figure 4.3: Schematic representation of online fault detection and diagnosis phase 
One key difference between parametric methods (such as PCA and its 
derivatives) and non-parametric methods (including NSA) is in the shape of the 
decision boundary. The latter do not assume that the data follows any specific (e.g. 
Gaussian) distribution and derive the decision boundary directly from the data. The 
Gaussian assumption has a big impact on the shape of boundary of normal region and 
hence on monitoring performance.  To illustrate this, consider an artificial process in 
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3-dimensions. The three variables  1 2 3, , andy y y  are sampled from the following 
distributions: 
                             31 y                                (4.7) 
                           1.0,12 Ny                            (4.8) 
                           213 yyy                             (4.9) 
500 training samples are generated and both the traditional PCA as well as the 
proposed V-detector algorithm based approaches are applied on this dataset to 
determine the boundary of normal region. The elliptical boundary of the normal 
region obtained through PCA based Hotelling T
2
 statistics at 95% and 99% levels of 
confidence limits as well as the boundary between self and non-self spaces obtained 
through the V-detectors with 99.9% coverage are shown in Fig. 4.4 in the sub-space 
of the first two principal components.   It is quite clear from the figure that a large 
amount of additional portion of the non-self space is subsumed within the elliptical 
normal region of PCA which would lead to more false negatives and higher lag in 
fault detection.  
The proposed V-detector algorithm based FDI approach is a generic one and 
can be applied for monitoring and fault diagnosis in continuous as well as batch 
processes or transient operations. In the next two sections, we evaluate the 
effectiveness of the proposed approach on various case studies.  
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Figure 4.4: Projection of artificial data (blue dots) onto first two principal components. 
The red broken lines show 95% and 99% confidence bounds from PCA and 
the solid magenta line shows the self/non-self boundary of the generated V-
detectors with 99.9% coverage 
 
4.3  Application to a Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor 
The effectiveness of the proposed FDI approach for monitoring and fault 
diagnosis of continuous processes is illustrated using a Continuous Stirred Tank 
Reactor (CSTR) case study. In this reactor, cyclopentenol is produced from 
cyclopentadiene by acid-catalyzed eletrophilic hydration in aqueous solution (Klatt 
and Engel, 1998). The main reaction is given by transformation of cyclopentadiene 
(substance A) into product, cyclopentenol (B). Cyclopentadiene also reacts in parallel 
reaction to form undesired by-product dicyclopentadiene (D). Cyclopentadiol (C) is 
also formed by unwanted decomposition of the product. This van der Vausse reaction 
is represented by: 
 CBA
kk  21   
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 DA
k 32  (4.10) 
The detailed process model including the values of chemical and physical 
parameters can be found in Appendix A. In this case study, we consider a situation 
where the CSTR can be operated in two different steady states (corresponding to 
different concentrations of A in the feed). The process is monitored using 4 online 
measurements – concentration of A  AC and B  BC  in the reactor, reactor temperature 
 rT and jacket temperature  jT . The process data corresponding to the two steady-
states which represent normal process operation are obtained by simulating the 
process model. Five process faults listed in Table 4.1 are also simulated. Random 
noise is added to the measurements.  
Table 4.1: Faults in CSTR case study 
Fault ID  Description Magnitude 
S1 High feed temperature 10K step increase in feed temperature 
S2 Low feed temperature 10K step decrease in feed temperature 
S3 Low feed concentration 25% step decrease in feed concentration 
S4 High jacket inlet temperature 10K step increase in jacket inlet temperature 
S5 Low jacket inlet temperature 10K step decrease in jacket inlet temperature 
 
For comparison, classical PCA-based FDI was also applied. For this purpose, 
a PCA model of normal operations was developed for fault detection. A fault is 
flagged when the 99% confidence limits of 2T statistic and SPE value is violated. For 
fault diagnosis, a fault reconstruction scheme is used wherein separate models are 
developed for each fault class. The PCA model that shows an in-control status during 
abnormal operations is considered to flag the right class of fault. In order to reduce the 
effect of noise on the performance of both the PCA and the proposed approach, the 
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result was filtered as follows: A process abnormality is flagged only if threshold 
violations occur in at least v samples out of u consecutive ones ( uv 1 ). We use u 
= 10 in all the case studies performed in this work. 
We consider two different scenarios in this case study. In Scenario 1, we 
consider a single normal class corresponding to both the steady-states of the process 
while in Scenario 2, the training data from the two states are treated distinctly and 
multi-state models are used for monitoring. 
Scenario 1 







are combined together to form a single normal class data (S0) 
which is used to generate the detector sets (DS0).. The data from five different fault 
conditions (S1, S2,… S5) are used to generate the fault detector sets (DS0, DS1, 
DS2,…DS5) as discussed in Section 4.2. The values of p ,  , and maxT  used to 
generate the detector sets are shown in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2: Parameter values used to generate detector sets in all case studies 
Parameters Values 
p 99.9% 
  0.05 
maxT  5000 
 
The summary of fault detection and diagnosis performance of the proposed as 
well as the PCA approaches is presented in Table 4.3. The results indicate that the 
proposed approach is much faster than PCA for detecting and diagnosing the process 
faults. It provides around 76% reduction in average fault detection delay and around 
73% reduction in average fault diagnosis delay compared to traditional PCA based 
approach. Table 4.4 shows that significant improvement in overall recognition rate 
(18% increase) and true positive rate (17% increase) can be achieved through the 
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proposed NSA based approach. The improvement in monitoring performance 
obtained through the proposed approach can be visualized through the receiver 
operating characteristics (ROC) curves shown in Fig. 4.5. The various data points in 
the ROC curves are obtained by varying v used in output filtering from 1 to 10. The 
area under the ROC curve provides a measure of monitoring performance of the 
classifier, higher the area better is the monitoring performance. It can be easily seen 
that the area under the ROC curve for proposed FDI approach is significantly higher 
than those of PCA with varying number of PCs. The points on the ROC curves 
indicated by arrows are those reported in Table 4.4. Therefore, in this scenario, the 




















Table 4.3: Detailed FDI performance of the proposed and PCA based approaches in CSTR case study 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Fault 
ID 

























S1 5 14 10 48 5 14 5 24 
S2 5 14 10 42 5 14 5 24 
S3 5 14 10 58 5 14 5 23 
S4 31 40 78 87 7 16 5 14 
S5 9 18 117 131 8 17 5 17 
Average 11 20 45 73.2 6 15 5 20.4 
*v=5; † 2v   
 
Table 4.4: Overall performance of the proposed and PCA based approaches in CSTR case study 






Overall recognition rate 97.16% 79.96% 97.76% 97.18% 
Detection rate/ True 
Positive rate (TPR) 
97.84% 81.19% 98.61% 98.75% 
False alarm rate/ False 
Positive rate (FPR) 
0% 2.08% 0% 0% 
*v=5; † 2v   
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Figure 4.5: ROC curves for proposed approach and classical PCA with varying 
number of PCs in CSTR case study – Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 











) and two PCA 
models are generated. The data from five different fault classes (S1, S2,… S5) are used 
to generate fault detector sets.  
Table 4.3 summarizes the performance of the proposed and PCA-based FDI 
approaches. It is quite evident from the results that FDI performance of both these 
approaches appears to be almost same with complete fault coverage, i.e.  all the five 
faults studied can be readily detected and identified, reasonably high overall 
recognition rate (>97%), no false alarm, significantly high true positive rate (~98%), 




approaches are comparable and both provide excellent monitoring and fault diagnosis 
performance. 
Fig. 4.6 shows the decision boundaries for PCA and proposed V-detector 
based approach for the 2 scenarios.  The results of proposed approach are nearly the 
same in both scenarios (as can be seen from the magenta solid lines in Fig. 4.6a and 
4.6b) while with PCA, the result in Scenario 1 is markedly poorer. For monitoring 
multi-state processes the conventional PCA-based approach requires separate PCA 
models for each normal operating state whereas the proposed approach can efficiently 
monitor such processes without requiring separate detector-sets corresponding to each 
normal operating state. A single set of detectors generated from the training data of all 
normal operating states can serve the purpose and provide adequate monitoring 
performance. This is because the data from multi-state operations usually show strong 
discontinuity (as can be seen from the projection on principal components subspace in 
Fig. 4.6a). Both Hotelling T
2
 and SPE statistics used in conventional PCA-based FDI 
assume Gaussian distribution of data which is not satisfied in such cases. Therefore, a 
single PCA model constructed using the data from all normal operating states 
performs poorly since some portions of the abnormal space fall within the normal 






Figure 4.6: Projection of training data (blue dots) onto first two principal components 
for (a) Scenario 1 and (b) Scenario 2 of CSTR case study. The red broken lines show 
95% and 99% confidence bounds from PCA and the solid magenta line shows the 
self/non-self boundary of the generated V-detectors with 99.9% coverage 
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On the other hand, the V-detector algorithm used in the proposed approach 
can efficiently cover the entire non-self space irrespective of the underlying 
distribution of process data (see Fig.4.6); hence it provides excellent monitoring 
performance in both scenarios. It should be noted that in contrast to Scenario 1, when 
PCA based models are used for Scenario 2, an additional determination of the current 
operating mode is required for online monitoring in order to trigger the appropriate 
PCA model. The proposed V-detector based approach allows lumping of data from 
multiple, non-contiguous regions into a single state (eg, normal) without any 
performance penalty. It also obviates the explicit mode selection step required in 
Scenario 2. 
There is a marginal difference in the performance of the proposed approach in 
the case of fault S4, and the detection delay is longer in Scenario 1 compared to 
Scenario 2. Fig. 4.7 shows the projection of the data obtained from the two normal 
operating states and fault S4 onto the subspace of first two principal components. It is 
quite clear from this figure that the samples from fault class S4 lie close to those from 
state S0
1
; hence the decision boundary between the two plays a crucial role. In the case 
of the V-detector algorithm, the decision boundary arises implicitly from the location 
of the various detectors, so it cannot be specified explicitly. However, the extent of 
detector coverage and the size of the detectors provide a proxy to understand the 
underlying cause. Fig. 4.8 shows the histograms of the V-detectors generated in the 
two scenarios. From these, it is evident that the average size (detection radius) of the 
generated V-detectors in Scenario 1 is smaller than in Scenario 2. Fig. 4.9 
demonstrates why this has to be expected. Fig. 4.9a consists of two disconnected 
rectangular shaped self-regions mimicking the situation in Scenario 1 while Fig. 4.9b 
shows a single self-space as in Scenario 2. The largest possible circular detectors that 
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can be accommodated in the two cases as per Eq (2.22.) are also shown. Clearly, the 
radius of the detector in Scenario 2 and consequently the extent of non-self space 
coverage from this detector is much higher for the case of a single self-space.  Since 
the total number of generated V-detectors is the same (5000) in both scenarios, the 
smaller sized detectors in Scenario 1 translate to lesser coverage of the non-self space, 
especially near the boundary of self space (shown in gray in Fig.4.9). Consequently, 
the detection delay for fault S4 becomes longer in Scenario 1. Samples from other 
faults do not lie in the vicinity of the self-space boundary and hence are not as much 
affected by this phenomenon. 


























Figure 4.7: Projection of data from two normal operating states S0
1
 (blue dots) and S0
2 












Figure 4.9: Rectangular shaped self spaces in a 2-D space and the largest possible 
circular detector. (a) self space comprising of two disconnected sub-spaces, 
(b) single self-space of equivalent area 
4.4  Application to Batch Processes and Process Transitions 
The effectiveness of the proposed FDI approach for batch processes and 
transient operations is presented next. 
4.4.1 Case Study 2: Fed-batch Penicillin Cultivation Process 
The production of penicillin from biomass is a multiphase process with 
nonlinear process dynamics. The penicillin fed-batch simulator PenSim v2.0 (Birol et 
al. 2002) is used to generate the training and testing data for analysis. Each 
fermentation run begins with an initial batch culture. The process switches to the fed-
batch mode of operation when the concentration of glucose (substrate) reaches 0.3g/l. 
The process is highly nonlinear and many variables show strong discontinuities 
during the period of cultivation. Eight process faults have been simulated as shown in 
Table 4.5. Out of 17 measured variables available, four – aeration rate, agitation 
power, substrate concentration, and substrate feedrate are considered as input 
variables. The remaining thirteen are selected for monitoring and fault diagnosis. The 
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training data corresponds to the normal operation (S0) as well as the eight different 
fault conditions (S1, S2,… S8). The parameter values used to generate the detector sets 
are shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.5: Faults in penicillin cultivation case study 
Fault ID Description Magnitude Occurrence 
time (h) 
S1 High substrate feed rate 30% step increase in substrate 
feed rate 
50 
S2 Low agitation power 30% step decrease in agitation 
power 
30 
S3 High aeration rate 30% step increase in aeration 
rate 
80 
S4 Low substrate feed rate Ramp decrease in substrate feed 120 
S5 pH controller failure pH controller is turned off 0.5 
S6 Temperature controller 
malfunction 
Improper tuning parameters 0.5 
S7 Low aeration rate Ramp decrease in aeration rate 60 




Given the temporal nature of the operation, dynamic variants of PCA, namely 
multi-way PCA (MPCA) and dynamic PCA (DPCA) were used for comparison. The 
summary of FDI results from the proposed as well as the statistical approaches is 
shown in Table 4.6. It can be seen that the proposed NSA based approach is 
successful in quickly detecting and identifying all the 8 process faults resulting in 
complete (100%) fault coverage. Both MPCA and DPCA are slow in detecting and 
diagnosing the faults; also, three faults (S2, S3 and S8) cannot be diagnosed. About 
90% reduction in average fault detection delay and about 80% reduction in average 
fault diagnosis delay are achieved by the proposed approach. As seen from Table 4.6, 
both MPCA and DPCA based approaches are prone to significant number of false 
positives. Most of these false alarms are flagged when the process switches to the fed-
batch mode of operation from the initial batch mode of operation. The proposed 
approach flags fewer false alarms during this period resulting in about 21% and 35% 
 88 
reduction in average number of false alarm compared to MPCA and DPCA, 
respectively. Table 4.7 shows that, the proposed approach also provides significant 
improvement in overall recognition rate (more than 40% increase), true positive rate 
(about 40% increase) and false positive rate (about 2% decrease) compared to MPCA 
and DPCA. The ROC curves for the proposed approach as well as MPCA with 
various numbers of principal components are shown in Fig. 4.10. The higher area 
under the curve for the proposed approach indicates that the monitoring performance 
is improved significantly. The points on the ROC curves indicated by arrows are those 
reported in Table 4.7. 
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Figure 4.10: ROC curves for proposed approach and MPCA with varying number of 








Table 4.6: Detailed Performance of FDI methods in penicillin cultivation case study 




























S1 5 19 42 433 433 45 435 473 54 
S2 1 3 9 5 - 21 6 - 27 
S3 2 8 42 629 - 45 625 - 54 
S4 31 35 42 134 140 45 131 145 54 
S5 15 28 0 5 27 0 3 34 0 
S6 32 42 0 5 14 0 3 14 0 
S7 41 110 42 466 554 45 466 565 54 
S8 17 135 0 32 - 21 29 - 27 
Average 18 47.5 22.125 213.625 234.2 27.75 212.25 246.8 33.75 
 
 
Table 4.7: Overall performance of FDI methods in penicillin cultivation case study 
 Proposed Approach MPCA DPCA 
Overall recognition rate 84.58% 42.68% 36.44% 
Detection rate/ True Positive rate (TPR) 94.66% 44.8% 44.71% 
False alarm rate/ False Positive rate (FPR) 5.74% 7.24% 8.86% 
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4.4.2 Case Study 3: Start-up transition of a simulated lab-scale 
distillation column 
In this section, the proposed FDI approach is tested on a simulated lab-scale 
distillation column. The simulated distillation column has 10 trays including a total 
condenser and a reboiler; the feed enters at 5
th
 tray from top. This distillation column 
is used to separate binary liquid mixture of ethanol and water (20%v/v). Dynamics of 
the start-up operation of a binary distillation column were modeled by a set of 
nonlinear Differential Algebraic Equations (Gunter, 2003).
 
The detailed model 
description can be found in Appendix B. This model is used to simulate the normal 
start-up operation as well as three abnormal start-up situations as listed in Table 4.8. 
The output variables – nine tray temperatures (top tray – tray 1 to reboiler – tray 9) 
are used for process monitoring and fault diagnosis.  
Detector-set DS0 was generated using the training data corresponding to normal 
operation. This is used for online process monitoring. Fault detector sets DS1, DS2 and 
DS3 generated from the training data corresponding to the different fault classes were 
used for fault diagnosis. For comparison DPCA and MPCA based models were also 
developed. 
Table 4.8: Faults in distillation column startup case study 
Fault 
ID 
Description Magnitude Occurrence 
time 
(Samples) 
S1 Low reflux ratio Step change from 9:1 to 1:1 1621 
S2 High Reboiler power Step change from 0.8 kW to 1.2 kW 1981 
S3 High feed pump speed 
 
Step change from 50 to 80 rpm 1261 
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Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show the monitoring and diagnosis performance of the 
various FDI approaches in this case study. The results clearly demonstrate that the 
proposed approach provides better FDI performance in terms of fault coverage, 
overall recognition rate (about 30% increase compared to DPCA), true positive rate 
(more than 30% increase compared to DPCA), false positive rate (about 0.6% 
decrease), fault detection and diagnosis delay (about 55% reduction in average fault 
detection delay and about 40% reduction in average fault diagnosis delay vis-à-vis 
traditional PCA based approaches). It is evident from Table 4.9 that, as in case study 2, 
the proposed approach gives fewer false alarms resulting in about 85% reduction in 
average number of false alarm compared to MPCA and DPCA. Most of these false 
alarms occur when the feed pump is switched at the beginning of the transition. 
Significant improvement achieved in monitoring performance through the proposed 
approach can also be visualized through the ROC curves in Fig. 4.11. The points on 




















Table 4.9: Detailed performance of FDI methods in distillation column startup case study 




























S1 10 18 7 45 51 41 43 54 45 
S2 9 18 3 8 14 40 2 - 46 
S3 9 14 9 9 17 40 3 5 45 
Average 9.33 16.67 6.33 20.67 27.33 40.33 16 29.5 45.33 
 
 
Table 4.10: Overall performance of FDI methods in distillation column startup case study 
 Proposed Approach MPCA DPCA 
Overall recognition rate 99.73% 97.23% 64.22% 
Detection rate/ True Positive rate (TPR) 99.80% 90.81% 63.94% 
False alarm rate/ False Positive rate (FPR) 0.079352 % 0.67% 0.71% 
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MPCA (with 2 PCs)
MPCA (with 3 PCs)
MPCA (with 4 PCs)
 
Figure 4.11: ROC curves for proposed approach and MPCA with varying number of 
PCs in distillation column startup case study 
4.5 Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we evaluate the sensitivity of the proposed approach to the target 
value of non-self space coverage  p . To study the sensitivity to different values of p , 
analysis of selectivity (true positive rate) vs. sensitivity (detection delay) is conducted 
for the monitoring detector sets DS0 in all cases. The selectivity vs. sensitivity 
analyses for the three case studies discussed above are presented in Tables 4.11-4.13. 
It is quite evident from these that in all cases as p decreases the number of detectors 
generated decreases gradually. With decreasing p, the true positive rate also decreases 
while average detection delay increases. Fig. 4.12 shows the V-detectors (magenta 
filled circles) generated for the CSTR case study at p = 80% in a 2-d space along with 
self data (blue dots). Numerous holes in the non-self space can be easily seen here.  
The presence of such holes at low p value in the non-self space is responsible for 






(such as 80%) certain faults may not be detected at all. However, there is a broad 
range of p values (≥ 95%) where the performance is acceptable.  
Table 4.11: Selectivity vs. sensitivity analysis in CSTR case study – Scenario 1 








99.9 5000 97.84 5 16 
99 500 90.98 5 35 
95 100 88.5 5 35 
90 51 80.36 5 45 
85 34 77.71 4 22 
80 26 76.4 4 24 
 
Table 4.12: Selectivity vs. sensitivity analysis in penicillin cultivation case study 








99.9 5000 94.66 8 18 
99 500 81.77 8 50 
95 100 65.73 8 84 
90 51 57.7 8 142 
85 34 51.5 8 123 
80 26 39.19 6 114 
 
Table 4.13: Selectivity vs. sensitivity analysis in distillation column startup case study 








99.9 5000 99.8 3 9 
99 500 99.6 3 10 
95 100 99.2 3 11 
90 54 98.9 3 12 
85 34 70.3 3 67 
80 26 69 2 11 
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Figure 4.12: Training data (blue dots) and the generated V-detectors (filled circles) 
with non-self space coverage parameter p=80% for CSTR case study - scenario 1 
4.6 Conclusions and Discussion 
Online process monitoring and fault diagnosis is important in chemical plants to 
detect and identify abnormal events and enable timely recovery. FDI can be 
considered as a pattern recognition problem – specifically fault detection involves 
binary classification of detecting the presence of abnormality in the process. The 
natural immune system also solves a binary classification problem for deciding if an 
antigen belongs to a pathogen or to the body’s own cells. The negative selection 
algorithm is a pattern recognition approach from the family of artificial immune 
systems that seeks to mimic the classification mechanism followed by the body’s T-
cell. Specifically, in negative selection, the search space is divided into a self region 
and a non-self region based on training (self) samples. The non-self region is covered 
by detectors which have no affinity to the training samples. When a new (test) sample 
is presented subsequently, its classification is performed based on its affinity with the 
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detectors, i.e., if the test sample matches any of the detectors it is classified as non-
self; else as self. In this manner, the negative selection approach relies on an implicit 
description of the non-self space (for which no training sample was available; hence 
“unknown” to the system) in contrast to most other pattern recognition and statistical 
approaches that attempt to describe the self space.  
In this chapter, we propose a negative selection system inspired FDI approach 
for monitoring and fault diagnosis of chemical processes. The proposed approach is a 
generic one and can be applied to both continuous as well as batch processes or 
transient operations. One key strength of proposed approach is that without making 
any assumption about the underlying structure of the training data, the proposed 
approach is computationally efficient to cover the entire non-self space by the 
generated detector-set. This is because the underlying computational paradigm does 
not require the samples or the self / non-self spaces to have any particular statistical 
properties. As a result, it provides superior monitoring performance when applied to 
multi-state operations with discontinuities and also to batch and transient operations 
with significant nonlinearities. This is in contrast to approaches based on statistical 
methods where monitoring thresholds typically require a Gaussian distribution of the 
samples and statistical stationary (i.e., time invariant mean and variance).  Extensive 
testing of the proposed approach using three case studies clearly demonstrates its 
ability to provide good monitoring and diagnosis performance.  
The proposed V-detector based FDI scheme suffers from two shortcomings. 
Firstly, the volume of the search space increases exponentially with the number of 
process variables. Hence, more detectors will be required to achieve adequate 
coverage which may lead to some increase in the computational load particularly 
during the offline detector generation phase. To overcome this, dimensionality 
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reduction techniques such as PCA can be applied to preprocess the data. We have 
evaluated this for the CSTR case study and find that the FDI performance deteriorates 
marginally when a small number of PCs are retained. In Scenario 1, when 2 PCs are 
retained instead of the 4 original variables, the true positive rate is reduced by about 
2% and average fault detection delay increases by about 5 samples. Another limitation 
is that, like other data-driven FDI methods, outliers in the training data lead to 
performance degradation. This can be overcome in two different ways – one, 
removing outliers from the training data before using it for detector generation. Any 
reliable outlier removal technique can be employed for this purpose (Pena and Preito, 
2001; Wang and Srinivasan, 2009). Alternatively, the problem can be alleviated by 
alternate ways to calculate self-radius. For instance, the self-radius can be set to the 
distance of the   percentile nearest neighbor.   can be specified based on the 
amount of outliers in the training data. This will make detector generation more robust.   
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Nomenclature 
a  Random point in  J-dimensional unitary hypercube  [0, 1]J 
nspa  Nearest self set point of a in J-dimensional unitary hypercube H 
C Set of all candidate detectors 
cd Center of detector d  JH ]1,0[  
c  Center of a candidate detector d   JH ]1,0[  
cs Center of self sample s  
DS0 Detector sets generated from normal process data 
DS1, DS2, …, DSN Fault detector sets generated from various known fault data sets 
 dd rcd ,  Detector with centre at cd and detection radius rd 
 ,d c r    A candidate detector with centre at c  and detection radius r  
D Set of valid detectors 
I Number of samples (observations) in data matrix  JIX   
J Number of variables in data matrix  JIX   
K Number of samples in each batch run 
L Number of batch runs  
Maxj Maximum measureable value of the j
th
 sensor 
Minj Minimum measureable value of the j
th
 sensor 
N Number of known process faults 
n Sample size used for statistical hypothesis testing 
nx Number of points covered by the generated detectors 
p Target non-self space coverage 
rd Detection radius of detector d 
rs Self-radius 
r  Detection radius of a candidate detector d 
 
S Set of self samples  
S0,S1, …, SN Preprocessed training data corresponding to process states 0,1…N 
 ss rcs ,  Self sample with centre at cs and self-radius rs 
T Total number of detectors 
Tmax Maximum number of detectors to be generated 
u Length of time window used for output filtering 
v Minimum number of fault samples in a time window of length u 
Xˆ  Raw data matrix with I  samples and J variables  JI  
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 jiX ,ˆ  Element in the i
th
 row and j
th
 column of raw data matrix 
 JIX ˆ  
X  Preprocessed data matrix obtained after normalization of raw data 
onto a unit hypercube  [0,1]J 
Xˆ  3-dimensional data matrix with L batches, J variables, and K 
samples  KJI   
x  Normalized measurement vector of length J 
xˆ  Raw measurement vector of length J 
xi i
th
 sample (observation) in training data matrix  
nn
ix  Nearest neighbour point of a data vector xi in the pre-processed 
training dataset 
321 ,, yyy  
Three variables considered in the artificial 3-dimensional case 
study 
Z Z-score used in statistical hypothesis testing 
Zα Z score of standard normal distribution at significance level of α 
Greek Letters  
  Significance level for statistical hypothesis testing 
  Percentile rank 
ε Affinity threshold 










Chapter 5 Reduced PCA Models for Process 
Monitoring - Metric to Identify the 
Key Variables for a Fault 
5.1  Introduction 
In modern chemical plants a large number (typically hundreds to thousands) of 
process variables are measured regularly. The large-scale and complexity of modern 
chemical plants pose challenges to most process monitoring methods in two different 
ways (Srinivasan and Qian, 2007): (1) the large number of variables that are measured 
in a plant lead to computational complexity issues and adversely impact the scale-up 
capability of the monitoring method; (2) the relationships between the variables are 
complex and not always unique; thus developing good quality models for monitoring 
is often difficult. The latter challenge can be overcome by preselecting a set of 
variables for monitoring. This pre-selection is based on the precept that not all the 
measured variables are equally important; certain variables contain more information 
about the process faults than others. Usually, only a small subset of the recorded 
variables carries essential information about the faults that affect the process and is 
hence more useful for process monitoring. In this chapter and also in the next chapter 
(Chapter 6), we refer to such variables as key variables. 
Generally, different types of faults can occur in a process and typically, each fault 
affects a different subset of variables. Hence, hence key variables are fault-specific 
and the monitoring performance is expected to improve if a fault is monitored using 
only its key variables. In this chapter, we first discuss the theoretical basis of why a 







improvement in performance. Then a metric to systematically estimate the monitoring 
performance of any subset of variables directly from process data of normal and fault 
operations is proposed. Based on these insights, two schemes for efficient process 
monitoring based on reduced PCA models that use only the selected subset of 
variables (key variables) are proposed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. In Chapter 6, we 
first develop a single reduced PCA based monitoring model using a set of key 
variables. The main idea is to select only the most important and relevant variables 
that contain useful information about all the faults and then use only these key 
variables to construct a single reduced PCA model which offers improved monitoring 
performance for all faults. A GA based stochastic optimization scheme is proposed to 
select the optimal set of key variables. Then we also propose a multiple reduced PCA 
models based approach to monitor a variety of faults in a process efficiently, wherein 
each reduced PCA model uses the key variables of a fault. 
The organization of the remainder of this chapter is as follows: in Section 5.1.1, 
we provide a brief literature review on key variables and their selection. Although 
many variables are eventually affected by a fault, a significant impact is exerted only 
on a small number of key variables. The use of these key variables exclusively can 
yield significant improvement in monitoring performance. The theoretical basis for 
the existence of key variables and their effect on PCA-based monitoring performance 
is presented in Section 5.2. Based on these insights, a metric to systematically 
estimate the monitoring performance of any subset of variables for a fault is proposed 
in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, the proposed metric is used to identify the key variables 







5.1.1 Key Variable Selection 
The concept of key variables has received attention in process systems 
engineering literature in a variety of contexts. Complex processes can sometimes be 
controlled adequately by controlling only a small subset of process variables In partial 
control, a small subset of the state variables to be controlled are selected to ensure 
overall process stability and disturbance rejection while satisfying performance 
specifications (Arbel et al., 1996). Some challenges in identifying the important 
variables for partial control problem were highlighted by Tyreus (1999). Kothare et al. 
(2000) emphasized on the combination of physical insights, mathematical criteria and 
engineering judgment for choosing such variables. To identify the dominant variables 
for implementing partial control, Nandong et al. (2009) proposed a novel 
methodology based on Principal Component Analysis which does not require 
extensive process knowledge. Hu et al. (2009) proposed an approach in which the 
dynamical relationships among the variables were utilized to reduce the number of 
control variables. In Assali and McAvoy (2010), an optimal decentralized control 
structure was designed to improve the control of production rate and product quality 
by identifying a set of dominant controlled and manipulated variables. 
Another related context is design of sensor networks and optimal sensor 
placement. The main objective here is to select the locations for sensors so as to 
achieve maximum estimation accuracy (Kresovalis and Mah, 1987), or minimum 
capital cost (Bagajewicz, 1997). Bhushan and Rengaswamy (2002a, b) proposed a 
methodology to design a sensor network based on various diagnosability and 
reliability criteria. The design of a sensor network optimally selected for maximizing 







by Musulin et al. (2004). In their approach, a sensor placement is sought that would 
minimize the sum of investment cost and the cost of not detecting a fault. The 
resulting optimization problem is solved using a Genetic Algorithm (GA). Sen et al. 
(1998) generalized the solution approach by using genetic algorithms which allowed 
the objective to be selected by the user. Muske and Georgakis (2004) formulated the 
problem as a multi-objective optimization one involving trade-off between process 
information that can be obtained by the sensor network and the total cost of sensors. A 
similar methodology, based on evaluating a trade-off between the quality of state 
estimation and the total measurement cost was presented by Kadu et. al. (2008) for 
multirate systems where measurements are sampled at different frequencies. 
Zumoffen and Basualdo (2010) proposed simultaneously solving the problems of 
optimal sensor location and control structure selection because of the strong impact of 
the initial investment and future controlled performance. Li (2011) presented a graph-
based approach for the optimization of sensor placement to ensure maximum 
observability of faults. 
This chapter focuses on the context of PCA based process monitoring. The main 
benefit sought here is to achieve improved monitoring performance by using only a 
small subset of variables, called key variables, in the plant measurement space. Many 
statistical pattern recognition techniques (such as PCA and derivatives) involve 
dimensionality reduction (or feature extraction). Therefore, at the outset, key variable 
selection (or feature selection) may appear to be redundant. In the next section, we 
show that the selection of key variables before dimensionality reduction (via PCA) 
can bring forth significant improvement in monitoring performance. The conditions 







5.2  Effect of variable selection on monitoring performance  
Consider an artificial process with three variables (x1, x2 and x3) that follow 



















  (5.1) 
This is not a restricting assumption since any normally distributed variable on auto-
scaling follows the standard normal distribution. The three-dimensional example is 
selected for ease of illustration of the resulting decision boundaries. We study the 
effect of variable selection on monitoring performance using two cases depending on 
the correlation between variables. 
5.2.1 Uncorrelated variables 
Let x1, x2 and x3 be uncorrelated. Consider a failure F as a ramp which affects 
x1 and x2 additively, but with different magnitudes  21, , while x3 remains 

















Now we will analyse the monitoring performance of two PCA models for 
detecting the fault F – a full PCA model comprising all three variables and a reduced 
PCA model with only two variables x1 and x2. Since the variables are uncorrelated it 






















  (5.3) 
































  (5.5) 
The columns of V represent the loading vectors of the three principal 
components (PCs) while the elements of  are the corresponding eigenvalues. In 
general, the j
th
 element of  is the eigenvalue of the jth PC. The ith element of a PC 
loading vector is the coefficient of the i
th
 variable in that PC. Therefore, the loading 





















































  (5.6) 
which suggests that the three PCs (t1, t2 and t2) are exactly the same as the three 
original variables (x1, x2 and x3) in this case. 
The T
2



















where, j  is the eigenvalue of the  j
th
 PC and m the number of PCs retained. Hence, 
the T
2






2 xxxT f    (5.8) 
The upper bound of T
2
 statistics at level of significance α is given by: 
  mT 22     (5.9) 
where,  m2 is the value of the Chi-square distribution at α level of significance with 
m degrees of freedom. Hence, in the case of the full PCA model when all three PCs 
are retained (m=3) the threshold for T
2
 statistics corresponding to 99% confidence 
level is: 
   3449.113201.0
2
,   fT   (5.10) 
Fault F would be detected by the full PCA model when the value of 2fT exceeds this 
threshold. i.e., 
  322 fT   (5.11) 
The decision boundary of the full PCA model with all 3 PCs retained (m=3) is shown 
by the sphere in Fig. 5.1(a). 
Fault F leads to a ramp in x1 and x2 with magnitudes 1 and 2 , respectively 
while it does not have any impact on x3. So, the time required for the 
2
fT  statistics to 











Following the same approach, if a reduced PCA model is constructed using 
only two variables  (x1 and x2) then its T
2










2 xxTr     (5.12) 
and the corresponding upper bound of the T
2
 statistics is: 
   2103.92201.0
2
,   rT   (5.13) 
Fig. 5.1(b) shows the decision boundary of the reduced PCA model as a 
cylinder perpendicular to the x1x2 plane. The fault would be detected by the reduced 











   32 22    , the reduced PCA model with only x1 and x2 would always have a 
shorter detection delay and hence a better detection rate compared to the full PCA 
model with all three variables. This is highlighted by Fig. 5.1(c) where the decision 
boundaries of full and reduced PCA models are presented together. Therefore, 
inclusion of a variable in a PCA based model leads to degradation in monitoring 
performance if the variable remains unaffected by the fault. 
Next, let us compare the monitoring performance of two reduced PCA models 
– (i) a reduced model with x1 and x2, and (ii) a reduced PCA model with only one 
variable (without loss of generality, say x1). The T
2
 statistics of the reduced PCA 




2 xTr     (5.14) 
and the corresponding upper bound of the T
2
 statistics is: 
   6349.61201.0
2















The reduced PCA model with only x1 would have a shorter detection delay and 
hence a higher detection rate if: 
 































































 represents the slope of the fault propagation 
trajectory. 
The decision boundary of the reduced PCA model comprising x1 and x2 with 
both the PCs retained (m=2) is shown by the solid circle in Fig. 5.2(a). In Fig. 5.2(b) 
the decision boundary of a reduced PCA model that uses only x1 and hence m=1 is 
shown by the dashed straight lines parallel to x2-axis.  The regions represented by the 





 lies in this region, 
the reduced model with only x1 provides superior performance. For instance, as Case 







5.2(b). It is evident that this fault would be detected earlier by the reduced model with 
only x1 as propagation trajectory crosses its decision boundary (dashed line) earlier. In 
the special case where .02  i.e., if the fault affects only x1, then a reduced PCA 
model based only on x1 would have better performance compared to the reduced 
model comprising x1 and x2. However, this reduced PCA model with only x1 would 


























Fig. 5.1: Decision boundaries of various PCA models with uncorrelated variables (a12 
=  a23 = a13 = 0) – (a) full PCA, (b) reduced PCA with x1 and x2, (c) decision 

























would apply for the case where the reduced model with only 2x  (again m=1) would 
have better detection performance over the reduced model comprising x1 and x2. The 
decision boundary of a reduced PCA model that uses only x2 is shown by the dashdot 
straight lines parallel to x1-axis in Fig. 5.2(c).The condition in Eq (5.18) is satisfied by 





 lies in this region, the reduced model with 
only x2 will have better performance. 
The reduced PCA model comprising x1 and x2 with both the PCs retained (m=2) 










 The four cyan regions in Fig. 5.2(d) satisfy the condition in Eq. (5.19). This 
shows that the reduced PCA model with x1 and x2 would have superior performance 
over any of the reduced models (comprising only x1 or x2) if both x1 and x2 are affected 
significantly by the fault; otherwise it is beneficial to use a reduced PCA model with 
only the significantly affected variable for process monitoring. As an example, the 







This trajectory intersects the decision boundary of the reduced PCA model with x1 and 

























Fig. 5.2: Comparison of fault detection performances of a reduced PCA model 
comprising x1 and x2 (with m=2) and two reduced PCA models comprising x1 and x2 
respectively in case of uncorrelated variables. (a) Decision boundary of reduced PCA 
model with x1 and x2, (b) decision boundary of reduced PCA model with x1 and 
regions where it has superior performance, (c) decision boundary of reduced PCA 
model with x2 and regions where it has superior performance, (d) regions where 







We can further generalize Eq. (5.16) for the n-variable case (n>2) where all 
the n variables are uncorrelated and independent of each other. Consider that the fault 
F (a ramp change) affects all the n variables with magnitudes n ,...,, 21  with 
























Let S be the set containing all the n measured variables and SR   be a subset 
of S containing only n variables. i.e., nS  , nR   and nn  . For the case where 
all the PCs are retained (i.e., m=n and nm  ), as in the example above, by 
generalizing Eq. (5.16) it can be shown that a reduced PCA model constructed only 
with the n variables in R would have better monitoring performance than the full 


























Since,    nn  22   , it follows from Eq. (5.21) that the inclusion of 
variables that are unaffected  0 or only marginally affected by the fault (small ) 
would lead to poor detection performance. Instead, a reduced PCA model comprising 
only the variables affected significantly by the fault can provide better monitoring 







m  PCs ( )n are retained in the full PCA model and mPCs ( )n are retained for the 































leading to the same conclusion as above. The above analysis is based on the 
assumption that the variables are uncorrelated and independent of each other. Next, 
we analyse the situation where the variables are correlated.  
5.2.2 Correlated variables 
Consider the same artificial process with 3 variables where all three variables 
follow standard normal distribution. Now assume that x1 and x2 are correlated with a 
covariance 12a , while x3 is not correlated with the other two variables, i.e.:  
 
  (5.23) 
Consider the same ramp fault F which affects x1 and x2 additively with 
magnitudes 1 and 2 , respectively but does not have any impact on x3. Now we will 
compare the monitoring performance of the full PCA model with a reduced PCA 
model comprising only x1 and x2. The covariance matrix of the full PCA model can be 







































































































  (5.26) 




























































  (5.27) 
The T
2




















   (5.28) 
Hence, the ellipsoid representing the decision boundary of the full PCA model, in 



























This ellipsoidal decision boundary (Eq. 5.29) is shown in Fig. 5.3(a). The detection 
delay of the full PCA model for fault F is

















Following a similar procedure, the T
2
 statistics of a reduced PCA model comprising x1 















   (5.30) 
The decision boundary of this reduced PCA model is a cylinder perpendicular to the 


















  (5.31) 
and shown in Fig. 5.3(b). Hence, the detection delay of the reduced PCA model would 
be
















. Since,    32 22    , the reduced PCA model with only x1 
and x2 would always have a shorter detection delay and hence a better detection rate 
compared to the full PCA model with all three variables as shown in Fig. 5.3(c). 
Therefore, inclusion of a variable that remains unaffected by the fault in a PCA based 


























Fig. 5.3: Decision boundaries of various PCA models with correlated variables (a12 = 
0.9, a23 = a13 = 0) – (a) full PCA, (b) reduced PCA with x1 and x2, (c) decision 
boundaries of (a) and (b) together 
 
Next, the monitoring performance of two reduced PCA models – (i) a reduced 
model with both x1 and x2, and (ii) a reduced PCA model with only one variable (say 
x1) will be compared. The detection delay for the reduced PCA model with only one 
variable (x1) remains the same as in the uncorrelated case. So, comparing with the 
reduced PCA model comprising x1 and x2, the detection delay of the reduced model 
with only x1 would be shorter if:  
 






























































































  (5.32) 
The roots of the above 2
nd
































































, lies close to 12a , i.e., the correlation between the variables remains unaffected 
or is only marginally affected by the fault, then a reduced model with x1 would 
provide better performance. This is visualized in Fig. 5.4 where the two axes represent 
x1 and x2, and 9.012 a . The decision boundary of the reduced PCA model 
comprising x1 and x2 with m=2 is shown by the solid ellipse in Fig. 5.4(a). The 
directions of two PCs (t1 and t2,) are shown as two straight lines 11tt   and 22tt   
respectively. The decision boundaries of a reduced PCA models with only x1 is shown 
by the dashed straight lines parallel to x2-axis in Fig. 5.4(b). The two yellow regions 












, when 9.012 a . The reduced PCA model with only x1 











 lies in these regions.  This occurs for the fault in Case 1 whose propagation 
path is shown by red stars in Fig. 5.4(b). As the propagation trajectory of this fault 
crosses the dashed line first, it is evident that the reduced model with only x1 will 
















































































































can be derived for the reduced PCA model which uses only 2x (and hence m =1). For 













The decision boundary of a reduced PCA model that uses only x2 is shown by 
the dashdot straight lines parallel to x1-axis in Fig. 5.4(c). The condition in Eq. (5.35) 










 lies in these green regions, 
the reduced model with only x2 would have better performance than the reduced 
model which uses both x1 and x2.  
Analogous to Eq (5.19), the reduced PCA model comprising x1 and x2 with both the 











































































































































which would occur if the correlation structure between x1 and x2 is affected 
significantly by fault F. In Fig. 5.4(d), the cyan regions satisfy the above conditions. 
The propagation path of one such ramp fault (noted as Case 2) is shown by the red 
circles in Fig. 5.4(d).  
In the derivations above, we have considered only the T
2
 monitoring statistic 
since all the PCs were retained (m=n). The Q statistic also commonly used in fault 
detection becomes applicable when m<n. The derivation can be extended to include 
the effect of Q statistic as well. Fig. 5.5 illustrates the effect of retaining only the first 
PC (i.e., m=1) and hence incorporating Q statistics into the monitoring of a reduced 
PCA model with two correlated variables x1 and x2 and with 9.012 a . Two PCs in 
this reduced PCA model are shown by two straight lines 11tt   and 22tt   respectively in 
Fig. 5.5(a). The decision boundary of the reduced model comprising x1 and x2 with T
2
 
statistic is shown by the straight lines ( MN and NM  ) and that with the Q statistic by 
the straight lines ( RS and SR  ) in Fig. 5.5(a). Thus, the rectangular region TUVW  in 
Fig. 5.5(a) becomes the decision boundary of this reduced PCA model when only the 
first PC is retained (m=1) and monitoring is performed based on violation of either T
2
 







the dashed straight lines parallel to x2-axis ( KL and LK  ) in Fig. 5.5(b). It can be 
shown that a reduced PCA model with only x1 would detect a fault earlier than a  
reduced PCA model comprising x1 and x2 (in which only the first PC is retained) using 
T
2






















  (5.39) 
where, Q denotes the upper bound of Q statistic at level of significance α. The 
condition in Eq. (5.39) is satisfied in the two yellow regions in Fig. 5.5(b). When the 
fault trajectory lies in these two regions, the reduced PCA model with only x1 will 
detect the fault earlier than the reduced PCA model with x1 and x2. The decision 
boundaries of the reduced model with only x2 is shown by the dashdot straight lines 
parallel to x1-axis ( KL and LK  ) in Fig. 5.5(c). A reduced model which uses only x2 
would detect a fault earlier than the reduced PCA model comprising x1 and x2 in 
which only the 1
st
 PC is retained (m=1) and monitoring is performed based on 
violation of either T
2





























The two green regions in Fig. 5.5(c) satisfy the condition in Eq. (5.40). Here, the 
reduced model that uses only x2 would detect the fault earlier. A reduced PCA model 
comprising x1 and x2 with only one retained PC (m=1) will yield better monitoring 
performance than either of the two reduced PCA models (that use only either x1 or x2) 
























































The condition in Eq. (5.41) would occur in the cyan regions in Fig. 5.5(d). For a 
general case involving n variables (n>2) the analytical derivation presented above 
requires identification of all the roots of a n
th
 order polynomial (analogous to the 2
nd
 
order polynomial shown in Eq. (5.32) for the 2 variable case) analytically which may 
be difficult. However, conceptually the analysis presented above could be extended to 
any case study involving 3 or more variables. 
In summary, the above analysis suggests that depending on the dynamics of the 
process, the correlation structure between the variables, as well as the effect of the 
faults on the variables and the correlation structure, a reduced PCA model comprising 
only the key variables can yield superior monitoring performance. Therefore, key 
variable selection is an important determinant of performance of any PCA model. 
Despite the obvious promise of key variable selection for improving the performance 
of PCA based monitoring method, its potential remains largely unexplored. In this 
thesis we seek to address this gap. In this chapter, we propose an efficient method to 
identify small sets of key variables for a fault that can be used to develop fault-
specific reduced PCA models. Next, we propose a metric to systematically estimate 
the monitoring performance of any subset of variables directly from data of normal 


























Fig. 5.4: Comparison of a reduced PCA model comprising x1 and x2 (with m=2) and 
two reduced PCA models comprising x1 and x2 respectively based on T
2
 statistics; 
Correlated variables with 9.012 a . (a) Decision boundary of reduced PCA model 
with x1 and x2, (b) decision boundary of reduced PCA model with x1 and regions 
where it has superior performance, (c) decision boundary of reduced PCA model with 
x2 and regions where it has superior performance, (d) regions where reduced PCA 






























Fig. 5.5: Comparison of fault detection performances of reduced PCA model 
comprising x1 and x2 (with m=1) and two reduced PCA models with x1 and x2 
respectively based on T
2
 and Q statistics; Correlated variables with 9.012 a . (a) 
Decision boundary of reduced PCA model with x1 and x2, (b) decision boundary of 
reduced PCA model with x1 and regions where it has superior performance, (c) 
decision boundary of reduced PCA model with x2 and regions where it has superior 








5.3  Inseparability Metric for Estimating PCA Monitoring 
Performance  
The proposed metric seeks to estimate the performance of a PCA model 
developed using a given set of variables. First, we explain the key concept underlying 
the proposed metric and subsequently derive and illustrate its functional form. A PCA 
monitoring model defines an ellipsoidal decision boundary that surrounds the normal 
process operation data. Fault samples that are located outside this ellipsoidal region 
would be flagged as faults. Any fault sample that lies inside this ellipsoidal region is 
considered normal and remains undetected. The performance of the PCA model thus 
depends on the extent of overlap or inseparability between the normal and fault 
samples. This extent of insurability depends on the set of variables used in the PCA 
model and can serve as an indicator of performance achievable by that set of 
variables.  
Consider a process affected by a fault which then becomes evident in some of the 
measured variables. Given a set of m measured variables, our metric estimates the 
monitoring performance of a PCA model developed using these variables based on the 
extent of inseparability between normal and fault samples in their m-dimensional 
space. Assume that online measurements (samples) from process operations are 
available comprising both normal operations as well as some from periods when the 
fault was manifested. Henceforth, we call these the cumulative samples. Next, locate 
those samples in the cumulative samples that correspond to normal operations of the 
process. These normal samples would be typically used for developing the PCA 
model. The proposed inseparability metric relies on an approximation of the regions 







dimensional space of the variables as shown in Fig. 5.6. The inseparability metric 
( insepM ) measures the extent of overlap between the two ellipsoids through the n-th 
















  (5.42) 
where, NA  denotes the hyper-volume of the normal ellipsoid and CA  is the hyper-
volume of the cumulative ellipsoid and n is the dimension of the ellipsoids. The n-th 
root of the ratio is taken in order to make it comparable across different number of 
variables. 
Lower the value of the metric, lower the overlap between the normal and 
cumulative ellipsoids and better the PCA monitoring performance. In contrast, when 
the fault samples in a subspace are completely inseparable from the normal ones, the 
hyper-volume of the normal ellipsoid approaches that of the cumulative ellipsoid (i.e., 
N CA A ) and indicates poor monitoring performance.  
Next, we derive an efficient approach to estimate insepM . Let, 
mn
NX
 1  be 
the training data matrix of normal operations and 
mn
FX
 2  of fault operations. 
Here, n1 and n2 represent the number of samples belonging to normal and the fault 
operations, respectively, and m the number of variables. First, normal data matrix, 
mn
NX
 1 is auto-scaled to obtain the scaled data matrix of normal, mnNX
 1 . 
Then the fault data matrix is also scaled according to mean and standard deviation of 
the normal data to obtain the scaled data matrix of the fault,
mn
FX







cumulative scaled data matrix, mnnCX
 )( 21  is obtained by combining both these 
scaled data matrices: 
 
C N FX X X  (5.43) 






















where, NCOV  and CCOV  
m m  and are the covariance matrices of NX  and CX , 
respectively. 
The eigenvalues of the covariance matrix represent the variances along the 
principal components’ directions. Therefore, the axis lengths of an ellipsoid which 
describes the data would be proportional to the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix. 
Hence, the hyper-volume of the normal ellipsoid from 











  (5.46) 











  (5.47) 
where, NCOVi and 
CCOV
i denote the i
th
 eigenvalue of NCOV  and CCOV , respectively.  
We know that, for any covariance (symmetric) matrix A, its determinant is equal to 





























    (5.49) 



















  (5.51) 






























  (5.52) 
It can be readily computed from the determinants of the two covariance matrices 
derived from the training data consisting of normal and fault samples.  
5.3.1 Illustrations 
Here, we illustrate the inseparability metric using two simple examples. First, 
we consider the three dimensional case discussed in Section 5.2.2, where during 
normal operation, a high correlation (a12=0.9) exists between x1 and x2, but the third 
variable x3 has no correlation with either x1 or x2. This correlation between x1 and x2 is 
broken by the fault, while x3 remains unaffected. We consider three possible PCA 
models with different sets of monitoring variables: (1) a full PCA model using all 







only x1. A fault is flagged based on violation of T
2
 and/or Q statistic (if applicable), 
and the PCA performance measured based on missed detection rate. As expected from 
the discussion in Section 5.2.2, of the three models, the reduced PCA model using x1 
and x2 offers the lowest MDR, as shown in Table 5.1. The proposed inseparability 
metric for the three sets of variables are also shown in Table 5.1. Minsep decreases from 
0.34 for the 3 variable set to 0.31 for the  1 2,x x set and then increases significantly to 
0.70 for the  1x set indicating highest separability between normal and fault samples 
in the x1-x2 space. It thus correctly supports the fact that in this instance, the inclusion 
of x3 does not offer any additional information to the PCA model, but instead leads to 
some degradation in the monitoring performance. This illustrates that the proposed 
inseparability metric can properly quantify the extent of inseparability between 
normal and fault samples in any feature space and provide an assessment of the 
resulting monitoring performance. 
Table 5.1: PCA Monitoring performance and Inseparability metric (Minsep) in different 
feature spaces 
 
Set of variables MDR(%) of 
corresponding PCA model 
Minsep 
x1, x2 and x3 11.03 0.3458 
x1 and x2 10.46 0.3144 
x1 79.58 0.7039 
 
 
The next illustration brings out the effect of correlation on monitoring 
performance and the ability of insepM  to account for this factor. Fig. 5.6 illustrates a 2-
D example where x1 and x2 are strongly correlated during normal operations with 







both Fig. 5.6(a) and Fig. 5.6(b) are exactly the same. The fault samples are however 
different. In Fig. 5.6(a), the correlation between x1 and x2 that exists in the normal 
samples is broken by the fault, while in Fig. 5.6(b) the fault does not affect the 
correlation. It is evident that the fault samples in Fig. 5.6(a) are more separable from 
the normal samples compared to those in Fig. 5.6(b). As expected, the PCA 
monitoring performance in terms of MDR is better (0.10) in Fig. 5.6(a) compared to 
0.80 in Fig. 5.6(b). This effect is also correctly reflected by the proposed 
inseparability metric. The area of the cumulative ellipse (AC) in Fig. 5.6(a) is much 
bigger compared to that in Fig. 5.6(b), while the areas of the normal ellipses (AN) are 
exactly the same in both cases. Therefore, the value of insepM  is much lower in Fig. 
5.6(a) ( 0.31insepM  ) compared to Fig. 5.6(b) ( 1insepM  ). Thus, this illustration 
demonstrates that the proposed inseparability metric correctly accounts for 
inseparability arising from changes in correlation structures due to the fault. Next, the 
efficacy of insepM  in correctly identifying key variables in large-scale processes is 



























Fig. 5.6: Projection of normal (blue circles) and fault (red stars) samples onto 
subspace of x1 and x2 along with normal and cumulative  ellipses. (a) Normal and fault 







5.4 Case study: Tennessee Eastman challenge problem 
The Tennessee Eastman process is a benchmark simulation proposed by Downs 
and Vogel (1993) to provide a realistic industrial process for evaluating process 
control and monitoring methods. In this section, the ability of the inseparability metric 
to identify key variables of various faults is evaluated using this case study. The 
process consists of five major units: a reactor, a condenser, a recycle compressor, a 
separator, and a stripper. Gaseous reactants A, C, D and E and inert B are injected into 
the reactor where the liquid products G and H are formed with a by-product F. The 
process flowsheet with the control structure proposed by Lyman and Georgakis (1995) 
is shown in Fig. 5.7. It contains 52 measured variables, 22 process measurements, 19 
composition measurements and 11 manipulated variables. Samples can be obtained 
every 3 minutes. All these 52 variables are included in the analysis below. 
 








The process simulator provides 20 programmed faults (see Table 5.2) of which 
17 are tested here.  According to Russell et al. (2000) and Zhang (2008) detection 
rates for IDVs 3, 9 and 15 are very low because there are no observable changes in 
variables’ mean, variance or higher moments. Hence, it has been inferred that these 
faults are unobservable and cannot be detected by any statistical technique; these three 
faults are not included in our analysis. The training and test datasets used here were 
obtained from http://brahms.scs.uiuc.edu/. The training dataset consists of 500 
samples from normal operating condition and 480 samples from each of the 17 fault 
conditions. The test dataset contains 960 samples from the normal as well as the 17 
faults. All faults in the test dataset are introduced at sample 160. Based on these 
datasets, we seek to identify the key variables for each fault.  
Table 5.2: Process faults in TE process (Downs and Vogel, 1993) 
Fault ID Description Type 
IDV1 A/C feed ratio, B composition constant (Stream 4) Step 
IDV2 B composition, A/C ratio constant (Stream 4) Step 
IDV3 D feed (Stream 2) Step 
IDV4 Reactor cooling water inlet temperature Step 
IDV5 Condensor cooling water inlet temperature Step 
IDV 6 A feed loss (Stream 1) Step 
IDV 7 C header pressure loss – reduced availability (Stream 4) Step 
IDV 8 A, B and C composition (Stream 4) Random variation 
IDV 9 D feed temperature (Stream 2) Random variation 
IDV 10 C feed temperature (Stream 4) Random variation 
IDV 11 Reactor cooling water inlet temperature Random variation 
IDV 12 Condensor cooling water inlet temperature Random variation 
IDV 13 Reaction kinetics Slow drift 
IDV 14 Reactor cooling water valve Sticking 
IDV 15 Condensor cooling water valve Sticking 
IDV 16 Unknown - 
IDV 17 Unknown - 
IDV 18 Unknown - 
IDV 19 Unknown - 
IDV 20 Unknown - 







A simple procedure for identifying and validating the key variables for each fault 
follows:  
1. The proposed inseparability metric can be calculated for all subsets of the 52 
variables. Following Occam’s razor, we only consider 2 and 3 variable subsets.  
2. Key variable identification: Each of these 52 522 3C C  = 23,426 subset of variables 
is generated and evaluated individually.  
a. The training data from normal as well as the specific fault are used to 
construct the cumulative samples. The normal data is used as is and used 
to calculate the normalization factors as described is Section 5.3. 
b. After normalization, NCOV  and CCOV are calculated and insepM  evaluated 
using Eq. (5.52) 
c. The above is repeated for each of subsets.  
d. Among all the subsets, the subset which gives the lowest insepM  is 
identified as the key variables for that fault. 
3. Validation: A reduced PCA model based on the key variables identified above is 
also constructed.  
a. In the model generation step, only training data corresponding to normal 







b. The performance of the PCA model is evaluated in terms of false alarm 
rate, FAR, and missed detection rate, MDR on the test data. A fault is 
flagged for a sample when either the T
2
 or Q statistics exceeds its threshold 
















MDR  (5.54) 
where, NN,F is the number of normal samples in the test dataset that has been 
flagged as abnormal, NF,N is the number of fault samples in the test dataset that has 
been identified as normal, NN  is the total number of normal samples in the test 
dataset, and NF is the total number of fault samples in the test dataset.  
4. The above analysis is repeated for each fault 
The identified 2 and 3 variable subsets (having lowest Minsep) for each fault are 
shown in Table 5.3 along with their Minsep. In this Table, the lowest Minsep values are 
highlighted in bold. It can be seen from Table 5.3 that for all IDVs, except IDV12 and 
19, Minsep values of two variable subsets are lower than that of three variable ones. 
Therefore, for these 15 faults (IDV1-2, 4-8, 10-11, 13-14, 16-18 and 20), two variable 
subsets reported in Table 5.3 are considered as the key variables.  
Only for IDV12 and IDV19 there are decrease in Minsep values in variable subset 
with 3 variables (see Table 5.3). Hence, the extent of separability increases 
significantly in the feature space of three variables. For this reason, for IDV12 and 







Table 5.4 shows the key variables identified using the proposed inseparability metric 
for each of the 17 faults.  




2 variable subset 3 Variable subset  
  Minsep  Minsep 
IDV1 XMEAS1, XMEAS16 0.1367 XMEAS1, XMEAS16, XMV9 0.1533 
IDV2 XMEAS10, XMEAS34 0.1020 XMEAS10, XMEAS30, XMEAS34 0.1698 
IDV4 XMEAS9, XMV10 0.4469 XMEAS9, XMEAS16, XMV10 0.5583 
IDV5 XMEAS17, XMV11 0.1741 XMEAS17, XMV9, XMV11 0.1983 
IDV6 XMEAS16, XMV10 0.0332 XMEAS1, XMV3, XMV10 0.0585 
IDV7 XMEAS7, XMV4 0.1634 XMEAS7, XMV4, XMV9 0.1675 
IDV8 XMEAS16, XMEAS20 0.1118 XMEAS7, XMEAS20, XMV9 0.1260 
IDV10 XMEAS18, XMV9 0.2057 XMEAS18, XMEAS38, XMV9 0.2932 
IDV11 XMEAS9, XMV10 0.2229 XMEAS9, XMEAS21, XMV10 0.3400 
IDV12 XMEAS18, XMV9 0.1439 XMEAS7, XMEAS18, XMV9 0.1392 
IDV13 XMEAS16, XMV9 0.0959 XMEAS16, XMEAS38, XMV9 0.1119 
IDV14 XMEAS21, XMEAS10 0.1068 XMEAS13, XMEAS21, XMV10 0.2072 
IDV16 XMEAS19, XMV9 0.2973 XMEAS18, XMEAS19, XMV9 0.3426 
IDV17 XMEAS9, XMEAS21 0.0768 XMEAS9, XMEAS21, XMV10 0.1458 
IDV18 XMEAS13, XMV5 0.0387 XMEAS13, XMV5, XMV10 0.0464 
IDV19 XMEAS20, XMV5 0.5689 XMEAS13,XMEAS16, XMV5 0.5377 
IDV20 XMEAS7, XMV13 0.1612 XMEAS7, XMEAS13, XMEAS20 0.2566 
 
 
Table 5.4: Key variables for the 17 faults 
Fault ID Key Variables 
IDV1 XMEAS1, XMEAS16 
IDV2 XMEAS10, XMEAS34 
IDV4 XMEAS9, XMV10 
IDV5 XMEAS17, XMV11 
IDV6 XMEAS16, XMV10 
IDV7 XMEAS7, XMV4 
IDV8 XMEAS16, XMEAS20 
IDV10 XMEAS18, XMV9 
IDV11 XMEAS9, XMV10 
IDV12 XMEAS7, XMEAS18, XMV9 
IDV13 XMEAS16, XMV9 
IDV14 XMEAS21, XMEAS10 
IDV16 XMEAS19, XMV9 
IDV17 XMEAS9, XMEAS21 
IDV18 XMEAS13, XMV5 
IDV19 XMEAS13, XMEAS16, XMV5 







Table 5.5 presents the monitoring performances in terms of MDR and FAR of the 
full PCA model using all the 52 variables and the 17 fault-specific reduced PCA 
models constructed using the key variables shown in Table 5.5. The average MDR of 
the reduced models is 9.80% compared to 21.51% for the full PCA model. The 
average FAR of the reduced models is 0.16% for the reduced models compared to 
1.56% for the full model. These demonstrate that for most faults, a small number (2 or 
3) of key variables are sufficient to provide excellent monitoring performance. We 
now discuss in detail the key variables for six scenarios and discuss how they not only 
enable better PCA monitoring performance but also offer direct insight into the 
process behaviour during the fault.  
Table 5.5: Monitoring performances of various PCA models  
Fault ID Full PCA 
model  
Reduced PCA model with key 
variables  
MDR (%) Model ID MDR (%) FAR (%) 
IDV1 0.125 RA1 0.375 0 
IDV2 1.25 RA2 1.75 0 
IDV4 0.25 RA4 0 0 
IDV5 73.625 RA5 0.5 0.21 
IDV6 0 RA6 2 0.1 
IDV7 0 RA7 0 0 
IDV8 2.25 RA8 8.5 0.62 
IDV10 48.5 RA10 25.75 0.52 
IDV11 32.5 RA11 19.625 0 
IDV12 1.125 RA12 12.125 0.52 
IDV13 4.875 RA13 7.75 0.21 
IDV14 0.125 RA14 0 0 
IDV16 55.25 RA16 21.25 0 
IDV17 4.375 RA17 5.875 0 
IDV18 9.875 RA18 12.5 0.21 
IDV19 85.875 RA19 21.875 0.21 
IDV20 45.75 RA20 26.375 0.1 
Average MDR (%) 21.51 Average MDR (%) 9.58% 








5.4.1 IDV 5: Step change in condenser cooling water inlet temperature 
As can be seen from Table 5.5, the full PCA model performs marginally for 
IDV5 with very high MDR (73%). In contrast, the low value of Minsep (0.0357) shows 
the separability of the subset {XMEAS17, XMV11} which are identified as the key 
variables for this fault. The reduced PCA model RA5 constructed using these two 
variables has a net 73.13% improvement in detection accuracy compared to the full 
PCA model. Table 5.6(a) shows detailed statics of the improvement – out of the 800 
test samples for IDV5, 73.63% of samples that can’t be detected at all by the full PCA 
model are correctly flagged as abnormal by RA5. In contrast, only 0.5% of IDV5 
samples that were detected by the full model were incorrectly classified as normal by 
RA5. The reason for this drastic improvement in performance can be seen from Fig. 
5.8, where normal and fault samples are projected onto the 2-D subspace of the key 
variables. It can be seen from Fig. 5.8 that condenser cooling water flow (XMV11) is 
manipulated to maintain the stripper underflow (XMEAS17) at a desired level. 
Therefore, as can be seen in Fig. 5.8(a), a strong correlation exists between these two 
variables when the plant is normal. When IDV5 occurs, there is a step increase in the 
condenser cooling water inlet temperature, hence the condenser cooling water flow 
(XMV11) has to increase to maintain XMEAS17.  This breaks the correlation 
between XMEAS17 and XMV11 (see Fig. 5.8(b)). The Q statistics of RA5 is more 
sensitized to this compared to the full PCA model (see Fig. 5.9) which leads to its 
higher detection rate. This change in correlation is also responsible for the high 
separability between normal and IDV5 data in the 2-D subspace of XMEAS17 and 







Table 5.6: Comparisons of monitoring performance between full PCA model and 
reduced PCA models for six faults  
 
(a) IDV5 


























































































































































































































































It can also be seen from Fig. 5.9(b) that Q statistics of RA5 increases sharply 
and remains consistently higher than the threshold throughout, after the introduction 







the fault only from sample 162 to 350 (see Fig. 5.9(a)); it drops below the threshold 
after sample 350. We explain the reason behind this poor performance of the full PCA 
model next. The Q statistic threshold of the full PCA model (11.01) is much larger 
than that of RA5 (0.0064) since the former has to incorporate the noise in all 52 
variables. The Q statistics of the full PCA model can be expressed as: 
 
 , ,f f KV f KVQ Q Q    (5.55) 
where, Qf ,  the Q statistics of the full PCA model is subdivided into its components 
,f KVQ  from the two key variables and  ,f KVQ   from the remaining 50 variables. Fig. 
5.10 shows the relative contributions of 
,f KVQ and  ,f KVQ  .  It is evident that although 
the contribution of the key variables (shown as red solid line in Fig. 5.10) increases 
after the occurrence of the fault, this increase in 
,f KVQ is not sufficient to exceed the 
high threshold of the full model. The presence of the other variables in the full model 
conceals the changes in the key variables. Even between samples 162 to 350 where 
the full PCA model detects the fault, the Q statistics threshold is exceeded mainly due 
to the contributions of the other variables (shown as green dotted line in Fig. 5.10), 
not due to the key variables. This obfuscation effect of the non-key variables can be 
further illustrated through the contribution plot of the full PCA model at sample 185 
at which the value of the Q statistics is the highest (73) and significantly larger than 
the threshold. The contribution plot of PCA T
2
 and Q statistics is a commonly used 
approach for identification of root cause of a fault (Miller et. al., 1998), by isolating 
the variables most affected by the fault.  It can be seen from Fig. 5.11 that the 







XMEAS2, XMEAS4, XMEAS21, XMEAS238, and XMV5 contribute the most. Thus, 
the Q-statistic contribution plot of the full PCA model at the sample could be 
misleading in correctly identifying the variables that are responsible for the fault.   
 
Fig. 5.8: Projection of samples onto subspace of XMEAS17 and XMV11 for IDV5 (a) 









Fig. 5.9: Q statistic plot for IDV5 (a) full PCA model; (b) reduced PCA model, RA5. 
 
 









Fig. 5.11: Q statistic contribution plot of full PCA model at sample 185 for IDV5 
 
5.4.2 IDV 10: Random variation in C feed temperature  
The full PCA model has a high MDR (48%) for IDV10. The proposed 
inseparability metric identifies XMEAS18 and XMV9 as the key variables for IDV10 
which are used to develop the reduced PCA model RA10. Table 5.6(b) shows that out 
of the 800 test samples, 26.88% of samples that can’t be detected by the full PCA 
model can be detected correctly as abnormal by RA10; the latter misclassifies only 
4.12% of samples detected correctly by the full PCA model. Therefore, there is a net 
22.76% improvement in detection rate with RA10. 
In Fig. 5.12, normal and IDV10 data are projected onto the 2-D subspace of 
XMEAS18 and XMV9. It is evident from Fig. 5.12(a) that a strong correlation exists 







during normal operation. This is because stripper temperature is controlled by 
manipulating the stripper steam valve (see Fig. 5.7). IDV10 leads to random 
fluctuations in stripper temperature since Stream 4 is fed directly to the stripper. As a 
result, the strong correlation between XMEAS18 and XMV9 is perturbed by IDV10 
(see Fig. 5.12(b)). The high separability between normal and IDV10 data in the 2-D 
subspace of XMEAS18 and XMV9 is mainly due to this Also, both the T
2
 and Q 
statistics of RA10 become more sensitive compared to those of the full PCA model 
(see Fig. 5.13) leading to the significant improvement in detection accuracy.  
 
 
Fig. 5.12: Projection of samples onto subspace of XMEAS18 and XMV9 for IDV10 
















Fig. 5.13: Normalized T
2
 and Q statistic plot for IDV10 (a) full PCA model, (b) 
reduced PCA model RA10. 
 
5.4.3 IDV 11: Random variation in Reactor cooling water inlet temperature 
XMEAS9 and XMV10 are identified as the key variables for IDV11. Table 
5.6(c) shows that 13.63% samples that are undetected by the full PCA model are 
flagged as abnormal by the reduced PCA model RA11 comprising these two key 
variables; only 0.75% of samples detected by the full model can’t be detected by RA11. 
Therefore, RA11 offers a net 12.88% improvement in detection accuracy over the full 
PCA model. In Fig. 5.14, the samples from normal and IDV11 are projected onto the 
2-D subspace of the key two variables. It can be seen from the process flowsheet that 
reactor cooling water flow (XMV10) is manipulated to maintain the reactor 










between these two variables when the plant is normal as can be seen in Fig. 5.14(a). 
IDV11 results in random fluctuations in the reactor temperature, which breaks this 
correlation (see Fig. 5.14(b)). The proposed inseparability metric recognises this and 
identifies XMEAS9 and XMV10 as the key variables.  
 
Fig. 5.14: Projection of samples onto subspace of XMEAS9 and XMV10 for IDV11 
(a) normal samples, (b) both normal and fault samples 
 
From the above three fault scenarios, it can be seen that usually the manipulated 
and controlled variables in a control loop are highly correlated when the process is 
normal. This manipulated and controlled variable pair can generally serve as key 
variables if a fault impacts the controlled variable. Next, we discuss three unknown 
fault scenarios (IDVs 16, 19 and 20) in detail and demonstrate that key variables offer 









5.4.4 IDV16: Unknown Fault 
The proposed inseparability metric identifies XMEAS19 and XMV9 as the key 
variables for IDV16. Table 5.6(d) shows that out of 800 test samples, 36.88% samples 
that remain undetected by the full PCA model can be correctly detected as abnormal 
by reduced PCA model RA16. Only 2.87% samples detected by the full PCA model 
can’t be detected by RA16 resulting in an overall improvement of 34.01% by RA16. 
The improved separability between normal and fault samples in the 2-D subspace of 
the key variables is also evident from the higher sensitivity of Q statistics of RA16 in 
Fig. 5.15. In Fig. 5.16, the normal and fault samples for this fault are projected onto 
the 2-D subspace of the two key variables. It is evident from Fig. 5.7 that stripper 
steam flow (XMEAS19) is adjusted by manipulating the stripper steam valve position 
(XMV9). Hence, these two variables are directly proportional when the process is 
normal as can be seen in Fig. 5.16(a). To achieve a specific change in stripper steam 
flow, the stripper steam valve has to be moved by a certain amount. For example, to 
increase stripper steam flow from 220 kg/hr to 260 kg/hr the stripper steam valve 
position needs to be increased from 40% to 60% opening (see Fig. 5.16(a)) and vice 
versa. Fig. 5.16(b) suggests that this strong correlation between XMEAS19 and 
XMV9 in the normal data is broken by the fault and the relationship becomes 
stochastic (see Fig. 5.16(b)). Hence, sometimes, a small change in the stripper steam 
valve position can bring about a large change in stripper steam flow while at other 
times a large change in the valve position results in negligible change in steam flow. 
From this behaviour, we can infer that IDV16 might be due to stiction in the stripper 
steam valve. Thus, key variables enable not only improvement in monitoring 








Fig. 5.15: Normalized T
2
 and Q statistic plot for IDV16 (a) full PCA model, (b) 











Fig. 5.16: Projection of samples onto subspace of XMEAS19 and XMV9 for IDV16 
(a) normal samples, (b) both normal and fault samples 
 
5.4.5 IDV19: Unknown Fault 
IDV19 requires 3 key variables – XMEAS13, XMEAS16, and XMV5, as shown 
in Table 5.4, because for this IDV, the separability between the fault and normal 
samples becomes more prominent in the 3-D subspace. To illustrate this, in Fig 
5.17(a), the training samples of both normal and IDV19 are projected onto the 2-D 
subspace of the variables XMEAS20 and XMV5 that has the lowest Minsep for this 
IDV (see Table 5.3). Similarly, in Fig 5.17(b) both normal and IDV19 training 
samples are projected onto the 3-D subspace of the variables XMEAS13, XMEAS16 
and XMV5 identified as the best for IDV19. It is evident from Fig. 5.17 that the 









Fig. 5.17(b)) compared to their separability in the 2-d subspace (see Fig. 5.17(a)). The 
proposed inseparability metric Minsep can correctly capture this enhanced separability 
in 3-D space since the value of Minsep in the 3-D subspace of the variables XMEAS13, 
XMEAS16 and XMV5 (~0.20) is much lower than in the 2-D subspace of XMEAS20 
and XMV5 (~0.39).  
Table 5.6(e) shows that 65% of samples that could not be detected by the full 
PCA model can be correctly flagged as abnormal by the reduced PCA model RB19 
that uses these 3 key variables. Only 1% of the samples detected by the full PCA 
model can’t be detected by RB19 resulting in a 64% improvement by RB19. Fig. 5.17 
shows that these three variables – product separator pressure (XMEAS13), stripper 
pressure (XMEAS16) and compressor recycle valve position (XMV5) are tightly 
correlated when the process is normal. This strong correlation might be for 
maintaining the product separator pressure and stripper pressure and hence the recycle 
flow (Stream 8) at desired levels since the recycle flow is controlled by manipulating 
the compressor recycle valve position (see Fig. 5.7). It is evident from Fig. 5.17(b) 
that when the fault occurs, in order to maintain XMEAS13 and XMEAS16 at desired 
levels, XMV5 has to undergo more fluctuations. As a result, their strong correlation is 
affected as can be seen in Fig. 5.17(b). From this, we can infer that the unknown fault 
IDV19 could be due to stiction in the compressor recycle valve. It is also evident that 
the separability between normal and fault samples is enhanced significantly in the 3-D 
subspace of the key variables which leads to higher sensitivity of Q statistics of the 













Fig. 5.17: Projection of both normal and IDV19 samples onto (a) 2-D subspace of 










Fig. 5.18: Normalized T
2
 and Q statistic plot for IDV19 (a) full PCA model, (b) 
reduced PCA model RB19 using XMEAS13, XMEAS16 and XMV5 
 
5.4.6 IDV20: Unknown Fault 
XMEAS7 and XMEAS13 are identified as the key variables for IDV20. Table 
5.6(f) shows that an additional 20.38% of samples can be correctly detected by the 
reduced PCA model RA20  using these variables. Fig. 5.7 shows that the gaseous 
stream (stream 7) from the reactor outlet is fed to the product separator via a 
condenser. Therefore, a strong correlation between reactor pressure (XMEAS7) and 
product separator pressure (XMEAS13) is expected when the process is normal. 
IDV20 breaks this correlation; at the same time the operating ranges of these two 
variables also increases (see Fig. 5.19(b)) from [2690   2725] kPa to [2665  2730] kPa 










decrease in the lower operating limits of these two variables which suggests that the 
fault might have arisen due to lower pressure in the reactor, the effect of which is 
subsequently propagated into the product separator pressure, resulting in a change in 
its correlation structure as well as operating ranges. This leads to a higher sensitivity 
in the Q statistics of RA20 compared to the full PCA model as shown in Fig. 5.20. It is 
evident from the above discussion on the three unknown faults that key variables not 
only improve the monitoring performance of PCA based models, they are also 
instrumental in analyzing the root cause of unknown abnormal behaviours.  
 
Fig. 5.19: Projection of samples onto subspace of XMEAS7 and XMEAS13 for 











Fig. 5.20: Normalized T
2
 and Q statistic plot for IDV20 (a) full PCA model, (b) 
reduced PCA model RA20 using XMEAS7 and XMEAS13. 
 
To further validate the proposed inseparability metric, for each fault, we ranked 
all the subsets of variables in two ways, (1) according to their Minsep monitoring 
performance, and (2) according to the MDR of the corresponding reduced PCA model. 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ) was computed between the two rankings. 
The high average value of 0.84  over all the faults considered as well as the 
excellent match ( 0.9  ) for 11 out of 17 faults suggest a strong correlation between 
the rankings It this validates the hypothesis that monitoring performance of PCA 












Table 5.7: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ) between rankings based on 
Minsep and MDR values for  all variable subsets comprising of 2 and 3 variables 





IDV 6 0.5619 
IDV 7 0.9602 
IDV 8 0.9075 
IDV 10 0.9419 
IDV 11 0.7417 
IDV 12 0.9651 
IDV 13 0.9619 
IDV 14 0.6836 
IDV 16 0.9281 
IDV 17 0.9318 
IDV 18 0.6993 
IDV 19 0.7314 
IDV 20 0.8983 
Average 0.8388 
 
5.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
Selection of key variables for improving the monitoring performance of PCA 
based model is discussed in this chapter. It has been shown theoretically that a PCA 
model with only a small number of key variables of a fault can provide significant 
improvement in monitoring that fault. A metric is proposed to systematically evaluate 
the monitoring performance of any set of variables for a given fault directly from 
some representative (or training) data from normal and that fault operations. The 
metric calculation requires minimum computational effort since it is based on 
determinants of the cumulative and normal covariance matrices. This metric can be 
used to effectively obtain a small number (2 or 3) of key variables of a fault by 







The proposed inseparability metric shares some conceptual similarity with the 
mutual information metric of Verron et al. (2008). Their mutual information metric, I 
was expressed as: 













loglog5.0  (5.56) 
where, COVcom denotes the covariance matrix of the cumulative samples obtained by 
combining the data from all classes; p(Ci) is the probability of occurrence of i-th class; 
iC
COV stands for covariance matrix of i-th class and N is the total number of classes. 
The main difference between the proposed inseparability metric and their mutual 
information metric is that the latter uses determinants of covariance matrix of all 
classes and is therefore suitable for estimating the performances of multiclass 
classifiers where the data from all the classes are used to train the classifiers whereas 
our inseparability metric (Minsep) uses only the determinant of covariance matrix of 
normal class and thus it is suitable for estimating the performances of one-class 
classifiers such as PCA where typically the data from only normal class is used to 
train the classifiers. This mutual information metric cannot be used to estimate the 
performance of one-class classifier like PCA. 
The excellent ability of the proposed metric in correctly identifying fault 
specific key variables is illustrated through the benchmark Tennessee Eastman case 
study. It has been shown that a reduced PCA model comprising only the key variables 
as identified by the proposed inseparability metric has significantly improved 
monitoring performance compared to a full PCA model that uses all measurements. 







controlled variable in a control loop, it perturbs the correlation between the 
manipulated and controlled variables. In such cases, the controlled and manipulated 
variable pair is correctly identified as the key variable by our proposed metric. Even 
in those cases where the root cause is unknown, the proposed metric zooms in on 
variables and their phenomena that is instrumental in locating the root cause. This 
would be useful to plant operators and engineers who must quickly diagnose any 
abnormal behaviour in the process and take remedial actions.  
The analysis presented in this work has adopted a fault-specific perspective. 
However, various faults would occur in a process. The use of key variables of one 
fault does not guarantee good monitoring performance for other faults. For example, 
the reduced PCA model RA10 comprising only the key variables of IDV10 has low 
MDR for IDV10, but its performance for other faults is poor. Therefore, it is 
necessary to develop a monitoring scheme that offers good detection accuracy for all 
the faults that may occur in the process. Developing such a monitoring scheme is the 




Chapter 6 Reduced PCA Models for Process 
Monitoring - Performance 
Enhancement through two schemes 
– (i) selection of an optimal set of 
key variables, and (ii) Multiple 
Fault-Specific Models  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Process monitoring plays an important role in the safe operation of chemical 
processes. The task of monitoring involves detection of abnormal process behaviour. 
For successful monitoring, it is important to detect all the faults that may occur in a 
process as early as possible. Early detection of fault not only enables prevention of 
major accidents but also reduces the maintenance downtime, and is instrumental in 
maintaining plant throughput. Process monitoring techniques can be broadly classified 
into: model-based and data-based methods (Venkatsubramaniam et al., 2003; Chiang 
et al., 2001). Model-based techniques require a comprehensive mathematical model 
which is often difficult or costly to obtain for complex chemical processes. Data-
driven techniques have therefore become attractive not only because process data are 
readily available for use in many process systems, but also because the techniques do 
not need any rigorous models. 
Among data-driven techniques, a popular category is multivariate statistical 
process monitoring (MSPM) methods such as principal component analysis (Kresta et 
al., 1991), partial least square (Piovoso and Kosanovich, 1994), fisher discriminant 
analysis (Chiang et al., 2000), and Correspondence Analysis (Detroja et. al. 2007). 
Apart from these, various pattern classification based methods such as artificial neural 
network (Srinivasan et al., 2005a; b), Support vector machine (Mahadevan and Shah, 
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2009), self organizing map (Ng and Srinivasan, 2008a; b), and k-nearest neighbor (He 
and Wang, 2007) have also been used extensively. Monitoring performance of the 
data-driven techniques depends largely on the quality and quantity of the data used to 
build the monitoring model. Modern chemical plants contain a large number of mass- 
and heat-integrated unit operations and thousands of process variables are measured 
regularly. Not all the measured variables are however equally important for process 
monitoring. Usually, only a small subset of the recorded variables, called key 
variables, carries essential information about a fault that can affect a process and is 
hence more useful for developing a monitoring model.  
In the previous chapter (Chapter 5), the theoretical basis for the existence of 
key variables and their effect on the performance of PCA-based monitoring method is 
presented. It has been established there that a reduced PCA model comprising only a 
small number of key variables that contain useful information about a fault can 
significantly improve the effectiveness in monitoring that fault. Typically, a variety of 
faults can occur in a process and each would affect various variables to different 
extents. It is quite clear from the Chapter 5 that generally the set of key variables are 
fault specific, i.e., different faults have different sets of key variables. Therefore, 
monitoring a process using the key variables of a fault might not yield good detection 
performance for all other known faults that frequently affect the process. For instance, 
the reduced PCA model (RA10 in Chapter 5) comprising only the key variables of 
IDV10 has significantly low MDR for IDV10, but its performance for other faults is 
not acceptable. However, it is necessary to develop a monitoring scheme that offers 
good detection accuracy for all the faults that may occur, not for any specific fault 
since it is not known a-priori that which fault might occur and the performance of a 
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monitoring method should be judged based on its overall detection accuracies for all 
the faults that may occur.  
The objective of this chapter is to develop efficient process monitoring 
schemes that offer adequate performance in detecting a variety of faults that can affect 
a process.  Developing such monitoring scheme is a challenging task, since the 
analysis needs to consider and adjudicate among different sets of optimal variables for 
different faults. A comprehensive multi-fault analysis is therefore required. Such a 
monitoring scheme can be developed by pre-selecting an optimal set of key variables 
that can adequately monitor a variety of faults in a process. Therefore, a reduced PCA 
model comprising such optimal set of key variables is expected to have good 
detection rate for all the faults. However, the selection of this optimal set of key 
variables is not a trivial task particularly, for a large scale process. The variable 
selection strategy suffers from the combinatorial explosion. For a process with n 
measured variables, there are 12 n choices which cannot be explored exhaustively 
when n is large. For these reasons, in this chapter of the thesis, we propose a 
stochastic optimization based approach using Genetic Algorithm (GA) for selecting 
the optimal set of key variables that can yield improved monitoring performance for 
all faults.   
However, constructing a single monitoring model with a set of selected 
optimal key variables may lead to a trade-off between the various faults since the key 
variables for each fault is different. Recently, Ghosh et al., (2011a; b) demonstrated 
the benefits of using multiple methods simultaneously for process monitoring and 
fault diagnosis. Another approach would be to exploit the differing effects and deploy 
a set of fault-specific monitoring models, each based on the key variables of a specific 
fault. This approached is also explored in this Chapter. One of the key challenges in 
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such an approach is the design of a suitable fusion scheme that assigns context-
sensitive weights to the results of each reduced model, as the same model may have 
good detection accuracy for some faults and poor accuracy for others. This will be 
addressed in this chapter of the thesis. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows: in Chapter 2, we provide a brief 
literature review on feature selection, a related topic widely studied in the pattern 
recognition literature. Based on those insights, a GA based scheme for selection of 
optimal set of key variables is presented in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, the efficacy of 
the proposed GA based scheme is illustrated through the benchmark Tennessee 
Eastman process challenge problem. Then a multi-model based process monitoring 
scheme using multiple reduced PCA models with different fault specific key variables 
is presented in Section 6.4. The benefits of the proposed multi-model based 
monitoring scheme are also illustrated through the Tennessee Eastman process 
challenge problem in this section. 
6.2 Optimization-based Approach for Variable Selection  
In this section, a stochastic optimization scheme using GA based wrapper is 
proposed to systematically select the most relevant informative variables, i.e., optimal 
set of key variables, in a large scale process. The problem of variable selection can be 
defined as follows: given a labelled training and test dataset, find a subset of the 
variables such that a monitoring model built using these variables has the best 
possible monitoring performance on the test data. Here this combinatorial search for 
the optimal subset of variable is performed using a genetic algorithm (GA). Our 
objective is to develop a reduced PCA model that yields the best possible monitoring 
performance on the available test data. The performance of the PCA model is 
measured in terms of cumulative false alarm and missed detection rates.  This leads to 
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a multi-objective optimization problem in which the two objectives are: (i) 
maximization of monitoring performance, and (ii) minimization of number of selected 
variables. 
This optimization problem can be solved using a variety of techniques. We use 
stochastic optimization in this chapter. Specifically, the non-dominated sorting 
genetic algorithm (NSGA) suggested by Goldberg (Goldberg, 1989) and implemented 
by Srinivas and Deb (1994) is popular for multi-objective optimization. Deb et al. 
(2002) introduced NSGA-II as an improved method which alleviates computational 
complexity. Recently, Kasat and Gupta (2003) developed the jumping gene (JG) 
operator to improve the convergence speed of NSGA-II. We therefore use NSGA-II-
JG to solve the variable selection problem. The chromosome design, fitness functions, 
and genetic operators for the proposed GA are described next. 
The monitoring performance of a PCA model depends on two factors – the set 
of variables used to develop the model and the levels of confidence limits of T
2
 and Q 
statistics. The level of confidence limits of the T
2
 and Q statistics are usually set by 
the user. In this work, instead of relying on the user to specify these, we use the GA to 
optimize these parameters simultaneously with the combination of variable subset 
selection. As shown in Fig. 6.1, the chromosome is a vector with n+2 elements (genes) 
where n is the total number of measured variables. The first n elements encode the 
variables to be used by the monitoring model. These can take binary values where 1 
stands for the presence and 0 for the absence of a variable in the selected subset. As 
an example, 01010000 indicates that only the second and fourth variables are selected 
and included in the monitoring model while the remaining 6 variables are not. The 
last two elements of the chromosome represent the confidence limits for T
2
 and Q 
statistics and take real values. For simplicity, all the elements in the chromosomes 
168 
 
have been implemented using real coding wherein the binary elements (the first n 
elements) are represented as real-valued ones in [0 1], that are then rounded off to 
convert to binary elements. 
 
Fig. 6.1: Structure of chromosome 
 
Two competing objectives are defined as fitness functions. Given a 
chromosome, a PCA model relying only on the selected variables is developed. The 
monitoring performance of this PCA model on the test dataset is evaluated based on (i) 
false alarm rate, FAR, defined as the percentage of normal samples indentified as 
abnormal and (ii) missed detection rate, MDR, the percentage of faulty samples 
















MDR  (6.2) 
where, NN,F is the number of normal samples in the test dataset that has been flagged 
as abnormal, NF,N is the number of fault samples in the test dataset that has been 
Parameter genes (last two genes in the chromosome) 
Q confidence limit 
T
2
 confidence limit 
Variable genes (first n genes in the chromosome) 




0 1 0 1 0 ….. 0 0.99 0.99 
 
Variable 2 is selected 
Variable 1 is not selected 
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identified as normal, NN  is the total number of normal samples in the test dataset, and 
NF is the total number of fault samples in the test dataset. The sum of these two error 
rates is considered as the cumulative error. Minimization of this cumulative error is 
the first objective.  
  MDRFARMinI 1  (6.3) 
The second objective is the minimization of the number of variables  n used in the 
reduced model. i.e., 
  nMinI 2  (6.4) 
Four genetic operators, selection, crossover, mutation, and jumping gene are 
used in the proposed GA. Binary tournament selection, which can yield better results 
than the methods of proportional and genitor selection, is adopted to select the next 
generation chromosome. The simulated binary crossover (SBX) and polynomial 
mutation (Deb, 2002) are employed along with the jumping gene operator of Kasat 
and Gupta (2005) wherein, a randomly selected chromosomal chunk of the daughters 
is replaced by a newly generated chunk.  
The proposed GA-based variable selection scheme is shown schematically in 
Fig. 6.2.  First, an initial population of chromosomes is randomly generated. Each 
chromosome in the population represents a set of variables to be used in the PCA 
monitoring model, and the confidence limits for the T
2
 and Q statistics. The PCA 
monitoring model is then developed for each chromosome using the autoscaled 
normal operations training data. Auto-scaling ensures that each variable has a zero 
mean and unit variance and thus provides equal weight to each variable in the 
resulting PCA model. The test dataset (containing data from both normal and faulty 
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operations) is also scaled according to the mean and standard deviation of the training 
data and then used to calculate the performance of the PCA monitoring model 
characterized by the chromosome. This monitoring performance is considered to be 
the fitness of the chromosome. Chromosomes are subjected to genetic operations, and 
the population of the next generation is obtained by elitism. The GA terminates when 
the maximum number of generations is reached. Next, we report the application of 
this scheme to a case study. 
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6.3 Case Study: Tennessee Eastman Challenge Process 
In this section, the proposed variable selection scheme is applied to the 
Tennessee Eastman process. The TE process case study presented here is the same as 
that described in Chapter 5. There are 21 kinds of programmed faults (Chiang et al. 
2001) in TE process. All these 21 faults are considered here. The training dataset 
consists of 500 samples from normal operating condition and 480 samples from each 
of the 21 fault conditions. The test dataset contains 960 samples from both normal as 
well as 21 faults. All faults in the test dataset are introduced at sample 160. The 
training and test datasets used here were obtained from http://brahms.scs.uiuc.edu/. 
For all the PCA models (both full as well as reduced) evaluated in this chapter, 
the percent variance method is employed to determine the number of PCs to be 
retained. The first a number of PCs that correspond to more than 95% of cumulative 
variance are selected and used for process monitoring. In TE case study, for the full 
PCA model, out of a total of 52 PCs, only the first 36 PCs were adequate to explain 
95% of cumulative variance. These 36 PCs were retained and used to compute both T
2
 
and Q statistics.  A fault is flagged when either the T
2
 or Q statistics exceeds its 
threshold. To eliminate the effect of noise that might be present in the data the 
detection delay is measured as the first time instant at which either the T
2
 or Q 
threshold is exceeded for five consecutive samples. The FAR is calculated from 960 
samples of normal operation data used in testing. First, we construct a full PCA model 
using all the 52 measured variables with 99.99% confidence limits for both T
2
 and Q 
statistics. The MDRs and detection delays of this full PCA model for all 21 faults are 
summarized in Table 6.1 along with the FAR and cumulative error rate. The 
performance of this full PCA model matches with those reported by Chiang et al. 
(2001). Overall, the FAR is small (1.56%), but the average MDR is high (33.95%). 
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The MDR for 11 faults is very low (<10%) while those of the remaining ten faults are 
very high (32.5%-98.6%). Particularly, three faults: IDV3, IDV9 and IDV15 have 
MDR over 90%.  
Table 6.1: Monitoring performances of two full PCA models at different confidence 
limits 
 99.99% confidence limits  Optimized confidence limits 
Fault ID MDR (%) Detection delay 
(Samples) 
MDR (%) Detection delay       
(Samples) 
IDV1 0.125 6 0.125 6 
IDV2 1.25 16 0.875 13 
IDV3 98.625 729 91.375 540 
IDV4 0.25 9 0 5 
IDV5 73.625 5 64.875 5 
IDV6 0 5 0 5 
IDV7 0 5 0 5 
IDV8 2.25 23 1.875 22 
IDV9 97.625 735 90.875 735 
IDV10 48.5 52 29.75 38 
IDV11 32.5 11 21.375 11 
IDV12 1.125 12 0.875 7 
IDV13 4.875 46 4.5 41 
IDV14 0.125 6 0 5 
IDV15 96.25 773 86.625 580 
IDV16 55.25 21 37 19 
IDV17 4.375 26 2.75 26 
IDV18 9.875 88 9 80 
IDV19 85.875 477 59.25 85 
IDV20 45.75 85 31.25 85 
IDV21 54.625 271 43.375 259 
Average 33.95 162 27.45 123 





Since the PCA monitoring performance depends on the confidence limits of 
the T
2
 and Q statistics, the effect of these parameters on the monitoring performance 
is evaluated. Fig. 6.3 shows the effect of changing the confidence limits of T
2
 and Q 
statistics on the cumulative error rate of the full PCA model. It can be seen that the 
cumulative error rate reaches a minimum (~33%) at 99.66% and 99.83% confidence 
limits of T
2
 and Q statistics, respectively. This indicates that the optimization of these 
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two parameters is important in addition to optimizing the subset of variables to be 
used by the PCA model. The monitoring performance of the full PCA model at these 
optimal values of the confidence limits is also reported in Table 6.1. It should be 
noted that the MDRs for 18 faults have improved; for the remaining 3, it is the same 
as for the 99.99% confidence limits. The detection delay also improves by an average 
of 39 samples and does not increase for any fault. Although the FAR increases by 
3.65%, the cumulative error is still better with the optimized confidence limits. 
Henceforth, we use this performance as the baseline full PCA model for comparison. 
 
Fig. 6.3: Effect of T
2
 and Q statistics confidence limits on cumulative error rate of the 
full PCA model 
As discussed in Chapter 5, each fault may affect different variables to a 
different extent. Next, we study the extent of this variation in the TE case study. To 
quantify each fault’s effect on different variables, we use univariate bounds to 
monitor the process. We calculate the MDR for each fault based on the derived bound 
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as 99.99% confidence on the T
2
 monitoring statistics. The results from this analysis 
are shown in Table 6.2. For instance, when the process is monitored solely using 
XMEAS1, all the samples from IDV6 can be detected correctly (MDR = 0%) while 
none of the samples from IDV3, IDV14-IDV17, IDV19-IDV21 are flagged as 
abnormal (MDR = 100%). A low MDR value ( 0% ) represents a case where the 
variable (in rows) is significantly affected by the fault (in columns); consequently, the 
fault can be readily detected using the variable alone. On the other hand, a high MDR 
value reflects a scenario where the fault does not have any significant impact on the 
variable. Thus, these MDRs provide a quantitative indication of the extent a variable 
is affected by a fault. The average MDR for all the fault-variable combination is 86% 
indicating the limited effect of many faults on many variables. 686 combinations 
(63%) have a MDR of 100% which indicates that the faults have no effect on those 
variables. Therefore, elimination of such variables from the PCA monitoring model 
would improve its detection performance. As an illustration consider IDV10. The 
performance of the full PCA model on this fault is poor (MDR = 48.5%). Table 6.2 
shows that for IDV10, the MDR of each variable ranges from 79% to 100% with a 
mean of 96%. The effect of this fault is best seen on XMEAS18-XMEAS20 where the 
MDRs are about 79%. A reduced PCA model comprising only these three variables 
and with 99.99% confidence limits of the monitoring statistics has a MDR of 20.63% 
for IDV10 (see Table 6.3) which is a significant improvement over the full PCA 
model. This example shows the promise of variable selection since a reduced model 
comprising only the most affected variables offers better detection performance over 
the full PCA model.  
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Table 6.2: Missed detection rates (%) for various fault when monitored using different variables 
 IDV1 IDV2 IDV3 IDV4 IDV5 IDV6 IDV7 IDV8 IDV9 IDV10 IDV11 IDV12 IDV13 IDV14 IDV15 IDV16 IDV17 IDV18 IDV19 IDV20 IDV21 
XMEAS1 
1.25 99.50 100.00 100.00 93.13 0.00 82.00 52.63 100.00 97.38 100.00 66.75 63.38 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 18.75 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS2 
99.88 99.75 100.00 99.88 99.75 99.88 99.50 99.88 99.88 100.00 100.00 98.75 94.88 100.00 99.75 100.00 100.00 97.88 100.00 99.88 100.00 
XMEAS3 
92.38 30.75 99.63 99.88 94.38 10.00 85.13 75.13 99.88 98.50 100.00 65.13 54.00 99.88 99.75 98.88 99.75 16.88 100.00 99.88 100.00 
XMEAS4 
9.13 61.13 99.88 100.00 92.00 10.88 83.50 60.63 99.88 97.63 100.00 53.88 57.38 99.88 100.00 99.00 99.88 14.38 100.00 99.75 100.00 
XMEAS5 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 90.63 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS6 
100.00 99.88 99.88 100.00 99.88 99.88 99.88 99.25 99.88 100.00 100.00 96.38 98.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 23.13 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS7 
75.63 82.25 100.00 99.75 87.13 3.00 76.38 25.00 99.63 84.75 98.75 28.75 27.13 100.00 98.63 93.38 96.00 13.63 100.00 93.63 70.50 
XMEAS8 
94.13 99.88 100.00 100.00 97.75 99.25 87.00 81.25 100.00 99.50 100.00 69.25 69.75 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 16.25 100.00 99.88 64.63 
XMEAS9 
100.00 100.00 100.00 99.88 100.00 100.00 99.75 99.88 100.00 100.00 63.13 90.13 99.25 12.38 100.00 100.00 45.50 97.88 99.50 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS10 
91.75 1.50 99.88 100.00 97.13 5.63 91.25 35.63 100.00 100.00 100.00 82.25 60.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.88 20.75 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS11 
84.00 16.50 99.75 99.50 88.63 4.00 82.88 42.00 99.88 96.50 99.25 25.50 36.75 99.88 99.63 98.00 93.38 13.38 100.00 90.00 79.88 
XMEAS12 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS13 
74.88 83.25 100.00 99.63 87.00 2.88 76.25 26.13 99.75 85.25 99.00 28.63 27.63 100.00 99.13 93.25 96.00 13.50 100.00 71.13 71.25 
XMEAS14 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.88 100.00 99.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS15 
100.00 100.00 99.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS16 
77.13 85.88 100.00 99.63 87.50 2.38 77.88 22.75 99.38 85.50 98.50 31.38 25.13 100.00 97.88 94.75 97.88 13.38 99.75 94.00 69.63 
XMEAS17 




16.25 10.00 100.00 100.00 88.25 10.88 73.25 49.63 100.00 79.00 99.38 43.75 19.13 100.00 97.00 85.25 99.13 18.63 100.00 99.63 98.25 
XMEAS19 
31.88 10.38 100.00 100.00 88.13 5.63 75.88 52.50 100.00 78.88 97.88 46.25 20.00 100.00 96.63 81.00 99.75 20.75 100.00 99.50 64.88 
XMEAS20 
71.75 95.13 99.25 100.00 80.88 0.50 69.25 42.88 99.50 79.38 100.00 36.75 34.38 100.00 100.00 89.88 97.38 13.88 100.00 66.63 98.25 
XMEAS21 
91.13 99.38 100.00 100.00 93.50 5.88 84.13 73.38 99.88 99.75 99.75 47.88 66.25 16.25 100.00 99.38 21.88 16.00 99.88 98.25 100.00 
XMEAS22 
94.38 9.38 100.00 100.00 98.00 5.63 93.38 80.00 100.00 99.88 100.00 40.00 59.00 99.88 99.88 100.00 99.38 17.75 100.00 96.63 99.63 
XMEAS23 
88.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 96.00 1.75 86.00 67.75 100.00 99.50 100.00 75.00 70.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.75 19.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS24 
98.75 84.25 100.00 100.00 99.25 97.25 96.25 74.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 88.75 77.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 22.75 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS25 
85.25 99.00 100.00 100.00 92.25 3.00 85.00 46.50 100.00 99.50 99.75 59.25 58.75 100.00 99.25 99.25 100.00 17.00 100.00 99.50 100.00 
XMEAS26 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.75 100.00 99.75 100.00 99.75 98.75 99.25 100.00 99.75 100.00 100.00 43.50 100.00 99.75 100.00 
XMEAS27 
89.75 98.50 100.00 100.00 92.25 94.50 82.75 68.25 100.00 97.00 100.00 61.25 57.50 100.00 100.00 99.00 99.75 17.00 99.75 99.75 100.00 
XMEAS28 
93.25 6.75 100.00 100.00 99.75 11.75 98.50 80.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 93.75 75.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 27.00 100.00 100.00 99.75 
XMEAS29 
83.00 99.75 100.00 100.00 93.00 1.25 82.25 52.75 99.75 96.00 100.00 61.50 57.50 100.00 100.00 99.75 100.00 18.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS30 
95.50 82.50 99.75 100.00 97.75 83.25 93.00 57.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 83.25 63.00 100.00 100.00 99.75 100.00 20.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS31 
82.00 97.25 100.00 100.00 90.75 2.25 82.25 36.25 99.25 96.50 99.50 47.75 47.75 100.00 99.00 97.50 100.00 15.25 100.00 98.00 100.00 
XMEAS32 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.75 99.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 98.50 87.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 32.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS33 
87.75 97.50 99.75 100.00 89.25 96.75 81.00 61.50 100.00 95.75 100.00 52.50 52.25 100.00 100.00 98.50 100.00 16.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS34 
82.50 6.25 100.00 100.00 98.75 6.25 93.25 65.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 84.75 62.75 100.00 99.75 100.00 100.00 22.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS35 
90.25 36.00 100.00 100.00 92.25 5.00 88.75 58.00 100.00 99.00 99.75 53.75 45.25 100.00 100.00 99.75 99.50 16.00 100.00 99.25 90.00 
XMEAS36 




100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS38 
75.63 98.13 99.38 100.00 85.63 8.13 71.88 45.00 100.00 86.25 100.00 38.13 29.38 100.00 100.00 95.00 98.75 18.13 100.00 98.75 100.00 
XMEAS39 
100.00 51.88 100.00 100.00 99.38 100.00 98.75 99.38 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 98.13 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 96.88 100.00 99.38 100.00 
XMEAS40 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.38 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 96.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMEAS41 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 95.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 96.25 100.00 100.00 99.38 100.00 94.38 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMV1 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 20.13 99.75 99.88 99.88 99.88 100.00 98.63 96.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 27.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMV2 
93.88 45.38 100.00 100.00 95.00 10.50 87.00 81.00 100.00 98.63 100.00 68.13 60.00 100.00 100.00 99.63 100.00 17.38 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMV3 
1.25 99.50 100.00 100.00 93.13 0.00 82.13 52.88 100.00 97.63 100.00 67.38 63.63 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 18.75 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMV4 
72.63 98.75 100.00 100.00 99.38 16.25 0.00 93.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 84.50 84.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.88 19.13 100.00 99.88 100.00 
XMV5 
78.38 88.63 99.63 100.00 83.50 8.38 72.88 47.13 99.88 85.75 100.00 36.63 36.38 100.00 99.88 94.13 98.50 15.00 96.38 51.75 97.25 
XMV6 
92.00 1.50 99.75 100.00 96.25 6.00 90.63 35.63 100.00 100.00 100.00 77.25 59.25 100.00 100.00 99.75 100.00 19.13 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMV7 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMV8 
100.00 100.00 99.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
XMV9 
22.50 10.25 100.00 100.00 88.13 7.00 75.13 51.25 100.00 82.00 97.63 45.25 21.00 100.00 96.25 88.75 100.00 21.13 100.00 100.00 72.63 
XMV10 
99.63 100.00 100.00 0.00 99.50 9.88 94.75 95.25 100.00 99.63 40.50 76.25 86.75 12.00 99.88 100.00 52.63 20.25 99.75 99.88 99.88 
XMV11 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 98.63 15.13 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.50 99.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 29.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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The subset of variables that yields the best performance for each fault would 
be different. For example, the reduced PCA model developed for IDV10 and 
comprising only 3 variables (XMEAS18–XMEAS20) has poor detection performance 
for other faults such as IDV4, IDV11, IDV14, IDV17, IDV19 as shown in Table 6.3 
since XMEAS18-XMEAS20 are not affected much by these faults (see Table 6.2). 
Therefore, to select the subset of variables that offers the best overall monitoring 
performance for the multi-fault scenario the GA based wrapper presented in Section 4 
has to be applied. Since, the selection of T
2
 and Q confidence limits affects the 
performance of the PCA model significantly as shown above, the GA optimizes the 
variable subset as well as the T
2
 and Q confidence limits to be used in the PCA model 
simultaneously. The GA parameters used in this study are listed in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.3: Monitoring performance of a reduced PCA model comprising 3 variables 
(XMEAS18-20) 
Fault ID Missed detection rate (%) Detection delay (Samples) 
IDV1 4.13 10 
IDV2 6.38 56 
IDV3 100 - 
IDV4 100 - 
IDV5 75.13 7 
IDV6 0.50 9 
IDV7 62.38 5 
IDV8 14.38 24 
IDV9 99.25 10 
IDV10 20.63 28 
IDV11 97.88 199 
IDV12 5.00 27 
IDV13 6.63 49 
IDV14 100 - 
IDV15 96.13 773 
IDV16 63.88 30 
IDV17 89.38 62 
IDV18 11.13 90 
IDV19 99.88 - 
IDV20 61.00 89 
IDV21 56.75 481 
Average 55.73 115 
False alarm rate (%) 0.42 
Cumulative Error Rate (%) 56.15 
180 
 
Table 6.4: Values of GA parameters  
Parameters Values 
Population size 100 
Number of Generations 1000 
Crossover rate 0.9 
Mutation rate 0.1 
Jumping gene 0.1 
 
The Pareto optimal front of the final population obtained from a GA run is 
shown in Fig. 6.4. Although the final population contains 100 non-dominated 
solutions, there are only seven unique solutions. All seven have better performance 
than the full PCA model (as shown in Fig. 6.4). Of the seven, four solutions (a to d) 
requiring 10–13 variables are considered for further analysis. Solutions with 7, 8 and 
9 variables have high cumulative error rate (>27.5%) and hence not considered. The 
set of variables used in each solution and the values of the confidence limits are listed 
in Table 6.5. 
 
Fig. 6.4: Pareto optimal front of final population 
181 
 
Table 6.5: Pareto optimal reduced PCA models and their monitoring performances  















 (%) Q (%) 







99.81 99.49 1.35 25.26 26.61 





99.74 99.53 1.98 24.40 26.38 





99.74 99.57 1.98 24.30 26.28 






99.84 99.69 1.46 23.84 25.30 
 
A close look at the selected variables in Solutions (a) to (d) reveal that 9 
variables (XMEAS17-18, 20-21, XMV4-5, 9-11) are present in all the four solutions. 
At least one of these 9 variables is affected strongly by the 13 faults: IDV1-2, IDV4, 
IDV6-8, IDV11-14, IDV17-18, and IDV20. For instance, XMEAS20 is significantly 
affected by IDV6, IDV8, IDV12, IDV13 and IDV18 (See Table 6.2). Similarly, IDV4, 
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IDV6, IDV11, IDV14 and IDV18 have a significant impact on XMV10. Therefore, 
the selection of these 9 variables may be responsible for the high detection rates for 
the above mentioned faults. Solution (b) is obtained by replacing XMEAS9 in 
Solution (a) with XMEAS5 and XMEAS19. Elimination of XMEAS9 leads to an 
increase in MDRs of IDV11 and IDV17 since both of these have an impact on 
XMEAS9 (See Table 6.2). The addition of XMEAS5 and XMEAS19 results in an 
increase in detection accuracy for IDV1, 8, 10, 12, 16, 18 , 19, and 21. As a 
consequence, there is a net 0.3% improvement in average MDR in Solution (b) over 
Solution (a). Solution (c) contains all the eleven variables in Solution (b), and 
additionally XMEAS4, which leads to a lower MDR for IDV1, IDV2, IDV8, and 
IDV12. As a result, the average MDR decreases slightly (by 0.1%). This provides an 
example of a situation where addition of a variable to an existing set can improve 
detection accuracy. Solution (d) can be obtained by removing XMEAS4 from 
Solution (c) and introducing XMEAS7 and XMEAS16. Elimination of XMEAS4 
leads to an increase in MDR of IDV12 while addition of XMEAS7 and XMEAS16 
results in decrease in MDRs of IDV1, IDV2, IDV8, IDV10, IDV13, and IDV21. It 
can be seen from Table 6.2 that XMEAS7 and XMEAS16 are affected by these faults. 
As a consequence, a further 1% improvement in average MDR is achieved. 
Next, the monitoring performance of Solution (d) is compared with that of the 
full PCA model. Overall, the reduced PCA model provides better performance with 
3.6% improvement in average MDR and a decrease of 60 samples in average 
detection delay (see Table 6.6). The FAR of the reduced PCA model is also quite 
good (1.46%) and significantly lower than that of the full PCA (21%). In particular, 
the MDRs decrease significantly for IDV5, IDV10, IDV16 and IDV19. These faults 
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have significant impact on XMEAS5, XMEAS7, XMEAS16, XMEAS18–XMEAS20, 
XMV5, and XMV9 that are selected in Solution (d).  
Table 6.6: Monitoring performance of Pareto optimal Solution (d)  
Fault ID Missed detection rate (%) Detection delay (Samples) 
IDV1 0.125 5 
IDV2 2.125 18 
IDV3 97.625 87 
IDV4 0 5 
IDV5 0.125 6 
IDV6 0.5 9 
IDV7 0 5 
IDV8 3.375 24 
IDV9 96.625 7 
IDV10 17.75 29 
IDV11 35.25 15 
IDV12 1 7 
IDV13 5 45 
IDV14 0 5 
IDV15 90.25 577 
IDV16 18.375 14 
IDV17 15.125 26 
IDV18 10.5 90 
IDV19 23.875 15 
IDV20 33.625 79 
IDV21 49.375 261 
Average 23.84 63 
False alarm rate (%) 1.46 
Cumulative Error Rate (%) 25.30 
 
The relative effect of a unit change in the i
th
 variable on the T
2
 statistics can be 














  (6.5) 
where, jiv , represents the element in i
th
 row and j
th
 column of the loading matrix V. 
Dividing Wi by 
2
T  yields a normalized weight W that can be compared across 



















  (6.6) 
Table 6.7 compares the iW
~
of 13 variables (variables selected in solution d) in 
the reduced and full PCA models. It is evident that there is a 5-fold increase in their 
normalized weights in the reduced PCA model which is responsible for the 
improvement in the MDRs. However, for IDV2, IDV6, IDV11, and IDV17 the MDRs 
obtained from the reduced PCA model is higher since the variables most affected by 
these faults are not included in the reduced model. For instance, IDV6 affects 
XMEAS1 and XMV3 significantly. Their absence in the reduced PCA model leads to 
lower detection rate. Similarly, XMEAS10, 28, 34 and XMV6 are most significantly 
affected by IDV2, but none of these are included in the reduced PCA model, and 
consequently, the reduced model has higher MDR.  
Table 6.7: Comparison of normalized weights for the variables in the reduced PCA 
model  
Variables Reduced PCA model Full PCA model 
XMEAS5 3.86E-02 1.58E-02 
XMEAS7 1.51E-02 2.28E-03 
XMEAS16 3.48E-02 2.74E-03 
XMEAS17 1.01E-02 4.28E-03 
XMEAS18 6.11E-03 2.12E-03 
XMEAS19 7.48E-03 3.35E-03 
XMEAS20 1.87E-02 2.94E-03 
XMEAS21 5.24E-02 5.34E-03 
XMV4 4.09E-02 1.43E-02 
XMV5 1.79E-02 3.91E-03 
XMV9 6.68E-03 2.89E-03 
XMV10 4.73E-02 8.26E-03 
XMV11 1.01E-02 4.28E-03 
 
Overall, the reduced PCA model has better performance since it is more 
sensitive to many faults and detects them earlier. It’s FAR and MDR are lower by 
about 3.6%, and detection delay by ~60 samples, leading to a reduction in the 
185 
 
cumulative error rate by about 7.35% over the full model. Zhang (2008) reported the 
performance of KPCA, an advanced nonlinear MSPM method on the same TE dataset. 
In Zhang (2008) MDRs are reported separately for T
2
 and Q statistic violations. In this 
work, following the more widely used criterion, a fault is detected if either T
2
 or Q 
statistic exceeds its threshold, i.e., the effect of T
2
 and Q statistics is considered jointly. 
For the sake of comparison, the proposed scheme was applied to develop a reduced 
model optimized only for T
2
 statistic violation. Eight of the 11 variables selected in 
this optimized PCA model are the same as those reported in Table 6.5. For 19 out of 
the 21 faults, the reduced PCA model provides equal or lower MDR than that from 
the KPCA based method. This results in a significant reduction of about 14% in the 
average MDR (from 42% for the KPCA to 31.64% for the reduced PCA model). This 
shows that the reduced PCA models with appropriately selected variables can 
outperform even more sophisticated methods. A similar study with the Q statistic 
violation criterion also showed that the reduced PCA had a 4% reduction (from 
30.52% in KPCA to 26.87%) in the average MDR.  
To monitor a large scale complex process holistically for a variety of known 
faults we also propose a multiple reduced PCA models based process monitoring 
scheme, where each PCA model uses the fault’s key variables. The proposed multi-
model based scheme for process monitoring is presented next. 
6.4  Process monitoring based on fault-specific reduced PCA models  
It has been seen in the Chapter 5 of this thesis that in most of the cases only a 
small number of key variables (typically 2 or 3) are adequate for monitoring a given 
fault. In this work, we use the inseparability metric (Minsep) proposed in Chapter 5 to 
identify a small number (2 or 3) of key variables for a fault through brute force 
enumeration over all possible variable subsets comprising 2 and 3 variables. The 
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subset of variables which has the lowest value of the metric, Minsep for a fault is 
considered as the key variables of that fault. 
Following steps are used to identify the key variables for each fault 
Step 1: First, for each fault the value of the inseparability metric Minsep is computed, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, for all possible subsets comprising small number (usually 2 
or 3) of variables.  
Step 2: Second, the subset with lowest value of the inseparability metric Minsep is 
identified as the key variables for monitoring that fault.  
Step 3: Steps (1) and (2) are repeated for all the known faults to determine the key 
variables for each fault. The identified key variable subset comprising both 2 as well 
as 3 variables are summarized in Table 6.8 for each fault. 
Table 6.8: Key variables identified for 17 faults in TE case study 
Fault ID Best 2 Key Variables Best 3 Key Variables 
IDV1 XMEAS1, XMEAS16 XMEAS1, XMEAS16, XMV9 
IDV2 XMEAS10, XMEAS34 XMEAS10, XMEAS30, XMEAS34 
IDV4 XMEAS9, XMV10 XMEAS9, XMEAS16, XMV10 
IDV5 XMEAS17, XMV11 XMEAS17, XMV9, XMV11 
IDV6 XMEAS16, XMV10 XMEAS1, XMV3, XMV10 
IDV7 XMEAS7, XMV4 XMEAS7, XMV4, XMV9 
IDV8 XMEAS16, XMEAS20 XMEAS7, XMEAS20, XMV9 
IDV10 XMEAS18, XMV9 XMEAS18, XMEAS38, XMV9 
IDV11 XMEAS9, XMV10 XMEAS9, XMEAS21, XMV10 
IDV12 XMEAS18, XMV9 XMEAS7, XMEAS18, XMV9 
IDV13 XMEAS16, XMV9 XMEAS16, XMEAS38, XMV9 
IDV14 XMEAS21, XMEAS10 XMEAS13, XMEAS21, XMV10 
IDV16 XMEAS19, XMV9 XMEAS18, XMEAS19, XMV9 
IDV17 XMEAS9, XMEAS21 XMEAS9, XMEAS21, XMV10 
IDV18 XMEAS13, XMV5 XMEAS13, XMV5, XMV10 
IDV19 XMEAS20, XMV5 XMEAS13,XMEAS16, XMV5 
IDV20 XMEAS7, XMV13 XMEAS7, XMEAS13, XMEAS20 
 
Once the key variables of each process fault are identified, multiple reduced 
PCA models, each with the key variables of a fault (as identified in Step 3), are 
generated. Thus, for each known process fault a reduced PCA model is obtained 
which is a specialist to detect that fault efficiently. 
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Next, we will compare the monitoring performances of these reduced PCA models, 
each comprising only 2 or 3 key variables with that of the full PCA model constructed 
with all 52 variables in Tennessee Eastman process case study. 
For all the PCA models, full as well as reduced ones, evaluated here, the 
cumulative percent variance method is employed to determine the number of PCs to 
be retained. The first m numbers of PCs that correspond to more than 95% of 
cumulative variance are retained. For the full PCA model, out of a total of 52 PCs, the 
first 36 PCs are adequate to explain 95% of cumulative variance. Hence, these 36 PCs 
were retained in the full PCA model. 99.99% confidence level is used in this work to 
determine both T
2
 and Q statistics thresholds of each PCA model to ensure very low 
false alarm rate. A fault is flagged when either the T
2
 or Q statistics exceeds its 
threshold. 
Table 6.9 presents the monitoring performances of 17 reduced PCA models 
constructed with the best key variables comprising both 2 and 3 variables for each 
fault along with the monitoring performance of full PCA model with all 52 variables. 
In Table 6.9, reduced PCA model RA1 uses the best 2 key variables for IDV1, while 
the best 3 key variables for IDV1 is used to construct reduced PCA model RB1 and so 
on. It can be seen from Table 6.9 that for 6 process faults (IDV 5, 10, 11, 16, 19 and 
20) significant improvement in MDRs (on an average about 39% decrease in MDR) 
can be achieved just by incorporating only 2 or 3 key variables in the reduced PCA 
models. Again, for 4 faults (IDV 4, 6, 7 and 14) zero MDRs are achieved using the 
reduced models with just 2 or 3 key variables which clearly suggest that just 2 or 3 
key variables are sufficient to detect these faults with 100% accuracy. Similarly, for 
IDV 1 and 2 MDRs obtained from the reduced PCA models with only 2 key variables 
are negligibly small (<1.8.%) and these MDRs are almost same as that for full model 
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with all 52 variables. Therefore, only 2 key variables are adequate to monitor these 
two faults. Thus, it is evident from Table 6.9 that for most of the faults only a very 
small number (2 or 3) of key variables are sufficient to provide excellent monitoring 
performance. 
Table 6.9: Monitoring performances of various PCA models  
Fault ID Full PCA 
model  
Reduced PCA model 
with 2 key variables  
Reduced PCA models 
with 3 key variables 












IDV1 0.125 RA1 0.375 0 RB1 0.375 0.21 
IDV2 1.25 RA2 1.75 0 RB2 1.25 0 
IDV4 0.25 RA4 0 0 RB4 0 0.1 
IDV5 73.625 RA5 0.5 0.21 RB5 0.5 0.21 
IDV6 0 RA6 2 0.1 RB6 0 0.1 
IDV7 0 RA7 0 0 RB7 0 0.1 
IDV8 2.25 RA8 8.5 0.62 RB8 6.25 0.31 
IDV10 48.5 RA10 25.75 0.52 RB10 23.375 0.31 
IDV11 32.5 RA11 19.625 0 RB11 20.125 0 
IDV12 1.125 RA12 12.125 0.52 RB12 3.5 0.73 
IDV13 4.875 RA13 7.75 0.21 RB13 5.125 0.52 
IDV14 0.125 RA14 0 0 RB14 0 0.1 
IDV16 55.25 RA16 21.25 0 RB16 23.875 0.21 
IDV17 4.375 RA17 5.875 0 RB17 5.875 0 
IDV18 9.875 RA18 12.5 0.21 RB18 12.125 0.21 
IDV19 85.875 RA19 59.875 0.21 RB19 21.875 0.21 
IDV20 45.75 RA20 26.375 0.1 RB20 24.625 0.62 
Average 






FAR (%) 1.56       
 
However, it can be seen from Table 6.9 that out of 17 fault scenarios studied only 
for 5 faults (IDVs 8, 12, 13, 17 and 18) MDRs obtained with the best 2 or 3 key 
variables are on an average about 2% higher than the MDRs obtained with the full 
PCA model. It can be noticed that for these 5 faults the reduced PCA models with 3 
key variables perform better than those with 2 key variables. Monitoring performance 
of a reduced PCA model comprising 13 variables is presented in Table 6.6 wherein a 
reduced PCA model with 13 variables was shown to have lower MDR for these 5 
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faults. For instance, the reduced PCA model comprising 13 variables provided 
3.375% MDR for IDV08 which is about 3% less than that of reduced model with 3 
key variables. This might be due to the fact only 2 or 3 key variables (as identified in 
Table 6.8) are not adequate enough for monitoring these faults and inclusion of 
additional key variables might lead to further improvement in monitoring 
performance. Nevertheless, even for these 5 faults the MDRs achieved with 2 or 3 key 
variables are still reasonably low and only about 0.3% (in IDV13) to about 4% (in 
IDV8) more than that of the full model. Therefore, only a small number of key 
variables (2 and 3) identified in Table 6.8 for each fault provides reasonably good 
performance in monitoring each fault. 
Now all the reduced PCA models, each with the key variables of a known 
fault, can be deployed simultaneously for online process monitoring. Very good 
monitoring performance for all the known faults can be achieved if the results from 
such reduced PCA models are combined suitably. Each PCA model assigns an online 
sample either as normal or abnormal. Therefore, a suitable decision fusion scheme is 
required to combine the outputs of such multiple models in a meaningful manner and 
to resolve the conflicts among them. Effectiveness of utility based voting and 
evidence based weighted voting, Bayesian fusion schemes for combining multiple 
heterogeneous FDI method was evaluated in Ghosh et.al. (2011). Ghosh et al (2011) 
also proposed a Demster-Shafer evidence theory based fusion scheme for combining 
hierarchical FDI methods where the conventional voting and Bayesian based fusion 
scheme are not well suited. Combing the results of such fault specific reduced PCA 
models, poses challenge. Because, it is very difficult to assign due credit to a 
monitoring model which flags the fault correctly as the same PCA model may have 
poor detection accuracy for other faults. Therefore, conventional voting, Bayesian and 
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D-S fusion schemes cannot be applied here directly to combine the outputs from 
multiple reduced PCA models.  We used simple AND logic to combine the outputs of 
multiple monitoring models. This simple AND logic based fusion scheme is discussed 
next. 
6.4.1 Fusion scheme - Simple AND logic 
It should be noted that each reduced model is a specialist to detect only a fault. 
It has very high detection rate for a specific fault, but its performance for all other 
faults is rather poor. For example, reduced model RA5 provides very low MDR for 
IDV5, but has very high MDRs for most other faults such as IDV1 IDV4, IDV7, 
IDV9-12, IDV14-17, and IDV19-20. As a result, the average MDR of each of the 17 
reduced PCA models becomes quite high, more than 61%. This suggests that a 
suitable decision fusion scheme is required to combine the outputs of such multiple 
reduced PCA models. Therefore, in order to exploit the strength of each specialist 
monitoring model to the maximum possible extent, a simple AND logic is used to 
combine the outputs of such multiple models. In this fusion scheme, a sample is 
classified as normal if all the monitoring models deployed detect it as normal, 
otherwise if the sample is assigned as abnormal by any of the models, it is considered 
as abnormal. This fusion strategy ensures that the detection capability of each 
specialist model is utilized to the fullest. However, one shortcoming of this fusion 
strategy is that the false alarm rate (FAR) of each method is amplified upon 
combination. If one of the models misclassifies a normal sample as abnormal, then 
according to this fusion scheme this sample will be assigned as abnormal, even 
though all other models correctly classify it as normal and there is no way to rectify 
this wrong result. This problem can be alleviated to a large extent, if the false alarm 
rate of each individual model is negligibly small (~0). In order to ensure negligible 
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FAR of each reduced PCA model, in this work 99.99% confidence limit is used for 
both T
2
 and Q statistics thresholds. The proposed multiple reduced PCA models based 
monitoring scheme is presented next. 
6.4.2 Reduced PCA models based Monitoring 
Let, Fi be the i
th
 fault in the system and there are total N known faults in the 
system. i.e, Ni ,...,2,1 . The key variables for the fault Fi is denoted by iKV . Ri 
represents the reduced PCA model constructed with the key variables iKV . Following 
steps are used to generate multiple reduced PCA models, Ri, where Ni ,...,2,1 . 
Step 1: First, for a fault Fi, the value of the inseparability metric Mins is computed for 
all possible subsets comprising small number (usually 2 or 3) of variables.  
Step 2: The subset with lowest value of the inseparability metric Mins is identified as 
the key variables iKV  for monitoring the fault Fi.  
Step 3: Key variables iKV  of all N known faults are identified by applying the Steps 
(1) and (2) repeatedly over all N known faults. i.e, Ni ,...,2,1 . 
Step 4: A reduced PCA model, Ri is constructed using the key variables KVi of the 
fault Fi. Thus, for each known process fault Fi a reduced PCA model Ri is obtained 
which is a specialist to detect Fi. 
Step 5: Fault specific reduced PCA models Ri for all N known faults are developed by 
applying the Step (4) repeatedly over all N known faults. i.e, Ni ,...,2,1 . 
Multiple reduced PCA models, Ri, where Ni ,...,2,1 , obtained above are 
deployed simultaneously for online process monitoring. Each PCA model assigns an 
online sample either as normal or abnormal. The outputs from all the reduced PCA 
models are combined through simple AND logic to obtain the final consolidated result. 
Next, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed multiple reduced PCA models 
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based monitoring scheme through the benchmark Tennessee Eastman Challenge 
process.   
First, we combine the results of 17 reduced PCA models (RA1 to RA20, in 
Table 6.9) with 2 key variables through simple AND logic. The results of 
combination are shown in Table 6.10. As seen in Table 6.10, upon combination, the 
MDR of each fault becomes even lower than that can be achieved with the best key 
variables. For example, in case of IDV20, the MDR of reduced model RA20 which 
uses the best two key variables for IDV20, is about 25% (see Table 6.9), whereas only 
around 14% MDR is obtained for IDV20 by combining the outputs from all 17 
reduced models (see Table 6.10). Therefore, almost 11% further improvement in 
MDR is achieved through fusion. Similar is the situation for almost all other faults. 
Consequently, the average MDR is also significantly lower than that of any single 
reduced model. The average MDRs obtained by combing multiple reduced PCA 
models (RA1 to RA20) with 2 key variables is 8.03% (See Table 6.10). Compared to 
the average MDR of full PCA model reported in Table 6.9, the average MDR 
achieved by combing all 17 reduced PCA models with 2 key variables of various 
faults is about 13% lower. This is because; each fault in TE case study affects a 
different subset of variables. So, use of a single PCA model involves trade off among 
several faults, whereas in multi-model scheme each reduced model uses the key 
variables for a particular fault. This leads to higher detection rates for all the faults 
upon combining the outputs from multiple reduced models. The FARs obtained by 
combining these 17 reduced PCA models is 1.56% which is exactly the same as the 
FAR of full PCA model (see Table 6.9). Therefore, combination of multiple reduced 
PCA offers more than 13% improvement in average detection accuracy compared to 
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the full PCA model while the FAR remains exactly the same as that of the full PCA 
model. 
Table 6.10: Monitoring performances achieved through fusion of multiple reduced 
PCA models  
Fault ID Fusion of 17 reduced PCA models 
each with only 2 key variables of a 
fault 
Fusion of 17 reduced PCA models 
each with only 3 key variables of a 
fault 
 MDR (%) MDR (%) 
IDV1 0.125 0.125 
IDV2 1.75 1.25 
IDV4 0 0 
IDV5 0.125 0.125 
IDV6 0 0 
IDV7 0 0 
IDV8 1.5 1.375 
IDV10 18.625 16.25 
IDV11 17 17.375 
IDV12 0.125 0.375 
IDV13 5 5 
IDV14 0 0 
IDV16 13.25 12.375 
IDV17 5.125 5.25 
IDV18 10.625 10.375 
IDV19 49.25 20.625 
IDV20 14 13.25 
Average 8.03 6.10 
FAR (%) 1.56 2.4 
 
The combination results of 17 reduced PCA models (RB1 to RB20, in Table 6.9) 
with 3 key variables are also presented in Table 6.10. This Table shows that for most 
of the faults combination 17 reduced PCA models with 3 key variables yields lower 
MDR than that could be achieved by combining the reduced models with 2 key 
variables. As a result, the average MDRs obtained by combing multiple reduced PCA 
models (RB1 to RB20) with 3 key variables is 6.13% (See Table 6.10) which is about 
1.9% lower than that of the reduced models with 2 key variables. But the FAR 
obtained by combining these 17 reduced PCA models is about 0.9% higher than could 
be achieved by combining the reduced models with 2 key variables. Hence, 
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combination of 17 reduced PCA models with 3 key variables provides about 1.9% 
improvement in MDR at the expanse of about 0.9% increase in FAR. 
Grbovic et al. (2012) deployed a centralized SVM method for detecting these 17 
faults in TE process. The average MDR of these 17 faults reported in Grbovic et al. 
(2012) is about 10%. This clearly shows that simple fusion of multiple reduced PCA 
models with just 2 or 3 key variables can provide better detection accuracy over 
advanced complicated method like SVM.  However, FAR increases upon combination. 
The FARs obtained by combining 17 reduced PCA models are 1.56% and 2.4% in 
case of multiple models with two and three key variables respectively (see Table 6.10) 
which is slightly more than the FAR (FAR=1.02%) reported in Grbovic et al. (2012). 
This is mainly due to the AND logic used in this work for combining the outputs of 
multiple reduced models. Nevertheless, FAR obtained upon combination is 
reasonably low and within the acceptable limit. Therefore, the benefit achieved in 
terms of MDR clearly outweighs the cost incurred due to increase in FAR. 
Yin et al. (2012) evaluated the monitoring performance of various data-driven 
methods such as PLS, FDA, ICA on the benchmark TE process. In Yin et al. (2012) 
the average MDR of PLS, FDA and ICA for these 17 faults were found to be 16.03%, 
6.28% and 4.48% respectively, while their FAR were 10%, 6.38% and 2.75% 
respectively. Therefore, the proposed fault specific reduced PCA models based 
monitoring scheme has superior or at least comparable monitoring performance in 
terms of detection accuracy over the PLS, FDA and ICA for these 17 faults, while the 




6.5  Conclusions and Discussion 
It has been shown in Chapter 5 of this thesis that monitoring performance of 
PCA based methods can be improved significantly by focusing only on the most 
relevant variables, called key variables. Based on those insights, two schemes for 
efficient process monitoring based on reduced PCA models that use only the selected 
subset of variables (key variables) are proposed in this Chapter. Here, we first develop 
a single reduced PCA based monitoring model using a set of key variables. The main 
idea is to select only the most important and relevant variables that contain useful 
information about all the faults and then use only these key variables to construct a 
single reduced PCA model which offers improved monitoring performance for all 
faults. A stochastic optimization based variable selection scheme is proposed in this 
chapter for making this selection. GA is applied to identify the subset of the available 
variables that minimizes the cumulative error for the test data, while simultaneously 
minimizing the number of selected variables. The framework for variable selection 
described here is general and can be used with other monitoring methods as well as 
other optimization techniques (such as simulated annealing, particle swarm 
optimization, and tabu search).  
The effectiveness of the proposed variable selection scheme is demonstrated 
on the benchmark Tennessee Eastman process challenge problem. The results clearly 
suggest that the proposed scheme can efficiently identify the most relevant variables. 
The monitoring performance of the reduced PCA model is improved significantly 
with lower average missed detection rates and shorter detection delay. Variable 
reduction leads to another collateral benefit. It can be noticed in the TE case study that 
the FAR is also reduced significantly (by more than 3.6%) for the reduced models. 
This is because the monitoring statistics of the full PCA model is affected by the noise 
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in all the variables; this effect is diminished in the reduced PCA models due to fewer 
variables and therefore fewer sources of noise. FAR is particularly important from the 
plant operators’ point of view since the plant would operate in the normal state most 
of the time and even a small increase in the FAR would translate to a large number of 
false alarms over a period of time. 
Many subsets of variables may have similar monitoring performance. It is 
evident from Table 6.2 that some variables are affected in a similar manner by the 
faults. Selecting any one of such variables would result in comparable monitoring 
performance. For instance, a separate GA run yielded another solution comprising 13 
variables where XMEAS7 and XMEAS16 in Solution (d) have been replaced by 
XMEAS23 and XMEAS38. The cumulative error rate of this solution is 26.2% and is 
comparable to that of Solution (d). 
One shortcoming of the proposed approach is that it is based on the closed-
world assumption, i.e., the monitoring model is optimized based only on the faults 
studied. The selected subset of variables may not be affected by a novel fault even 
though it perturbs other variables in the process. This limitation can be overcome by 
updating the model with that based on another subset of variables when new faults 
become known. 
In this chapter, we also propose a multiple reduced PCA models based 
monitoring approach to achieve superior detection performance for all known faults, 
wherein each reduced PCA model uses the key variables of a fault. In this scheme, 
first the key variable set of each fault is identified using the inseparability metric 
(Minsep) proposed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Once the key variable of each fault is 
identified, various fault-specific reduced PCA models, each with the key variables of 
a fault, can be developed. Such multiple reduced models can be deployed 
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simultaneously for process monitoring and their outputs can be combined through 
simple AND logic in which a sample is classified as normal if all the models assign it 
as normal, otherwise it is classified as abnormal or fault. Application of such multi-
model based process monitoring scheme in TE process case study results in further 
improvement in MDRs for most of the faults, than that can be obtained through 
individual fault specific reduced PCA models alone. Furthermore, the proposed 
multiple fault specific reduced PCA model based approach provides excellent overall 
monitoring performance and it outperforms other advanced data driven approach such 
as SVM, FDA and PLS in terms of both fault detection accuracy and false alarm rate. 
However, similar to proposed GA based optimal key variables selection 
approach, one shortcoming of the proposed approach is that it is based on the closed-
world assumption. The proposed scheme cannot guarantee high detection rate for a 
novel fault if its key variables are completely different from that of other known faults. 
This limitation can be overcome by introducing a new reduced PCA model that uses 
only the key variables of the novel fault. Another way to alleviate this limitation is to 
use full PCA model together with the various fault specific reduced PCA models and 
then combining their outputs through simple AND logic. 
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Chapter 7 Evaluation of Decision fusion 
strategies for effective collaboration 
among heterogeneous FDI methods  
7.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, multiple heterogeneous FDI methods such as Extended Kalman 
Filter (EKF), PCA, SOM, ANN, and rule-based Expert systems organized in flat 
architecture are used for providing diversity, since the heterogeneous methods are 
expected to have decision boundaries significantly different from one another. The 
intuition is that if each FDI method makes different errors, then a suitable 
combination of these classifiers can reduce the total error. The objective of this 
chapter is to evaluate the benefits of the multiple heterogeneous classifier approach to 
chemical process FDI. Particularly, we are interested to evaluate the performance of 
various utility based such as voting, and evidence based such as weighted voting, 
Baeysian, Dempster-Shafer fusion strategies in situations where the individual FDI 
methods are highly diverse, with strong disagreement among them and the overall 
performance of each FDI method is inadequate. The rest of the chapter is organized as 
follows: In Section 7.2, various schemes for fusing the results from different 
classifiers is discussed. In Section 7.3, online fault detection and identification of 
chemical processes based on multiple FDI methods is presented and illustrated using a 
lab-scale continuous distillation column case study. The performance of the proposed 
scheme using the Tennessee Eastman Challenge problem is evaluated in Section 7.4. 
7.2 Decision fusion strategies 
A key component in multiple classifier systems is to combine the decisions of 
individual classifiers in such a way that the correct decisions are amplified, and 
incorrect ones cancelled out. In this chapter utility based voting and evidence based 
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weighted voting, Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer decision fusion strategies are 
explored. 
The closed-world assumption (Smets, 2007) is considered quite often in evidence-
based decision fusion strategies (Niu et al., 2008, Parikh et al., 2001, 2003). In 
closed-world assumption all the known M classes  MCCC ,...,, 21 are regarded as 
being a complete description of the world. Hence, the existence of some unknown 
class, 1MC  which is not in M known classes is not considered. In this chapter, we 
have considered the closed-world assumption to combine the results of individual 
classifiers through evidence-based fusion strategies. 
7.2.1 Voting based fusion 
Voting has been a popular form of utility-based decision fusion. In voting-
based fusion, the class assigned by a classifier is considered as a vote for that class. 
There are three major versions of voting, where the winner is the class (i) on which all 
classifiers agree (unanimous voting); (ii) predicted by at least one more than half the 
number of classifiers (simple majority); or (iii) that receives the highest number of 
votes, whether or not the sum of those votes exceeds 50% (plurality voting or just 
majority voting). The most popular one is the majority vote in which the class voted 
by most of classifiers will be regarded as winner and the input assigned to that class. 
If there are K independent classifiers and each of these classifier produces a 
unique decision regarding the identity of the unknown sample. Then the sample is 
assigned to the class for which at least a fraction (α) of total number of classifiers (K) 
agrees; otherwise, the sample is rejected. In this work, the voting rule has been 
implemented as follows: 
Step 1: Compute individual vote of each class  
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The first step is to compute individual vote of each class from the output of a 
classifier. If the output of the k
th
 classifier is class Ci. i.e.  Ek(x) = Ci., then the 
individual vote V of classifier k for class Ci is given by:  
  




E x C i M k K
V C
   
 

    (7.1) 
Step 2: Compute total votes for each class 
The next step is to compute the total votes TV for each class by adding the 
respective individual votes.  





   (7.2) 
Step 3: Decision rule 
Finally, the class with the maximum total vote is considered as the winner if 


























where, 10  .  xE votingcom,  is the combined classification result for sample x 
obtained through voting based  fusion. 1,  Mvotingcom CE , denotes that the sample 
cannot be assigned to any of the known M classes and is rejected.  
Although quite simple, there are certain drawbacks associated with the voting 
based method. Voting methods treat all the classifiers equally without any 
consideration of the classifier’s characteristics or performance. But under certain 
circumstances one classifier may outperform others and should be given more weight. 
In the present work, we employed weighted voting, Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer 
based fusion strategies in order to overcome this difficulty. All these fusion methods 
use previous performance of each classifier to combine their outputs.  
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7.2.2 Weighted voting based fusion 
In weighted voting, usually, a weight is assigned for each classifier, or 
sometimes the classifier-predicted class combination based on the performance on the 
training dataset or even a separate validation dataset. In weighted voting method, 
usually a weight is assigned to each classifier, for instance proportional to its 
classification accuracy on a training dataset. The class-specific performance of a 
classifier can be captured in a confusion matrix that is usually constructed by testing 
the classifier performance on separate validation datasets or on training datasets (Xu 
et al., 1992). The confusion matrix CM for classifier k is typically represented as 
shown below. 
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The rows in this confusion matrix stand for the actual classes: C1, C2,…, CM, 
while the columns indicate the classes assigned by the k
th
 classifier. An element kijN , 
in the confusion matrix, represents the input samples from class iC  that are assigned 
to class jC by classifier k. 
The number of representative samples from each class may not be the same in 
the training or validation dataset. Since this training or validation data are used to 
construct the confusion matrix the class with more samples will be more likely to 
occur (i.e. will have higher probability of occurrence).  In order to overcome this 
problem, in this work, the confusion matrix of each FDI method has been normalized 
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so that all the classes will have same number (100) of samples. This is done by 












In this work, the weighted voting algorithm has been implemented based on 
the confusion matrix as follows: 
Step 1: Compute individual weight for each class  
The first step is to compute individual weight for each class from the output of 
a classifier. Let the output of the k
th
 classifier be class Cj. i.e.,  Ek(x) = Cj.. Then the 
individual weight WV for each class Ci for classifier k, is given by:  















Thus, each classifier assigns a weight for each class based on the confusion 
matrix.  
Step 2: Compute total weight for each class 
The next step is to compute the total weight TWV for each class by adding the 
respective individual weights.  





   (7.6) 
Step 3: Decision rule 
Finally, the class with the maximum total weight is considered as the winner 









      (7.7)                   
7.2.3 Bayesian based fusion 
Bayesian technique is a popular evidence-based method for decision fusion 
and conflict resolution among multiple classifiers. It estimates the posteriori 
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probability of a class from the a priori knowledge of class-specific performance of 
each individual classifier. The Bayes rule is used to calculate the posteriori 
probability. The final predictions are then made based on the estimated value of 
posteriori probability.  
The Bayesian fusion algorithm used in this work has the following steps: 
Step 1: Compute individual probability of each class  
The first step is to compute the individual a priori probability of each class 
from the output of the classifier. If the output of the k
th
 classifier is class Cj. i.e.  Ek(x) 
= Cj, then individual probability P of class Ci assigned by classifier k is computed as:  










CP    Kk ,...,2,1   (7.8) 
Step 2: Compute overall probability of each class 
The overall probability OP of each class is computed by multiplying the 
individual probabilities from the various classifiers.  







iki CPCOP    Mi ,...,2,1  (7.9) 
Step 3: Compute Bayesian belief value of each class 
The next step is to compute the Bayesian posteriori probability Bel of each 














      (7.10) 
Step 4: Decision rule 










  (7.11)             
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7.2.4 Dempster-Shafer fusion 
The Dempster-Shafer theory, also referred to as theory of belief functions, is a 
generalization of the Bayesian theory of subjective probabilities. The theory of 
Dempster-Shafer is based on belief functions originally developed by Dempster 
(1968), and later refined by Shafer (1976) to robustly deal with incomplete data. It 
allows for a representation of both imprecision and uncertainty through the definition 
of two functions: plausibility (Pl) and belief (Bel), both derived from a mass function 
m or basic probability assignment (BPA).  
  Several approaches to compute BPAs for classifiers have been proposed by 
Xu et al. 1992. Here, we have used the approach where the performance of the 
classifier on training data, stored in the confusion matrix, is used to estimate the belief 
functions of the classifier.  
Step 1: Calculate individual Basic probability assignment (BPA) values for each 
classifier. 
Suppose, Θ = {C1, C2 , ... , CM} has M exhaustive and mutually exclusive elementary 
classes. If the output of the k
th
 classifier is class Cj, i.e.  Ek(x) = Cj., then the individual 
BPA values of a class Ci for classifier k can be expressed as: 














    Kk ,...,2,1  
   0km  (7.12)
  
 where,  MCCC ,...,, 21  
Step 2: Compute combined BPA values using Dempster’s Rule 
Individual BPA values of all the classifiers are combined by Dempster 
combination rule in Eq. (2.18) to obtain the combined BPA values  iK Cm ,...,2,1 .  
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Step 3: Decision rule  












The step by step details of Voting, Weighted Voting, Bayesian and Dempster-
Shafer based fusion schemes have been presented in Appendix D through an 
illustrative example.  
There exists little work in the literature regarding the application of decision 
fusion strategies to combine multiple FDI methods for fault detection and 
identification in chemical processes. Despite the obvious promise of multi classifier 
systems to process monitoring and fault diagnosis, their potential remains largely 
unexplored, especially in situations where the FDI method are diverse with significant 
amount of conflict. We address this important issue here. 
7.3 Decision fusion for Chemical Process FDI 
The decision fusion based fault detection and identification scheme deployed in 
this work is shown schematically in Fig. 7.1. The input to each FDI method is online 
process data. The output from each FDI method is an assigned class, normal or a fault 
class. The output from the FDI methods are combined through the decision fusion 
strategies reviewed above to obtain a consolidated result in which the agreements 
among individual methods are combined and conflicts are resolved. The proposed 
scheme is illustrated using a lab-scale distillation unit case study.  
7.3.1 Case Study I: Lab-scale continuous distillation column 
The schematic of the distillation unit is shown in Fig. 7.2(a). This distillation 
column considered here is a real physical system (see Fig. 7.2(b)). It is located at the 
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UG Lab, Department of Chemical and Bimolecular Engineering, National University 
of Singapore. The distillation column is of 2 meters height and 20cm width and has 10 
trays including a total condenser and a reboiler; the feed enters at 5
th
 tray from top. 
This distillation column is used to separate binary liquid mixture of ethanol and water 
(20%v/v). The system is well integrated with a control console and data acquisition 
system. Seventeen variables – all tray temperatures (top tray – tray 1 to reboiler – tray 
9), column top temperature, cooling water inlet and outlet temperature, reflux 
temperature, feed temperature, feed pump rpm, reboiler heat duty and reflux ratio – 
are measured at 10-second intervals. First cold startup of the distillation column unit 
is performed following the standard operating procedure (SOP). The startup normally 
takes two hours to reach the final steady-state. Once the distillation column reaches 
steady-state, three different faults – reflux valve fault (F1), reboiler power fault (F2) 
and feed pump fault (F3) are introduced in different runs. The details of the faults are 
shown in Table 7.1. Various FDI methods are used to detect and diagnose the faults. 
Table 7.1: Process faults analyzed for distillation column case study 
Fault ID  Description Magnitude 
F1 Low reflux ratio Step change from 9:1 to 1:1 
F2 Low Reboiler power  Step change from 0.8 kW to 0.4 kW 
F3 Low feed pump speed  Step change from 50 to 20 rpm 
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Figure 7.2:  Lab-scale distillation Column (a) Schematics, (b) actual physical setup 
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7.3.1.1 FDI Methods  
We have implemented both model-based and data-driven FDI methods for 
online process monitoring and fault diagnosis of the continuous distillation column. 
We briefly describe these methods next. 
Extended Kalman Filter method 
Gunter (2003) presented a dynamic, nonlinear 1
st
 principles model of a binary 
methanol-water distillation column. An extended Kalman filter (EKF) has been 
developed based on this model to estimate the process outputs from the measured 
process variables (input, output and states). In the EKF implementation, all the 9 tray 
temperatures are used as process outputs, while reboiler heat duty, feed flow rate, feed 
temperature, feed composition, reflux ratio, reflux temperature are used as process 
inputs and liquid and vapor phase compositions of all the 10 trays (including 
condenser and reboiler) are considered as process states. Values of the process 
parameters related to physico-chemical properties of ethanol and water and 
thermodynamic equilibrium properties of ethanol-water mixture are obtained from the 
literature, while the parameters pertaining to the column’s design such as molar hold-
up of all the trays, condenser, and reboiler are obtained from the distillation column 
manual. Heat loss from the column is estimated by fitting the experimental results 
with model simulation data.  
The difference between the actual measurement and that estimated by the filter 
is defined as the innovation or residual of the filter. When a fault occurs, the behavior 
of the process is altered which results in larger than normal residuals. Threshold limits 
are defined for residuals for normal behavior to account for noise and un-modeled 
nonlinearity. In addition, a minimum time above threshold criterion, called dwell-
time, is also used (Bhagwat et al. 2003). The dwell-time criterion accounts for 
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momentary threshold crossings due to noise, discontinuities, phase changes or bad 
readings. Faults are flagged when both these conditions are satisfied. Once a fault is 
detected, its location and cause is identified by analyzing the residuals (Bhagwat et al. 
2003). Fault maps have been developed to identify the possible location(s) of the 
fault(s). The fault map is a set of logical statements that correlate faults to their 
causes. It can be generated by analyzing observable faults and detectable causes for 
the process under consideration. For example, if the residuals of some top tray 
temperatures (Tray 1 to tray 3 in the rectification section) exceed the threshold limit, 
then the fault is most likely due to reflux valve fault. Similarly, if the residual of feed 
tray temperature and a few trays above and/or below it cross the threshold limit then 
abnormality is most likely due to feed pump fault. Higher residuals on reboiler and/or 
few bottom plate temperatures in the striping section will be most likely due to 
reboiler power fault.  
Data-based FDI methods 
This first principles model based EKF method is used along with three data 
driven methods – Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Self-organizing maps (SOM) 
and artificial neural network (ANN) for monitoring and fault diagnosis. Since in the 
EKF method we use all 9 tray temperatures (top tray – tray 1 to reboiler – tray 9) as 
process outputs, for the data driven FDI methods the same nine tray temperatures are 
also used for process monitoring. This is solely to provide a common ground for 
comparing the various FDI schemes and is not a requirement of the decision fusion 
strategies.  
A PCA-based model of normal operations was developed for fault detection. A fault 
is flagged when the 99% confidence limits of 2T statistic and/or SPE value is violated. 
For fault diagnosis, a fault reconstruction scheme is used where in separate models are 
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developed for each fault class. The PCA model that shows an in-control status during 
abnormal operations is considered to flag the class of fault. 
The ANN-based FDI method considered here used a feed-forward back 
propagation neural-network that mapped the online sample to the four process states 
(normal and 3 fault classes). The ANN has two layers with [10 4] nodes using tan-
sigmoid transfer function for the hidden layers, and linear transfer function for the 
final output layer. The ANN was trained using the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm. 
Among the 4 output nodes, the one with the largest value was considered to indicate 
the process state if its value is close to 1 (1 3.0 ). 
A Self-Organizing Map (SOM) based on the approach proposed by Ng and 
Srinivasan (2008a; b) was also developed for this case study. This involves two 
phases – (i) offline training, (ii) online process monitoring and fault diagnosis. During 
offline training phase, first a 2-dimesional SOM is trained using all available training 
data. After training, the neurons on 2-dimensional SOM space are clustered. The 
trained SOM for this case study consists of 48x11map units and the neurons are 
clustered into 30 clusters using the k-means clustering algorithm. The cluster hits 
corresponding to normal training data as well as various known fault states are 
annotated and stored in a database. During online process monitoring and fault 
diagnosis phase, the online process data is projected onto the trained SOM. The SOM 
method performs monitoring by tracking any deviations from the nominal operating 
cluster on the SOM space. Fault identification is through fault signature analysis by 
comparing the cluster hits generated from online measurement to that of the training 
data of each class of fault. The interested reader is referred to Ng (2008) for details of 
the SOM implementation. The decision fusion based on of these heterogeneous FDI 
methods is illustrated next. 
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7.3.1.2 Results  
We have studied two different scenarios for this case study. In Scenario 1, all 
the FDI methods used are well designed and well trained. Therefore each of them is 
best-in-class and can quickly detect and identify all three process faults. In industrial 
processes, often it is difficult to design a single FDI method that can detect and 
identify all process faults. To mimic this situation, in Scenario 2, we have redesigned 
and retrained all four FDI methods in such a way that each FDI method now becomes 
a specialist that can detect and identify only certain faults. Since none of the FDI 
methods can detect/identify all the faults the overall recognition rate of each method 
becomes quite low. In addition, there will be significant amount of conflict among the 
FDI methods. Next, we present the results in both these scenarios. 
Scenario 1 
Table 7.2 shows the performance of the four FDI methods for the three faults. 
It can be seen from this table that all the FDI methods can quickly detect and identify 
all the three process faults. The inter-classifier agreement between each pair of 
method is shown in Table 7.3. The high Kappa values (>0.8) suggest that almost 
perfect agreement exist between all the method pairs. There is no significant conflict 
as such among the different methods. The performance of the various decision fusion 
strategies are summarized in Table 7.4. The results show that all three fusion methods 
respond quickly in terms of detecting and diagnosing all three process faults with 
voting being the slowest among them. Both Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer strategies 
yield around 80% reduction in average fault detection delay and 90% reduction in 
diagnosis delay w.r.t. the slowest FDI method. The percentage of samples correctly 
classified by a method is termed as its overall recognition rate.  
 
No. of samples correctly classifed
Overall recognition rate % x 100
Total No. of samples
  (7.14) 
 213 
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show that 3-5% improvement in overall recognition rate 
can be achieved through Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer based fusion whereas 







































F1 50 7 12 1 345 3 46 1 2 
F2 50 4 12 1 47 3 5 2 3 
F3 50 3 3 3 3 19 309 3 25 
Average Delay 4.667 9.000 1.667 131.7 8.333 120 2.0 10.0 
 
 
Table 7.3: Inter-classifier agreement among FDI methods in distillation column case study – Scenario 1 
FDI method I FDI method II Kappa  Value Agreement Level 
EKF PCA 0.8911 Almost perfect 
EKF SOM 0.8901 Almost perfect 
EKF ANN 0.9335 Almost perfect 
PCA SOM 0.8474 Almost perfect 
PCA ANN 0.8830 Almost perfect 
SOM ANN 0.8906 Almost perfect 
 215 
Table 7.4: Performance of various decision fusion strategies in distillation column case study – Scenario 1 



















F1 3 46 1 3 1 3 
F2 3 12 1 5 1 5 
F3 3 25 3 3 3 3 




Table 7.5: Overall recognition rate of each FDI method in distillation column case study – Scenario 1 
FDI methods Faults Identified Overall Recognition Rate (%) 
EKF F1, F2, F3 96.49 
PCA F1, F2, F3 94.52 
SOM F1, F2, F3 94.06 
ANN F1, F2, F3 96.26 
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Table 7.6: Overall recognition rate of decision fusion strategies for distillation column 
case study – Scenario 1 
FDI methods Faults Identified Overall Recognition Rate (%) 
Voting F1, F2, F3 97.4 
Bayesian F1, F2, F3 99.88 
Dempster-Shafer F1, F2, F3 99.88 
 
Although all three fusion strategies provide some improvement over any 
single FDI method, the improvement achieved through decision fusion is marginal in 
this case since the individual FDI methods perform reasonably well (with an overall 
recognition rate > 94%) and with no significant conflict among them (Kappa 
values>0.8).  
Scenario 2 
In this scenario, we have retrained the FDI methods to mimic the situation 
more likely in large-scale processes, i.e., not all FDI methods can detect and identify 
all three process faults. In this scenario, the PCA model obtained from the training 
data of normal class and two other PCA models generated from the training data 
corresponding to fault classes F1 and F2 are considered as normal models. As a result, 
PCA based FDI method is unable to detect and identify both faults F1 and F2. The 
samples from these fault classes (F1 and F2) are classified as normal. Similarly, the 
training data belonging to fault class F3 is considered as normal during training of 
both SOM and ANN models. For Extend Kalman filter used in this work the 
magnitude of residues/innovations generated by fault F1 are usually lower than that of 
faults F2 and F3. Therefore, a threshold value of higher magnitude is used in order to 
make the Kalman filter insensible/ insensitive to fault F1. Thus, each FDI method 
now becomes a specialist that can detect and identify only a few process faults. 
 217 
The performance of each FDI method in this scenario is shown in Table 7.7. It 
is quite evident from this table that none of the FDI methods can detect and identify 
all three faults – EKF method can detect and identify faults F2 and F3 only. PCA 
detects and identifies only F3. Both SOM and ANN methods can detect and identify 
F1 and F2. The inter-classifier agreement between the methods is presented in Table 
7.8. The Kappa values show that almost perfect agreement exists only between SOM 
and ANN; agreements among the other methods vary from moderate to less-than-
chance. In this scenario, there exists significant conflict (disagreement) among the 
results from the different FDI methods and decision fusion become more challenging.  
The performance of various decision fusion strategies are presented in Table 
7.9. The results indicate that all the faults can be detected/ identified very quickly 
through weighted voting, Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer based fusion i.e., complete 
(100%) fault coverage can be achieved. All three evidence-based methods provide 
around 43% reduction in average fault detection delay and around 90% reduction in 
average fault diagnosis delay w.r.t the slowest FDI method. Tables 7.10 and 7.11 
show that significant improvement (40-50%) in overall recognition rate can be 
achieved through fusion. The improvement in monitoring performance can be 
visualized through the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves shown in Fig 
7.3. The area under the ROC curve provides a measure of monitoring performance of 
a classifier, higher the area better is the monitoring performance. It can be easily seen 
that the area under the ROC curve for Bayesian fusion is significantly higher than that 
of any single FDI method. 
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F1  50 _ _ _ _ 3 46 1 2 
F2  50 4 12 _ _ 3 5 2 3 
F3  50 3 3 3 3 _ _ _ _ 
Average  Delay 3.5 7.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 25.5 1.5 2.5 
 
Table 7.8: Inter-classifier agreement among FDI methods in distillation column case study – Scenario 2 
FDI method I FDI method II Kappa  Value Agreement Level 
EKF PCA 0.422 Moderate 
EKF SOM 0.053 Slight 
EKF ANN 0.053 Slight 
PCA SOM -0.274 Less than chance 
PCA ANN -0.275 Less than chance 
SOM ANN 0.990 Almost perfect 
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F1 50 _ _ 1 1 1 1 1 1 
F2 50 4 7 2 3 2 3 2 3 
F3 50 _ _ 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Average Delay  4.0 7.0 2.0 2.33 2.0 2.33 2.0 2.33 
Table 7.10: Overall recognition rate of each FDI method in distillation column case study – Scenario 2 
FDI methods Faults Identified Overall Recognition Rate (%) 
EKF F2, F3 52.339 
PCA F3 59.737 
SOM F1, F2 49.124 
ANN F1, F2 49.666 
Table 7.11: Overall recognition rate of decision fusion strategies for distillation column case study – Scenario 2 
FDI methods Faults Identified Overall Recognition Rate (%) 
Voting F2 51.832 
Weighted Voting F1, F2, F3 99.79 
Bayesian F1, F2, F3 99.88 





















Figure 7.3: ROC curves for individual FDI methods and Bayesian fusion in 
distillation column case study – Scenario 2 
 
The performance of voting based fusion scheme is rather poor in this scenario. 
Only fault F2 can be successfully detected and identified and the overall recognition 
rate is only about 52%. Its performance is not better than any single FDI method. This 
is because voting treats each method equally without considering their class-specific 
performance. Since in this case each method is a specialist that can detect and identify 
only certain faults, the success of decision fusion depends primarily on proper 
utilization of a priori information about class specific performance. Weighted voting, 
Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer methods, which use the class specific performance 
from the confusion matrix, hence outperform voting.  
7.4 Case Study II: Tennessee Eastman Challenge Problem 
In this section, the various decision fusion methods are tested for online 
disturbance identification on the Tennessee Eastman (TE) industrial challenge 
problem (Downs and Vogel, 1993) as described in Section 5.4. The decentralized 
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contains 41 measured, 12 manipulated and 50 state variables. Out of 41 measured 
variables, 22 are sampled frequently (usually in every 3 minutes) and the remaining 
19 are composition measurements that are sampled less frequently. We use the 22 
continuous process measurements for online identification unknown process 
disturbances. Out of 21 programmed process disturbances (see Table 5.1), eighteen 
faults are tested here.  Since the decentralized multi-loop control strategy is able to 
provide very good recovery actions to disturbances IDV15, IDV16 and IDV21 these 
three IDVs are excluded from the analysis. 
To generate a training dataset, 19 runs (one normal run and 18 fault runs) were 
performed. Each training run simulates 25hrs (1500 min) of operations with a 
sampling interval of 3 min. All faults were introduced at 1 hour of operating time for 
the training data. In contrast, the testing dataset consist of runs simulating 50 
operating hours (3000 min) with the fault introduced at 8 hrs (480 min). The signals 
for each test run are thus different from the training data in terms of run-length and 
time of fault introduction.  
7.4.1 FDI Methods  
We deployed five FDI methods in this case study. Apart from PCA, SOM, and 
ANN developed using the same strategy as described in Section 7.3, we also use two 
additional FDI methods namely Dynamic Principal Components Analysis (DPCA) 
and an Expert System (ES) for monitoring and fault diagnosis Tennessee Eastman 
process. Next, we briefly discuss the DPCA and Expert System based FDI methods. 
The DPCA is broadly similar to the PCA method for FDI. The key difference 
is that each raw sample is augmented with a number of previous observations to 
provide temporal information to the PCA model. In this case study, a time lag of five 
samples was used to construct the augmented sample. The DPCA FDI method is 
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developed by constructing a DPCA model for normal as well as each for each of the 
fault classes. Fault detection is based on the violation of 99% confidence limit of the 
2T  and / or SPE statistic for the normal model. When a fault is detected, the DPCA 
model that shows in-control status is considered to flag the right class of fault.  
Table 7.12 shows the monitoring and diagnosis performance of the various FDI 
methods. As seen there, some of the process disturbances are extremely difficult to 
detect and identify using data-driven FDI methods. The multi-loop decentralized 
control strategy employed in this case study is efficient in bringing the process back to 
its normal operating range quickly after the disturbances occur, thus camouflaging the 
fault and preventing effective diagnosis. This occurs widely in real-life processes as 
well. However, plant operators and engineers with wide experience in operating the 
process use subtle clues to uncover such disturbances/faults in the underlying process. 
To mimic this knowledge of experienced operators, we use a simple rule-based expert 
system to identify these disturbances that are otherwise hard to detect / diagnose. 
Some examples of the if-then rules used in our expert system are: 
(a) If the reactor cooling water flow increases from the normal operating region of 
~36% by 2%, then the fault is likely due to increase in the reactor cooling 
water temperature (IDV04),  
(b) If the condenser cooling water flow increases from the normal operating 
region of ~20% by 2%, then the fault is likely due to increase in condenser 
cooling water temperature (IDV05).  
(c) If there is a simultaneous fall in reactor pressure, stripper pressure, stream 4 
flow rate,  and purge rate by 1% even for a very brief period of time, then the 
fault is likely due to C header pressure loss and the consequent reduced 
availability of stream 4 (IDV07). 
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(d) If there is a significant simultaneous increase in the magnitude of oscillation of 
stripper underflow, product separator underflow, reactor pressure, and product 
separator pressure, then fault IDV19 is most likely to have occurred. 
This ES and the DPCA based FDI methods are used along with ANN, SOM, and 
PCA based methods for supervising the TE process. The ANN in this case has three 
layers with [10 10 19] nodes. The trained SOM consists of 37x22 map units that are 
further clustered to 50 clusters. The predictions from all five FDI methods are 
combined through the various fusion strategies and their performance compared. 
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1 160 8 - 12 86 3 180 - - 3 12 
2 160 11 363 27 28 8 229 - - 5 12 
3 160 397 - - - 27 - 25 27 11 - 
4 160 8 - - - 2 - 31 31 16 - 
5 160 - - - - 2 - 19 21 9 - 
6 160 7 7 7 27 1 166 - - 1 3 
7 160 7 - 2 - 1 - 51 51 21 - 
8 160 18 43 23 72 10 186 - - 6 12 
9 160 149 - - - 34 - 57 57 20 - 
10 160 11 13 - - 5 170 - - 1 5 
11 160 22 29 18 30 15 186 - - 31 - 
12 160 35 - - - 7 386 29 29 21 - 
13 160 18 20 27 53 12 185 - - 33 97 
14 160 10 22 117 - 4 174 - - 29 - 
17 160 23 34 41 41 16 196 - - 5 17 
18 160 46 61 74 74 31 219 - - 2 25 
19 160 57 - - - 32 199 27 29 6 - 
20 160 19 35 27 30 12 193 - - 3 10 
Average delay 49.76 62.70 34.09 49 12.33 45.31 34.14 35 12.39 21.44 
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7.4.2 Results  
Table 7.13 provides a summary of FDI performance of each method. It is 
evident that none of the FDI method can individually detect / identify all the eighteen 
process faults. In terms of average detection delay, the DPCA method performs the 
best (12samples) which is about 75% faster compared to the PCA method that 
performs the worst (50 samples). In terms of average diagnosis delay, the ANN 
method is the fastest (21 samples) and PCA the slowest (63 samples). Further, the 
overall recognition rates of the individual FDI methods are extremely poor, varying 
from 32% to 52%. As shown in Table 7.14, the low Kappa values indicate that the 
FDI methods are highly diverse and there is significant disagreement among them.  
Table 7.13: Overall recognition rate of FDI methods in Tennessee Eastman process 
case study 
FDI Method No. of IDVs 
Identified 
Overall Recognition Rate 
(%) 
PCA 10 39.352 
SOM 9 47.799 
DPCA 13 49.200 
Expert System 7 52.000 


















Table 7.14: Inter-classifier agreement among FDI methods in Tennessee Eastman 
process case study 
FDI Method I FDI Method II Kappa Value Agreement Level 
PCA SOM 0.385 Fair 
PCA DPCA 0.407 Fair 
PCA Expert System 0.003 Slight 
PCA ANN -0.027 Less than chance 
SOM DPCA 0.404 Fair 
SOM Expert System -0.203 Less than chance 
SOM ANN 0.144 Slight 
DPCA Expert System -0.019 Less than chance 
DPCA ANN 0.157 Slight 
Expert System ANN 0.000 Slight 
 
The detailed FDI results for the various decision fusion strategies are shown in 
Table 7.15. It can be seen that all the evidence-based methods are successful in 
quickly detecting and identifying all the 18 process faults resulting in complete 
(100%) fault coverage.  This results in a 66% reduction in average fault detection 
delay and around 69% reduction in average fault diagnosis delay w.r.t the slowest FDI 
method. As seen from Table 7.16, they perform well (~95%) in terms of overall 
recognition rate as well. The ROC curves for the individual FDI methods as well as 
Bayesian fusion are shown in Fig. 7.4. The higher area under the curve for Bayesian 
based fusion compared to any single FDI method indicates that the monitoring 
performance is improved significantly through evidence-based decision fusion. 
Voting based fusion can detect and identify 16 faults, suffers from poorer overall 
recognition rate and higher detection/diagnosis delay and is thus not as good in 
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Figure 7.4: ROC curves for individual FDI methods and Bayesian fusion in TE 
process case study 
 
In order to reduce the effect of noise on the performance of all FDI methods 
used in this work the output from these methods is filtered as follows: A process 
abnormality alarm is flagged whenever the fault/abnormality is detected in at least v 
samples out of u consecutive time series samples, where ( uv 1 ). We use 10u  in 
all the case studies performed in this work. In both the case studies, the data points in 
the ROC curves are obtained by varying the parameter v used in output filtering. 
The above case studies clearly demonstrate the potential benefits obtainable by 
combining multiple heterogeneous FDI methods through decision fusion in the 
situations where the FDI methods are diverse with strong disagreement (conflict) 
among them and the overall performance of each FDI method is extremely poor. 
 228 
































1 160 12 14 2 12 6 14 6 14 
2 160 27 27 11 12 11 12 11 12 
3 160 399 399 25 25 25 25 25 25 
4 160 - - 2 31 8 31 8 31 
5 160 - - 19 19 19 19 19 19 
6 160 7 7 2 3 2 3 2 3 
7 160 7 54 2 19 1 9 1 9 
8 160 23 23 12 12 12 12 12 12 
9 160 169 169 57 57 57 57 57 57 
10 160 11 11 5 5 5 5 5 5 
11 160 23 23 18 18 18 18 18 18 
12 160 35 35 29 29 29 29 29 29 
13 160 27 27 18 25 18 20 18 20 
14 160 117 117 5 5 9 10 9 10 
17 160 36 36 17 17 17 17 17 17 
18 160 59 59 25 25 31 31 31 31 
19 160 63 63 27 27 27 27 27 27 
20 160 27 27 8 10 10 10 10 10 
Average delay 65.13 68.19 15.78 19.5 16.94 19.39 16.94 19.39 
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Table 7.16: Overall recognition rate of various decision fusion strategies in Tennessee 
Eastman process case study 
Fusion Schemes No. of IDVs 
Identified 
Overall Recognition Rate 
(%) 
Voting 16 57.924 
Weighted Voting 18 94.67 
Bayesian 18 97.16 
Dempster-Shafer 18 97.155 
7.5 Discussion 
Fault detection and identification in chemical processes has received significant 
attention in literature. Traditionally, single FDI methods are used for process 
monitoring. In this work, we have studied the benefits that accrue from deploying 
multiple heterogeneous FDI methods simultaneously. In such situations, a key step is 
in having an effective means to combine the results from the various FDI methods. 
These decision fusion strategies can be broadly classified into utility-based methods 
and evidence-based methods – the former being the simplest strategies for 
deployment, while the latter exploit some priori information of the relative merits and 
demerits of the various FDI methods and hence require “training”. The performance 
of some popular utility and evidence-based decision fusion strategies has been 
evaluated under different scenarios. When all FDI methods are equally good 
performers, our results show that decision fusion provides only marginal 
improvement in FDI performance since the individual FDI methods detect and 
identify all the faults quickly and there is no significant conflict among them. The 
fusion performance of utility-based methods is comparable to those of evidence-based 
strategies in such cases. Since all the FDI methods have high individual overall 
recognition rate, treating all the methods equally is a reasonable strategy with the 
benefit of simplicity.  However, it can be argued that multiple FDI methods are 
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probably not warranted in such cases due to the additional complexity with limited 
benefits.  
When the individual FDI methods have varying performance for different faults, 
disagreements among them then come to the fore. Our results indicate that the 
maximum benefit in terms of FDI performance improvement can be achieved in such 
situations where the overall performance of any one method is inadequate. Here, 
evidence-based methods perform significantly better than utility-based ones. 
Performance of both Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer based fusion schemes are 
essentially the same in the two case studies evaluated here. Both can effectively 
resolve conflicts among multiple heterogeneous FDI methods and yield excellent 
results with (i) high prediction accuracy (overall recognition rate> 95%), (ii) complete 
(100%) fault coverage, (iii) short detection and diagnosis delay, and (iv) remarkable 
monitoring performance. This supports the claim of Hoffman and Murphy (1993), 
Luo and Caselton (1997), and Cobb and Shenoy (2003) that both Bayesian and 
Dempster-Shafer approaches have roughly the same expressive power. Utility based 
methods perform poorly in such situations because they treat all the FDI methods 






i , j Fault ID 
 




M Total number of classes known to a FDI method/ classifier 
 
K Total number of FDI methods/classifiers used 
 
S Total number of samples in the training data 
 




  Empty set 
 




 Kappa statistic between two FDI methods 
 
 MCCC ,,, 21   Frame of discernment (FOD) having M  exhaustive & 




Standard error for Cohen’s Kappa statistic for large sample 
 




Bayes CBel  Bayesian posteriori probability of class Ci 
 
 ABel  Total belief value committed to A 
 




 class of fault   
 
CM
k Confusion matrix for kth  classifier/FDI method 
 
Ek(x) Classification results of  k
th
  FDI method for sample x 
 
 xEcom  Combined classification results for sample x 
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 xE votingcom,  Combined classification results for sample x obtained 
through 
voting based  fusion 
 
 xE wvcom,  Combined classification results for sample x obtained 
through 
weighted voting based  fusion 
 
 xE Bayesiancom,  Combined classification results for sample x obtained 
through 
Bayesian based  fusion 
 




 ik Cm  Basic Probability Assignment of class Ci for k
th
 FDI method 
 
 Umk  Basic Probability Assignment of U for k
th
 FDI method 
 








ijN  Element of the confusion matrix CM
k
 , denoting number of 
sample belong to class ‘i’, classified as class ‘j’ by kth  FDI 
method 
 
 iCOP  Overall probability of class Ci 
 
 ik CP  Individual probability of class Ci for k
th
 FDI method 
 
pc Proportion of agreement by chance 
 
po Proportion of agreement observed 
 
 iCTV  Total vote of class Ci  
 iCTWV  Total weighted vote of class Ci  
 MCCCU ,..., 21  Universal set containing union of all known classes 
 
u Length of time window used for output filtering 




v Minimum number of detectable faulty/abnormal samples in 
a time window of length u 
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Chapter 8 Hierarchically Distributed Fault 
Detection and Identification 




Modern sensors, instruments and equipments are equipped with self-diagnostic 
capabilities for determining faults within themselves. Current monolithic process 
monitoring strategies do not take advantage of the information provided by such smart 
sensors, instruments and equipments. To exploit these recent developments and tame 
complexity, chemical processes can be monitored in a hierarchical manner with 
multiple FDI methods operating at different levels of the hierarchy. In this chapter, we 
propose a framework for distributed fault detection and identification, wherein the 
process is decomposed hierarchically into sections and subsections based on process 
flow diagram. Multiple hierarchical FDI methods at varying levels of granularity are 
deployed to monitor the various sections and subsections of the process. The results 
from the individual FDI methods contain mutually non-exclusive fault classes at 
different levels of granularity and such results cannot be combined suitably through 
Bayesian based fusion scheme. We propose an adaptation of the Dempster-Shafer 
evidence theory to combine these diagnostic results at different levels of abstraction. 
The key contribution of this chapter is to apply D-S evidence theory for combining 
results from multiple FDI methods distributed hierarchically to realize better 
adaptability and robustness in the monitoring performance. The rest of the chapter is 
organized as follows: Section 8.2 proposes a framework for hierarchically distributed 
fault detection and identification in chemical processes. The performance of the 
proposed framework using two case studies – (i) a simulated CSTR-distillation 
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column system, and (ii) the Tennessee Eastman Challenge process is evaluated in 
Sections 8.3 and 8.4, respectively.  
8.2 Proposed framework for hierarchical FDI  
The proposed framework for hierarchical fault detection and identification in 
chemical process consists of three stages: (i) decomposition of the process into a 
compositional hierarchy and grouping faults at various levels into a tree-structured 
hierarchy, (ii) development of appropriate hierarchical FDI methods, and (iii) 
development of a suitable fusion scheme for combining the results from the FDI 
methods. Each of these stages is described in detail next. 
8.2.1 Process decomposition  
Modern chemical plants contain a large number of mass- and heat- integrated 
unit operations that can be decomposed as a compositional hierarchy into sections and 
subsections and further into equipments and instruments. This decomposition can be 
carried out based on the process flow diagram and knowledge of operating objectives 
and procedures (Srinivasan et al. 2005c; Prasad et al.1998). For example, a refinery 
can be divided into crude distillation unit, vacuum distillation unit, and catalytic 
cracking unit sections. The catalytic cracking unit section can be further subdivided 
into air-preheater, feed preheater, fractionator, regenerator and waste heat boiler 
subsections. The air-preheater section in turn comprises of equipments such as air-
blower, and heater. A compositional decomposition of the refinery unit is shown in 
Fig. 8.1. Similarly, the faults can also be organized in a hierarchical manner by 
primary processing sections, subsections, equipment and so on and organized into a 
tree structure following the compositional hierarchy of the process. This hierarchical 
decomposition provides effective modularity for developing hierarchically distributed 
FDI systems in large-scale, complex chemical processes. 
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8.2.2 Hierarchically distributed FDI methods 
Once the hierarchical structure of the fault classes has been determined, FDI 
methods can be developed to supervise the process at various levels within the 
compositional hierarchy. For instance, a FDI method can be developed for monitoring 
the overall process (process level), another for the catalytic cracking unit (section 
level) etc. The diagnostic methods that identify the root cause of malfunction within 
an equipment (eg. air-blower) and the instrument’s built-in diagnostic capabilities can 
also be considered as FDI methods in the hierarchy. The FDI methods at the lower 
levels in the hierarchy (equipment and instrument level) can diagnose the root cause 
of all abnormal behaviors for which they are trained. But these would be unable to 
identify any novel fault situations. The monitoring methods at the higher levels in the 
hierarchy (section and process levels) would detect any deviation including those 
from novel faults as an abnormality. Thus, one key benefit of such multiple 
hierarchical FDI methods is that novel faults can be localized. The FDI methods need 
not exactly follow the fault hierarchy. That is, multiple FDI methods may be 
associated with any node; also some inner nodes in the hierarchy may not have any 
FDI method associated with them. The input to each FDI method is online process 
data and its output is an assigned class – normal or any fault class. The outputs from 
the various FDI methods then need to be fused in order to obtain a meaningful, 
coherent final diagnosis result. 
 237 
 





























8.2.3 Fusion scheme for hierarchical classifiers 
When flat classifiers are used the classes they assign are mutually exclusive. 
Generally speaking, two events are said to be mutually exclusive if both of them 
cannot occur at the same time. All the faults that lie on branch in a hierarchically 
organized structure of the fault classes are mutually non-exclusive, since they can 
occur simultaneously. For instance, all the faults starting from air-blower malfunction 
to plant abnormality in the fault hierarchy, derived from the plant compositional 
hierarchy as shown in Fig. 8.1, are mutually non-exclusive. This is because a 
malfunction in the air-blower (equipment fault) may give rise to abnormality in the 
air-preheater sub-section (subsection fault) which in turn may result in failure of 
catalytic cracking unit (section fault) and finally as a consequence of this the normal 
operation of plant would be affected (process fault). The simple fusion techniques 
such as majority vote, Bayesian probability based fusion that are effective for 
combining the decisions of flat classifier systems, dealing with mutually exclusive 
classes, cannot be applied to hierarchical decision profiles.  
In most of the literature, the classical decision tree combiner is used for fusing 
decisions of hierarchical classifiers (Kumar et al., 2002; Schwenker, 2001; 
Eslamloueyan, 2011; Othman et al., 2007; Rusinov et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2004; 
Cheong et al., 2004). Starting from the root node, each given instance x is pushed to 
one of the child nodes recursively until a leaf node is reached. The classifier at the top 
most level is triggered first; classifiers at lower levels are activated subsequently 
depending on the results of the higher level classifier. That is, to assign a class label to 
a given instance, only the classifiers along the unique path from the root node to one 
of the leaf nodes are activated. The underlying assumption in applying the decision 
tree for fusing hierarchical classifiers is that the classifiers also follow exactly the 
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same hierarchy as that of the classes. That is each non-leaf node within the class 
hierarchy must be associated with exactly one classifier. Clearly, this combination 
approach is restrictive and would not be very effective if some nodes do not have any 
associated classifier or have multiple classifiers, i.e., when the hierarchy of classifiers 
differs from that of the classes. Furthermore, this approach is not robust to any 
misclassification at the higher levels of the hierarchy, that is, if any classifier at a 
higher level misclassifies a sample, then there is no possibility to correct it. Hence it 
would be beneficial not to take a single path within the hierarchy into account but to 
consider the results of all the classifiers. 
A suitable scheme for fusing hierarchical classifiers should meet several 
requirements due to the inherent characteristics of the hierarchy. The classifier 
hierarchy naturally provides a hierarchical class grouping, i.e. the individual 
classifiers can provide results sets of classes. Therefore, the combination method 
should provide the means for dealing with information at different levels of 
abstraction. Also, not all classifiers will provide information about all classes; some 
may be capable of identifying only a specific subset of the classes. Therefore it is 
necessary that the combination approach offers a possibility to represent lack of 
knowledge and doubt. Moreover, the combination scheme should be robust enough to 
provide meaningful results even in situations where the classifier hierarchy departs 
from the class hierarchy. D-S theory meets all these requirements and allows fusion of 
outputs from hierarchical classifiers. A motivating example is provided next to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of D-S evidence theory based fusion scheme over that 
of Bayesian particularly in combining the results from hierarchical classifiers. 
Using the combination rule in Eq. (2.16) it is possible to effectively combine 
the BPAs of two independent classifiers where each classifier assigns BPAs not only 
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to the atomic classes but also to compound classes. The intersections between the 
BPA set of classifier 1 with that of classifier 2 determine the classes (compound or 
atomic) to which the combined BPAs are to be assigned. Next, the combination rule 
in Eq. (2.16) is explained through a simple illustrative example. Consider a process 
whose, the frame of discernment contains six different states: normal (N) and five 
abnormal (fault) states (F1, F2, .., F5). i.e.,  5,4,3,2,1, FFFFFN . Let, two FDI 
methods be deployed to supervise this process - Method 1 is an overall process 
monitoring method that can detect process abnormality (presence or absence of state 
N) but cannot diagnose its root cause (F1, F2, .., F5). Method 2 is a diagnostic method 
which is capable of identifying the specific fault that can occur. 
For a given sample (x), let Method 1 be 50% confident that x is normal. So it 
also has 50% confidence that this sample is abnormal (i.e., belonging to one or more 
of F1, F2, F3, F4, or F5). Method 2 identifies this sample as F2 with 75% confidence 
while it is 25% confident that the sample is normal. The BPAs assigned by Method 1 
are:   5.01 Nm  and    5.05,4,3,2,11 FFFFFm  the latter being a compound 
class, while Method 2 assigns    25.02 Nm  and   75.022 Fm . Now, if we apply 
the Dempster’s combination rule (Eq. 2.16) combined BPAs can be assigned only to 
normal and F2 since these two classes (N and F2) are formed by the intersection 
between the two sets of BPAs. From Eq. (2.16), the combined BPAs are: 
  25.02,1 Nm  and   75.022,1 Fm  from which it can be concluded that fault F2 is 
most likely to have occurred. 
To contrast the difference between D-S and Bayesian based fusion techniques 
we will now apply Bayesian based fusion scheme to the same example. Since 
Bayesian based fusion cannot deal with a compound class, a probability has to be 
assigned to each of its constituent atomic classes. In the absence of any other 
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information the probability assigned to the different atomic classes are equal and as 
follows:           1.054321 11111  FpFpFpFpFp  and   5.01 Np  for 
Method 1 while   25.02 Np  and   75.022 Fp for Method 2. The combined 
probabilities through Bayesian based fusion (Eq. 7.10) are:   625.02,1 Np  
and   375.022,1 Fp  which suggests that the sample should be classified as normal. 
That is, the Bayesian based fusion assigns the process state to be normal even though 
FDI Method 2 provides strong (75%) evidence for F2 and Method 1 also suggests it 
as equally likely. Thus, Bayesian based fusion can yield counterintuitive results since 
it cannot explicitly account for imprecision in the classifier output. 
The different stages of the proposed D-S evidence theory based fusion 
schemes are illustrated in Fig. 8.2. In the first step, the output from each classifier 
Ek(x) is converted into a mass function or BPA  km . BPA can be assigned to any 
node (root, inner or leaf node) within the class hierarchy. The assignment of BPA to 
various nodes is possible because D-S theory allows BPAs to be assigned not only to 
single (atomic) classes (i.e., leaf nodes) but also to compound ones (i.e., non-leaf - 
root and inner nodes) as discussed in the next subsection. Individual BPAs  km are 
then combined by the Dempster combination rule in Eq. (2.18) to obtain the combined 
BPA  Km ,...,2,1 . Next, the combined belief function  KBel ,..2,1  is calculated from the 
combined BPA using Eq. (2.10). The value of the combined belief function (Bel1,2,…,K) 
of a class denotes the total belief committed to that class. This can be a single class 
(leaf node) or a compound class (root or inner node). Finally, decision making is 
based on the values of combined belief function  KBel ,..2,1 . The classes for which the 
combined belief value  KBel ,..2,1  is high (1) are considered the true fault class(es).  
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   (8.1) 
where, α is predefined threshold  10  . Here,  xE K,,2,1   is the combined 
classification results of K hierarchical classifiers for sample x.  
Classification algorithms generally do not directly yield a BPA. A method for 
estimating BPA from the outputs of the individual classifiers is proposed next. 
8.2.3.1 Estimation of basic probability assignment 
Each BPA has to represent all the knowledge provided by a classifier. In 
particular, BPAs should reflect each classifier’s strengths and weaknesses. The 
classifiers used in this work are abstract level classifiers (Ng and Srinivasan, 2010) 
providing only class labels as classification result. For calculating the BPA for such a 
classifier, confusion matrix in which the class specific performance of a classifier is 
captured systematically, is used (Xu et al. 1992). The confusion matrix, CM
k
 is 
usually constructed by testing the k
th
 classifier performance on training or separate 

























































The rows stand for the actual classes: C1, C2,…, CM, while the columns 
indicate the classes assigned by the k
th
 classifier. An element
k
jiN , , in the confusion 
matrix, represents the number of input samples from class iC  that are assigned to class 
jC by the k
th
 classifier. The class CM+1 denotes that the sample cannot be assigned to 
any of the M classes known to this classifier and is rejected. The confusion matrix of 
each classifier is in a normalized form – so the total number of samples for each class 
(i.e., row total) adds up to unity.  
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For an ensemble system consisting of multiple flat classifiers, the confusion 
matrix of each classifier has exactly the same number of rows (M rows) and columns 
(M+1 columns) (shown in Eq (8.2) above) since all the classifiers in a flat ensemble 
assign an input sample to any of the M+1 classes. However, hierarchical classifiers 
pose the challenge of mutually non-exclusive classes, where not all the classifiers may 
provide information about all the classes, in the hierarchy, but can classify an input 
sample only to a subset of the classes. Therefore, the confusion matrix for hierarchical 
classifiers has dimensions that depend on the number of classes that the classifier can 
recognize. If the k
th





CCC ,...,, 21 , then its frame of 
discernment k  can be represented as:  kMkkk kCCC ,...,, 21  where, 
 Mk CCC ,...,, 21 . The confusion matrix, CM
k
 has dimensions 





CCC ,...,, 21 that the k
th
 classifier can identify and the  1kM
th
 row represents the 
set of classes in , that are not in k . We denote this set as  k . The first Mk 
columns in CM
k
 indicate the classes assigned by the k
th
 classifier (including normal), 
and the  1kM
th
 column corresponds to samples that can’t be assigned to any of the 
known Mk classes and is rejected by the classifier. The 1kM
th
 row represents a set 
of classes in the set  , which are not in the set k . We denote this set as k .  
The confusion matrix of the k
th



























































In this work, we assign the belief masses to a classifier output utilizing the 
class-specific reliability of the classifier (Mercier et al. 2005; Johansson et al. 2008). 
If the output of the k
th
 classifier is class kjC i.e.,  
k






























Cm  (8.4) 





CCCC 121 ,...,,  , but 





CCCC ,...,, 21 . 
The rest of the belief mass is assigned to k  








1  (8.5) 
  Thus, the belief mass assigned to k  is the proportion of samples assigned 
to class Cj
k
 but actually belonging to k . Next, the effectiveness of the proposed 
scheme is demonstrated using two case studies.  
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Figure 8.2: Proposed fusion Scheme 
8.3 Case Study 1: A simulated CSTR - distillation column system 
The process consists of a jacketed CSTR and a distillation column connected 
in series (shown in Fig. 8.3). The flow F to the reactor contains only reactant A at 
concentration CAf and temperature Tf. The main reaction occurring in the CSTR is the 
1
st
 order liquid phase decomposition of A into product B. i.e., BA
k 1 . The output 
from the reactor contains both B and unconverted A which are separated in a 
Process data (x) 
FDI method 1 FDI method 2 …
. 
FDI method K 
Output:  xE1  Output:  xE2  Output:  xEK  …
. 
Estimation of 
BPA: 1m   
Estimation of 
BPA: 2m   
Estimation of 
BPA: Km   
…
. 
Combination of BPAs Km ,...,2,1  using Dempster Rule 
Km ,...,2,1   
Calculation of combined belief: KBel ,...,2,1  
Decision making based on combined belief ( KBel ,...,2,1 ) 
Final Decision:  xE K,...,2,1  
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continuous distillation column. The detailed process model including the values of 









Figure 8.3: Schematic of a simple process in Case Study 1 
 
The process data corresponding to normal process operation are obtained by 
simulating the model. Six atomic fault classes (F1 to F6) listed in Table 8.1 are also 
simulated. These atomic fault classes may be considered as the root causes of various 
abnormalities. Faults F1 to F3 would lead to abnormality in the CSTR section, which 
is considered to be a new compound fault class F7 i.e.,  3,2,17 FFFF  . Similarly, 
an abnormality in distillation column (F8) can be due to faults F4, F5 and F6, i.e., 
 6,5,48 FFFF  . At a higher level of hierarchy, any fault in the CSTR or 
distillation column section would lead to a process abnormality (F9). 
 
m, Tjin 
F, CAf, Tf 
m, Tj 
Fb, xA,b,Tb 
F, CA, CB, Tf 








So,  8,79 FFF  . It should be noted that when an atomic fault occurs it would 
propagate and affect the operation of the corresponding section, thus leading to higher 
level compound faults. For instance, deactivation of catalyst in the CSTR (F2) would 
lead to abnormal operation of the CSTR section (F7) and as a consequence the normal 
operation of the process would be affected (F9). Clearly, F2, F7 and F9 are mutually 
non-exclusive since they can occur at the same time. It should be noted that such 
mutually non-exclusive fault classes are different from multiple simultaneous faults in 
Lee et al. (2004), Cho et al.
 
(2005), and Yelamos et al. (2007) where independent 
atomic faults affect the process concurrently. Fault classes (F1 to F9) can be 
organized in a hierarchical manner following the compositional hierarchy of the 
process (Fig. 8.4). The hierarchical structure of the fault can be depicted in two 
different manners. Fig. 8.4a shows the hierarchy using the traditional tree structure 
while in Fig. 8.4b each fault class is represented as a rectangle. The sub-faults 
(children) are shown as smaller rectangles contained inside the rectangles depicting 









Process Fault (F9) 
CSTR Fault (F7) Distillation Column Fault (F8) 





Figure 8.4: Hierarchical structures of the faults in Case Study 1 
 
 
Table 8.1: Faults analyzed in Case Study 1 
Fault ID Fault description 
F1 Leak in reactor  inlet 
F2 Catalyst deactivation/poisoning 
F3 Leak in cooling water inlet 
F4 Leak in Distillation column inlet 
F5 Leak in reflux valve 
F6 Reboiler power failure 
 
To monitor this process, we have implemented a hierarchically distributed 
fault detection and diagnosis scheme in which 9 FDI methods supervise the process at 
varying levels of granularity. These methods are described next. To identify the 6 
atomic faults (F1 to F6) listed in Table 8.1 we deployed six specialist FDI methods, 
three of which focus on the CSTR section (faults F1, F2 & F3) and the others on the 
distillation column section (faults F4, F5 and F6). It should be noted that these FDI 
methods are not intended to be the best that can be developed for the case study; 
rather, these illustrate how multiple FDI methods with different scopes and 
  
Process Fault (F9) 
CSTR faults (F7) Distillation Column faults (F8) 
Leak in reactor inlet (F1) 
Catalyst deactivation/poisoning (F2) 
Leak in cooling water inlet (F3) 
Leak in distillation column inlet (F4) 
Leak in reflux valve (F5) 
Reboiler power failure (F6) 
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capabilities can jointly supervise the process at various levels of the compositional 
hierarchy. The emphasis of the chapter is not to design and use the best FDI method 
for monitoring and fault diagnosis of chemical processes, rather the objective is to 
illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed D-S based fusion scheme in combining 
even imperfect FDI methods. The variables monitored by these FDI methods are 
shown in Table 8.2.  
Method 1  
A PCA based method was developed for detecting and diagnosing F2 and F3. 
A fault is flagged when the 99% confidence limits of T
2
 statistic and/or SPE value is 
violated. A fault reconstruction scheme is used for fault diagnosis wherein separate 
PCA models were developed for each fault class. The PCA model that shows an in-





























Table 8.2: Monitored variables in Case Study 1 
No. Variables  Nominal 
value 
Methods 
1 to 3 
Methods 
4 to 6 
Method7 Methods8  Methods9  
1 Reactor feed flow rate (F) 0.7 l/h      
2 Feed concentration (CAf) 55.6 
moles/l 
     
3 Feed temperature (Tf) 28
o
C      
4 Reactor outlet flow rate (Fout) 0.7 l/h      
5 Reactor outlet temperature (Tout) 30.5
 o
C      
6 Concentration of  A in the reactor (CA) 54.2 
moles/l 
     
7 Concentration of  B  in the reactor (CB) 1.4 
moles/l 
     
8 Jacket inflow rate (Fj,in) 130 g/h      
9 Jacket outflow rate (Fj,out) 130 g/h      
10 Jacket inlet temperature (Tj,in) 20
 o
C      
11 Jacket outlet temperature (Tj,out) 29.7
 o
C      




     




C      
14 Mole fraction of B in distillation 
column feed (xDC,in) 
0.024       
15 Distillation column top flow rate (FD) 0.025 
moles/min 
     




     
17 Mole fraction of B in Distillate (xD) 0.88      
18 Mole fraction of B in Bottom (xB) ~0      
19 Distillate temperature (TD) 78.2
 o
C      
20 Bottom temperature (TB) ~100
 o
C      
21 Distillation column Tray 1 temperature  78.2
 o
C      
22 Distillation column Tray 2 temperature 79.1
 o
C      
23 Distillation column Tray 3 temperature 80.9
 o
C      
24 Distillation column Tray 4 temperature 81.9
 o
C      
25 Distillation column Tray 5 temperature 83.4
 o
C      
26 Distillation column Tray 6 temperature 88.6
 o
C      
27 Distillation column Tray 7 temperature 96.2
 o
C      
28 Distillation column Tray 8 temperature 99.0
 o
C      
29 Distillation column Tray 9 temperature 100
 o




  A feed-forward back propagation neural network that mapped each online 
sample to three process states (normal, F1 and F3) was developed. The ANN has two 
layers with [10  3] nodes using tan-sigmoid transfer function for the hidden layer, and 
linear transfer function for the final output layer. The ANN was trained using the 
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Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm. Among the 3 output nodes, the one with the largest 
value was considered to indicate the process state if its value is close to 1 (1 0.1). 
Method 3 
 A SOM based on the approach proposed by Ng and Srinivasan (2008a,b) was 
developed to identify faults F1 and F2. This involves two phases – (i) offline training, 
(ii) online process monitoring and fault diagnosis. During offline training phase, first 
a 2-dimesional SOM is trained using all available training data. After training, the 
neurons on 2-dimensional SOM space are clustered. The trained SOM for this case 
study consists of 48x11map units and the neurons are clustered into 30 clusters using 
the k-means clustering algorithm. The cluster hits corresponding to normal training 
data as well as two fault states are annotated and stored in a database. During online 
process monitoring and fault diagnosis phase, the online process data is projected onto 
the trained SOM. The SOM method performs monitoring by tracking any deviations 
from the nominal operating cluster on the SOM space. Fault identification is through 
fault signature analysis by comparing the cluster hits generated from online 
measurement to that of the training data of each class of fault. The interested reader is 
referred to Ng and Srinivasan
 
(2008a,b) for details of the SOM implementation.  
Similarly, three FDI methods were developed for the distillation column 
section. A PCA (Method 4) was designed to identify faults F5 and F6, a ANN 
(Method 5) was developed to identify faults F4 and F6, and a SOM (Method 6) to 
identify faults F4 and F5. Apart from these, three more monitoring methods were 
deployed, two of which (Methods 7 and 8) monitor the process at section level and the 
method 9 supervises the process as a whole. 
Methods 7 and 8 monitor the CSTR (control volume shown in Fig. 8.3 as dash 
red rectangle) and distillation column section (dash-dot magenta rectangle). They flag 
abnormalities (F7 and F8) in their respective sections when any of their monitored 
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variables deviate significantly from their nominal values (see Table 8.2). Method 9 is 
similar to methods 7 and 8 and monitors the overall process. Its control volume is the 
whole process (shown in Fig. 8.3 as the solid blue rectangle). It monitors the streams 
that enter and leave this control volume (see Table 8.2) and flags a process 
abnormality (F9) if they deviate significantly from their nominal values. These 
Methods (Methods 7 to 9) can be considered as simple expert systems. 
Table 8.3 summaries the capabilities of each FDI method. A check mark 
indicates that the particular method (row) can correctly diagnose the corresponding 
fault (column) while the star (*) denotes that the particular fault can only be detected 
by the corresponding method. Fig. 8.5 shows the scope of the various FDI methods 
within the hierarchical structure of the fault classes as depicted in Fig. 8.4b. The grey 
colored rectangle(s) denote the fault class(es) that the given FDI method can 
diagnose.  
In the offline phase, once the training of each FDI method is completed, its 
confusion matrix (see Eq. 8.3) is constructed by testing its performance on the 
training dataset following the procedure in Section 8.2.3. For example, Method 1 can 
recognize only 3 classes – normal, F2 and F3. Hence, its confusion matrix (see Fig. 
8.6a) will contain 4 rows and 4 columns where the first 3 rows correspond to normal, 
F2 and F3 classes while the 4
th
 row contains the classes that are not recognizable by 
this method i.e.,  8,11 FF . From Fig. 8.6a, it can be seen that 94% of the 
training samples from the normal class are correctly classified, as are 94% of F2 and 
92% of F3 samples. 4% and 5% of the samples belonging to classes F2 and F3 
respectively are misclassified as normal. 6% of normal samples, 2% of F2, and 3% of 
F3 samples are classified as unknown. Method 1 also misclassifies 18% of training 
samples that belong to  8,11 FF  as normal and 82% as unknown classes. 
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Method 9 recognizes only two classes – normal and F9. From the hierarchical 
structure of the fault classes, it is evident that F9 subsumes all other fault classes. 
Therefore,  9 . As a consequence, the confusion matrix for Method 9 (Fig. 8.6i) 
has only 2 rows corresponding to the normal and F9 classes. Similarly, the confusion 
matrices for all the nine FDI methods are constructed.  
Table 8.3: Capability of various FDI methods in Case Study 1 
 Atomic faults Compound faults 
FDI 
Methods  












 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6    
Method 1          
Method 2          
Method 3          
Method 4          
Method 5          
Method 6          
Method 7  *  *  *            
Method 8        *  *  *      
Method 9  *  *  *  *  *  *     
 =  Detect and Diagnose 
*  = Detect 
 
Next, we discuss the performance of the proposed hierarchical fault detection 
and diagnosis approach.  
8.3.1 Identification of Known Faults 
Scenario 1 
  In this scenario, we deploy only the Methods 1 to 6 that can detect and 
diagnose all 6 atomic fault classes (see Table 8.1). Consider the deactivation of 
catalyst in the CSTR (F2). This fault is first diagnosed as F2 by Method 1 at time t = 5 
samples. Then, at t = 7, Method 3 also identifies it as F2. At t =10, method 4 detect 
this fault as an unknown class but is unable to diagnose it. FDI methods 2, 5 and 6 are 
unable to detect this fault and indicate that the process is normal. Conflicts arise when 
for a given sample different FDI methods yield different monitoring results. In case of 
 254 
fault F2 at t = 10 samples, FDI Methods 2, 5 & 6 identify the process as normal while 
Methods 1 and 3 diagnose it as F2. At this time, Method 4 detects an unknown fault 
but is unable to diagnose it. Therefore, at this time (t = 10) the monitoring results of 
FDI methods 1, 2 and 4 are in conflict with each other. As can be seen, in this 
scenario, the individual FDI methods are in congruence till t=5 when all the FDI 
methods identify the process as normal. From t=5 onwards the FDI methods conflict; 




























Figure 8.5: Scope of various FDI methods in Case Study 1 
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Leak in column inlet (F4) 
  
Leak in reflux valve (F5) 
  
Reboiler power failure (F6) 
  
    
Process Fault (F9) 
  
CSTR faults (F7) 
  Distillation Column faults (F8)   
Leak in reactor inlet (F1) 
Catalyst deactivation (F2) 
Leak in jacket inlet (F3) 
  
Leak in column inlet (F4) 
  
Leak in reflux valve (F5) 
  
Reboiler power failure (F6) 
  
    
Process Fault (F9) 
  
Distillation Column faults (F8) 
  
Catalyst deactivation (F2) 
Leak in jacket inlet (F3) 
  
Leak in column inlet (F4) 
  
Leak in reflux valve (F5) 
  
Reboiler power failure (F6) 
CSTR faults (F7) 
Leak in reactor inlet (F1) 
  
    
Process Fault (F9) 
  
CSTR faults (F7) 
  Distillation Column faults (F8)   
Leak in reactor inlet (F1) 
Catalyst deactivation (F2) 
Leak in jacket inlet (F3) 
  
Leak in column inlet (F4) 
  
Leak in reflux valve (F5) 
  
Reboiler power failure (F6) 
  
    
Process Fault (F9) 
  
CSTR faults (F7) 
  Distillation Column faults (F8)   
Leak in reactor inlet (F1) 
Catalyst deactivation (F2) 
Leak in jacket inlet (F3) 
  
Leak in column inlet (F4) 
  
Leak in reflux valve (F5) 
  
Reboiler power failure (F6) 
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(a) Method 1 
 N F2 F3 Unknown 
N 94 0 0 6 
F2 4 94 0 2 
F3 5 0 92 3 
1  18 0 0 82 







(b) Method 2 
 N F1 F3 Unknown 
N 100 0 0 0 
F1 5 95 0 0 
F3 6 0 94 0 
2  100 0 0 0 
 8,22 FF  
 
(c) Method 3 
 N F1 F2 Unknown 
N 100 0 0 0 
F1 7 93 0 0 
F2 6 0 94 0 
3  100 0 0 0 
 8,33 FF  
 
(d) Method 4 
 N F5 F6 Unknown 
N 92 0 0 8 
F5 5 92 0 3 
F6 5 0 93 2 
4  22 0 0 78 
 7,44 FF  
 
(e) Method 5 
 N F4 F6 Unknown 
N 100 0 0 0 
F4 7 93 0 0 
F6 6 0 94 0 
5  100 0 0 0 
 7,55 FF  
 
(f) Method 6 
 N F4 F5 Unknown 
N 100 0 0 0 
F4 5 95 0 0 
F5 6 0 94 0 
6  100 0 0 0 
 7,66 FF  
 
(g) Method 7 
 N F7 Unknown 
N 100 0 0 
F7 14 86 0 
7  100 0 0 
 87 F  
 
(h) Method 8 
 N F8 Unknown 
N 100 0 0 
F8 16 84 0 
8  32 68 0 
 78 F  
 
(i) Method 9 
 N F9 Unknown 
N 100 0 0 




Figure 8.6: Confusion matrices for FDI methods in Case Study 1 
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Table 8.4 shows the BPA values assigned by the FDI methods at various 
times. At t = 5, only Method 1 identifies the sample as F2, while the rest classify the 
process as normal. Based on these results, the BPA of each method is calculated from 
its respective confusion matrix using Eq (8.4) and (8.5). For example, when method 2 
flags the sample as normal, then using its confusion matrix in Fig. 8.6b, the BPAs are 








































  Similarly, when Method 4 identifies the sample as F2, then the BPA 
  124 Fm  is assigned. This assignment of the entire belief mass to F2, indicates that 
method 4 has complete belief that the sample is from F2. BPAs of the other methods 
are also assigned in a similar way.  
 Once the individual BPAs of all FDI methods are assigned, the Dempster 
combination rule (Eq. 2.18) is used to calculate the combined BPA ( Km ,...,2,1 ). The 
hierarchical (parent-child) relationship among the fault classes are used to determine 
the intersections of the classes to which the combined BPAs are to be assigned. At t 
=5, the combined BPA is calculated as   12,..,2,1 Fm K , indicating a total belief to 
class F2. From the class hierarchy, 972 FFF  , the combined beliefs at t = 5 are 
estimated using Eq. (2.10) as: 
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E1=F2 E2=N E3=N E4=N E5=N E6=N m1,2,,6(F2)=1 Bel1,2,,6(F2) =1     





















































E1=F2 E2=N E3=F2 E4=N E5=N E6=N m1,2,,6(F2)=1 Bel1,2,,6(F2) =1     

















































E1=F2 E2=N E3=F2 E4=X E5=N E6=N m1,2,,6(F2)=1 Bel1,2,,6(F2) =1     















































N = Normal class; X = Unknown class;  8,11 FF ;  8,22 FF ;  8,33 FF ;  7,44 FF ;  7,55 FF ; 





















  (8.7) 
 This shows that there is very strong evidence not only for fault F2 but also for 
F7 and F9 although none of the deployed FDI methods explicitly flags F7 and F9. 
Thus, the D-S combination propagates the belief for F2 up the hierarchy and 
establishes that F7 and F9 would also be present. That is the CSTR section should be 
abnormal (F7) even though it has not been detected yet. Similarly, it flags that the 
process should also be abnormal (F9). 
 If the information about the fault class hierarchy is not used, then at t = 5, only 
F2 would be identified while the CSTR section (F7) and the process (F9) would be 
considered normal which would be counterintuitive to the plant operators who are 
responsible for taking the necessary corrective actions upon identification of an 
abnormality. Thus, the hierarchical organization of the fault classes provides a 
coherent explanation of the entire plant state. 
Table 8.5 summaries the performance of the different FDI methods as well as 
the D-S based fusion scheme for various fault scenarios. In all cases, the proposed 
approach was successful in quickly and correctly identifying all the faults even though 
no individual method can identify all of them. Another benefit of this approach is that 
the fault identification lag is decreased since the D-S based fusion scheme uses the a 
priori knowledge of the FDI methods performance from the confusion matrix to 
suitably weight the results of a method. It does not wait for confirmation from other 
methods and flags a fault when the fault is first successfully identified by a method 
with very high confidence.  
 260 
Table 8.5:  Diagnosis delay of various FDI methods and D-S based fusion scheme in 
Case Study 1 
 Diagnosis delay (sample no.) 
Scenarios Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4 Method 5 Method 6 D-S based 
fusion scheme 
F1 - 8 9 - - - 8 
F2 5 - 7 - - - 5 
F3 7 6 - - - - 6 
F4 - - - - 9 10 9 
F5 - - - 10 - 7 7 
F6 - - - 8 11 - 8 
 
Usually, the percentage of samples correctly classified is called the 
recognition rate. In this work, we have deployed multiple FDI methods with varying 
scopes; hence FDI methods can recognize only a subset of the fault classes. Hence, 
we distinguish between two different metrics. The cumulative recognition rate 
CUM
kRR  of the k
th
 FDI method is defined as the percentage of total samples correctly 







RR k  (8.8) 
where,
kC
N represents the number of samples correctly classified by the k
th
 FDI 
method and TN denotes the total number of samples in  . The percentage of samples 
correctly classified, from those classes that the FDI method is capable of identifying, 









RR  (8.9) 
where, 
kT
N is the total number of samples in k . 
 The recognition rates of each FDI method are presented in Table 8.6. The six 
methods have different cumulative and capable recognition rates since each can 
identify only some of the faults. The capable recognition rate is reasonably high for 
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all methods (~90%) but the cumulative recognition rate is low (~50%). To calculate 
the recognition rates (both capable and cumulative) the performance of each FDI 
method is tested on 100 samples from each of the seven classes: normal and six 
atomic fault classes (F1 to F6), for a total of 700 samples. Hence, in this 
case, 700TN . Method 1 correctly recognizes 292 samples out of 300 test samples 
from the 3 classes: normal, F2 and F3. It misclassifies all the 400 test samples from 
F1, F4, F5 and F6. Hence, 292
1








The recognition rates of other FDI methods were also calculated in a similar manner 
and are listed in Table 8.6. 
Table 8.6: Cumulative and Capable recognition rates in Case Study 1 
FDI Methods Capable Recognition Rate (%) Cumulative Recognition Rate (%) 
Method 1 97.33 41.71 
Method 2 96.67 41.43 
Method 3 96.00 41.14 
Method 4 95.33 40.86 
Method 5 96.00 41.14 
Method 6 96.67 41.43 
D-S based fusion 95.42 95.42 
 
 The recognition rate of D-S based fusion scheme is also presented in Table 8.6. 
For calculating the recognition rate of fusion scheme for compound fault classes a 
sample is considered to be classified correctly if the method can accurately identify all 
the possible fault classes across the hierarchy to which the sample belongs. For 
example, if fusion assigns only the fault classes F7 (CSTR abnormality) and F9 
(process abnormality) to a sample which belongs to fault class F2 (catalyst 
deactivation/poisoning) then the overall recognition rate of the fusion method for that 
sample will be 66.67%. If the sample is assigned to all the three relevant fault classes 
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(F2, F7 and F9) then the recognition rate will be 100% for that sample. Very high 
recognition rate (>95%) demonstrates that significant improvement in FDI 
performance can be obtained through fusion of the disparate FDI methods. 
8.3.2 Isolation of Novel faults 
 In this section, we additionally deployed FDI methods 7 to 9 that operate at 
higher levels of the process hierarchy and can only detect compound fault classes. 
When a novel fault which is not any of the known atomic faults (F1 to F6) occurs, its 
effect would still be evident at the higher level of the hierarchy. Consequently, faults 
F7, F8 and F9 can occur even when F1 to F6 do not. Next, we present three novel 
fault scenarios that bring out additional benefits of the proposed hierarchical FDI 
scheme. 
Scenario 2  
 A leak in the distillation column bottom outlet can be considered as a novel 
fault. When this occurs, the variables monitored by methods 1 to 6 are unaffected and 
the fault cannot be detected by Methods 1 to 6. Methods 8 and 9 monitor the 
distillation column bottom flow rate, which is the affected by this fault. Method 8 
therefore flags an abnormality in the distillation column section (F8) and Method 9 a 
process abnormality (F9). The various stages of the fusion scheme are illustrated in 
Table 8.7. Based on the results of methods 8 and 9 this novel fault is successfully 
localized to the distillation column section. Thus, localization of novel faults is 
possible with hierarchical FDI methods even though none of the specialist FDI 
methods can identify the fault or even detect it.  
Scenario 3 
 Here we consider an increase in the CSTR jacket inlet temperature. Methods 7 
and 9 monitor the CSTR jacket inlet temperature, which is affected immediately. As 
the fault propagates, other variables will also be affected eventually. As a result, 
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Method 7 identifies an abnormality in the CSTR section (F7), and Method 8 in the 
distillation column section (F8) and Method 9 in the process (F9).  Methods 1 and 4 
only detect this fault as an unknown class but can’t diagnose it. All other FDI methods 
can’t detect this fault and classify the process as normal. Table 8.8 shows the different 
stages of the fusion to combine the results of all methods. The results clearly indicate 
that this novel fault can be correctly localized to the CSTR section. Thus, proper 
localization of the novel fault is possible despite the fault propagation throughout the 
process. 
Scenario 4 
 Finally, we consider a bias in tray 8 temperature sensor in distillation column. 
When this fault occurs, the variables monitored by methods 7, 8 and 9 are all 
unaffected. Method 4 detects this fault as an unknown class but can’t diagnose it. All 
other FDI methods can’t detect this fault and classify the process as normal. The 
different stages of the fusion are shown in Table 8.9. From, the result it is clear that 
the proposed fusion scheme correctly recognizes that the process state is normal even 
though an abnormality is detected by method 4. Unlike the other scenarios discussed 
above, the temperature sensor bias does not affect the normal operation of the process. 
The proposed scheme thus correctly identifies the process state even when a fault 
does not perturb any section of the process and solely has a local impact.  
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Table 8.7: D-S based fusion scheme during scenario 2 in Case Study 1 
Various stages 




 Method 1 Method 2  Method 3  Method 4  Method 5 Method 6 Method 7 Method 8  Method 9 
Assigned class 
  xEk  






































m7( 7 ) 
=0.47 
m8(F8)=0.56  





m1,2,…,9(N)=0;    m1,2,…,9(F1)=0.01;     m1,2,…,9(F2)=0.05;     m1,2,…,9(F3)=0.05;     m1,2,…,9(F4)=0.10;     m1,2,…,9(F5)=0.36;    m1,2,…,9(F6)=0.43 
m1,2,…,9(F7)=0;       m1,2,…,9(F8)=0;       m1,2,…,9(F9)=0 
Combined 
Belief   
Bel1,2,…,9(N)=0;        Bel1,2,…,9(F1)=0.01;       Bel1,2,…,9(F2)=0.05;       Bel1,2,…,9(F3)=0.05;       Bel1,2,…,9(F4)=0.10;        Bel1,2,…,9(F5)=0.36;         
Bel1,2,…,9(F6)=0.43;       Bel1,2,…,9(F7)=0.11;       Bel1,2,…,9(F8)=0.89;       Bel1,2,…,9(F9)=1 
N = Normal class;  8,11 FF ;  8,22 FF ;  8,33 FF ;  7,44 FF ;  7,55 FF ;  7,66 FF ;  87 F ; 















Table 8.8: D-S based fusion scheme during scenario 3 in Case Study 1 
Various stages 




 Method 1 Method 2  Method 3  Method 4  Method 5 Method 6 Method 7 Method 8  Method 9 
Assigned class 
  xEk  












































m1,2,…,9(N)=0;  m1,2,…,9(F1)=0.48;    m1,2,…,9(F2)=0.23;    m1,2,…,9(F3)=0.29;    m1,2,…,9(F4)=0;     m1,2,…,9(F5)=0;    m1,2,…,9(F6)=0 
m1,2,…,9(F7)=0;       m1,2,…,9(F8)=0;       m1,2,…,9(F9)=0 
Combined 
Belief   
 Bel1,2,…,9(F1)=0.48;    Bel1,2,…,9(F2)=0.23;    Bel1,2,…,9(F3)=0.29;    Bel1,2,…,9(F7)=1;    Bel1,2,…,9(F9)=1 
N = Normal class; X = Unknown class;  8,11 FF ;  8,22 FF ;  8,33 FF ;  7,44 FF ;  7,55 FF ; 
 7,66 FF ;  87 F ;  78 F  
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Table 8.9: D-S based fusion scheme during scenario 4 in Case Study 1 
Various stages 




Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4 Method 5 Method 6 Method 7 Method 8 Method 9 
Assigned class 
  xEk  
















































m1,2,…,9(N)=0.9981; m1,2,…,9(F1)=0.0001; m1,2,…,9(F2)=0.0007; m1,2,…,9(F3)=0.0007; m1,2,…,9(F4)=0.0002; m1,2,…,9(F5)=0.0001; 
m1,2,…,9(F6)=0.0001;     m1,2,…,9(F7)=0;       m1,2,…,9(F8)=0;       m1,2,…,9(F9)=0 
Combined 
Belief 
Bel1,2,…,9(N)=0.9981;     Bel1,2,…,9(F1)=0.0001;   Bel1,2,…,9(F2)=0.0007;   Bel1,2,…,9(F3)=0.0007;   Bel1,2,…,9(F4)=0.0002;   
Bel1,2,…,9(F5)=0.0001;   Bel1,2,…,9(F6)=0.0001;   Bel1,2,…,9(F7)=0.0015;  Bel1,2,…,9(F8)=0.0004;  Bel1,2,…,9(F9)=0.0019 
N = Normal class; X = Unknown class;  8,11 FF ;  8,22 FF ;  8,33 FF ;  7,44 FF ;  7,55 FF ; 
 7,66 FF ;  87 F ;  78 F  
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 The above results clearly demonstrate the key benefits of the proposed 
hierarchical fault detection and diagnosis scheme. It is effective in fusing the results 
of atomic faults from specialist FDI methods (Methods 1 to 6) and decreases the 
detection and diagnosis lag. In the case of novel faults, it helps to localize the 
abnormality even as the effects propagate through the process. Finally, faults that do 
not perturb the operation of the process are also localized and the absence of 
operations abnormality correctly highlighted. 
 It should be noted that the traditional decision tree combiner which is commonly 
used to fuse multiple hierarchical classifiers cannot be applied here directly. 
Traditional decision tree combiner is suitable only in the situation where the classifier 
hierarchy matches exactly with the class hierarchy and each interior node in the tree is 
associated with exactly one classifier. This key requirement of the conventional 
decision tree combiner does not hold in this case study. As can be seen, multiple FDI 
methods (Methods 1 to 3) can be deployed here to diagnose the root cause of the 
CSTR fault (F7). Similarly, three FDI methods (Methods 4 to 6) can be used to find 
the cause (F3 or F4 or F6) for F8. Higher in the hierarchy, two FDI methods (Methods 
7 & 8) can be applied to localize the section of the process (CSTR or distillation 
column) where an abnormality (F9) originates. Therefore, decision tree combiner 
cannot be applied if all the 9 FDI methods deployed in this case study are used 
simultaneously. Nevertheless, for illustration we estimate the upper bound of 
performance of a decision tree combiner by selecting the best FDI method for a given 
fault scenario at each level in the hierarchy. For example, consider the deactivation of 
catalyst in the CSTR (F2). From Table 8.7, it is evident that this fault is first 
successfully diagnosed by Method 1 at t=5 samples. So, only this method (Method 1) 
is selected at the lowest level of the hierarchy. At the intermediate level, only Method 
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7 is considered since it can detect fault F2 as CSTR fault (F8) at t=20 samples. 
Method 9 is the sole method located at the highest level of the hierarchy and hence 
must have to be considered in decision tree combiner. When these three FDI methods 
(Methods 9, 7 and 1) are used in a decision tree combiner for diagnosing fault F2, the 
fault can only be identified successfully with a delay of t=25 samples when Method 9 
located at the highest level of the hierarchy first flags a process abnormality (F9). At 
that time, Method 7 at the next level of hierarchy will be triggered which will detect 
this fault as CSTR fault (F7) immediately and will in turn fire Method 1 at the lowest 
level. Finally, this method will correctly isolate the fault as F2 also at t=25 samples. 
As discussed in Section 8.3.1 under scenario 1, this fault can be successfully 
diagnosed by the proposed D-S based fusion scheme with a delay of only t=5 
samples. Therefore, it is clear the decision tree combiner would result in longer 
diagnosis delay compared to the proposed fusion scheme. As a consequence, the 
recognition rate of decision tree combiner is lower as is brought out by the results of 
all the atomic faults in Table 8.10. It should be noted that these results are an upper 
bound (best case) on the performance since they require a priori information about the 
fault in order to select the best FDI method at each level of the hierarchy. The actual 
performance would be much worse since the single classifier selected at a given level 
of the hierarchy may have poorer performance for that fault then is considered here. 
Therefore, in summary, the traditional decision tree combiner is not well suited for 
combining the hierarchical FDI methods online.  
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Table 8.10: Diagnosis delay and recognition rates of decision tree combiner in Case 
Study 1 







Capable Recognition rate (%) 83.57 
Cumulative Recognition rate (%) 83.57 
 
Bayesian based fusion strategy is effective in combining flat classifiers that 
recognize only the atomic classes. The hierarchical FDI methods deployed in this 
work provide information not only about the atomic fault classes but also about 
compound fault classes. When a Bayesian based fusion scheme is applied, the belief 
for a compound class has to be distributed artificially among the atomic classes that 
constitute the compound class. As a result, the results from Bayesian fusion may yield 
counterintuitive results as illustrated in Section 8.2.3. Therefore, the Bayesian based 
fusion technique is not used in this work to combine the results of hierarchical FDI 
methods. 
8.4 Case Study 2: Tennessee Eastman Challenge Problem 
In this section, the proposed adaptation of Dempster-Shafer based decision fusion 
method is tested on the Tennessee Eastman (TE) industrial challenge problem (Downs 
and Vogel, 1993). The TE process decentralized multi-loop control strategy proposed 
by Ricker (1996) is shown in Fig. 8.7. Out of 21 programmed process faults (see 
Table 5.1), IDV16 to IDV20 are unknown disturbances and hence not considered 
here. We have excluded the IDV15 and IDV21 from the analysis since the 
decentralized multi-loop control strategy is able to provide good recovery for these 
disturbances. The TE process can be decomposed broadly into two sections: reactor-
 270 
separator and stripper sections (see Fig. 8.7). The reactor-separator section can be 
further subdivided into four subsections, namely: a two-phase reactor, a product 
condenser, a flash separator and a recycle compressor subsections. The stripper 
section contains the product stripper. The hierarchy of the fault classes is depicted in 
Fig. 8.8. The compound classes F1 to F7 indicate abnormal operations in the 
subsections and section.  The 15 atomic faults (IDV01 to IDV15) are grouped 
following this compositional hierarchy based on the section where their root cause 
originates. The effect of these atomic faults propagates to the other sections. So faults 
that originate at the stripper section, e.g., IDV01, will eventually affect the reactor-
separator section as well and vice versa.  
To generate a training dataset, 15 runs (one normal run and 14 fault runs) were 
performed. Each training run simulates 25hrs (1500 min) of operations. All faults 
were introduced at 1 hour of operating time for the training data. In contrast, the 
testing dataset consist of runs simulating 50 operating hours (3000 min) with the fault 
introduced at 8 hrs (480 min). The signals for each test run are thus different from the 
training data in terms of run-length and time of fault introduction. 
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Figure 8.7: Process flow diagram of Tennessee Eastman Process showing the control 
volume of the monitoring methods 
 
In this case study, we deployed seven FDI methods to monitor the process in a 
hierarchically distributed manner.  
FDI Methods 1 to 5  
These FDI methods are capable of identifying atomic faults (IDV01 to 
IDV14). Each method uses a different FDI technique and therefore has different 
performances. Apart from PCA (Method 1), SOM (Method 2), and ANN (Method 5) 
as described in Section 8.3, we also use Dynamic Principal Components Analysis 
(DPCA) and an Expert System (ES). The DPCA (Method 3) is broadly similar to the 
PCA method for FDI. The key difference is that each raw sample is augmented with a 
number of previous observations (5 samples here) to provide temporal information to 
the PCA model. To mimic this knowledge of experienced operators, we use a simple 
rule-based expert system (Method 4) to identify these disturbances that are otherwise 
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hard to detect and diagnose. More details about these methods can be found in 
Chapter 7. All these methods were trained with data from all the classes – normal as 
well as 14 fault classes. So, as in case study 1, these FDI methods were not explicitly 
handicapped during offline training.  
In addition, two more monitoring methods were developed that supervise the TE plant 
at the higher level of process hierarchy and detect compound fault classes. The control 
volumes of these methods were selected to account for the availability of process 
measurements at their boundaries. 
Method 6  
The operation of the reactor-separator section with the control volume shown 
in Fig. 8.7 by the red solid rectangle is monitored using the flow rates and 
compositions of the inlet and outlet streams. Based on their values, the derived 
quantities shown in Table 8.11 are calculated. This method flags abnormality in the 
reactor-separator section (F2) if any of these calculated quantities deviate significantly 
from their nominal values.  
Method 7 
The control volume for this monitoring method is the overall process (shown 
as the blue dash rectangle in Fig. 8.7). It monitors the flow rates and compositions of 
streams 1 to 4 that enter the control volume and streams 9 and 11 that exit the control 
volume. From these, certain ratios are derived (see Table 8.11). A process 











Table 8.11: Derived quantities monitored by FDI methods 6 and 7 in Case Study 2 
Derived Quantity  Nominal 
value 







































































































Figure 8.8: Hierarchical structures of faults in Case Study 2 
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As in the previous case study, the confusion matrix for each FDI method (not 
shown here due to space constraints) was developed in the offline phase by testing the 
performance of each method on the training data. The monitoring and diagnostic 
capabilities of the FDI methods are summarized in Table 8.12. It should be noted that, 
unlike in the previous case study, the scope of the different FDI methods does not 
neatly fit into any of the nodes in the fault hierarchy. However the proposed method 
still functions effectively and detects and diagnoses faults that originate in various 
sections of the process.  
Table 8.13 provides a summary of the FDI performance of each method as 
well as D-S based fusion. It is evident that none of the FDI method can individually 
identify all the atomic faults. D-S fusion is successful in quickly detecting and 
identifying all the 15 faults resulting in complete (100%) fault coverage. The benefit 
of FDI methods 6 and 7 that monitor the process at the higher levels of the hierarchy 
is also evident from this table. FDI methods 6 and 7 correctly localize IDV07 within 
the reactor-separator section at time t = 10 which is much earlier (by 31 samples) than 
its diagnosis by the best specialist FDI method in this case, Method 5 at t = 51. 
Similar is the situations for IDV04 and IDV13 as well. Thus, these results clearly 








Table 8.12: Capabilities of various FDI methods in Case Study 2 
FDI 
Method 
Atomic faults Compound faults 
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Table 8.13:  Performance of various FDI methods in Case Study 2 
 FDI method D-S based fusion  
 Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4 Method 5 Method 6 Method 7 
IDV  I DD I DD I DD I DD I DD I DD I DD I DD 
1 - - IDV1 86 IDV1 20 - - IDV1 12 F2 11 F1 12 (F2, F1) 11 
2 IDV2 363 IDV2 28 IDV2 69 - - IDV2 12 F2 12 F1 12 (IDV2, F2, F1) 12 
3 - - - - - - IDV3 25 - - - - - - (IDV3, F2, F1) 25 
4 - - - - - - IDV4 31 - - F2 10 F1 10 (F2, F1) 10 
5 - - - - - - IDV5 21 - - - - - - (IDV5, F2, F1) 21 
6 IDV6 7 IDV6 27 IDV6 6 - - IDV6 3 F2 10 F1 10 (IDV6, F2, F1) 3 
7 - - - - - - IDV7 51 - - F2 10 F1 10 (F2, F1) 10 
8 IDV8 43 IDV8 72 IDV8 26 - - IDV8 12 F2 21 F1 19 (IDV8, F2, F1) 12 
9 - - - - - - IDV9 57 - - F2 115 F1 112 (IDV9, F2, F1) 57 
10 IDV10 13 - - IDV10 10 - - IDV10 5 F2 212 F1 26 (IDV10, F2, F1) 5 
11 IDV11 29 IDV11 30 IDV11 26 - - - - F2 25 F1 24 (F1) 24 
12 - - - - IDV12 226 IDV12 29 - - F2 211 F1 211 (IDV12, F2, F1) 29 
13 IDV13 20 IDV13 53 IDV13 25 - - IDV13 97 F2 15 F1 15 (IDV13, F2, F1) 15 
14 IDV14 22 - - IDV14 14 - - - - - - - - (IDV14, F2, F1) 14 
I = Identified as 
DD = Diagnosis delay (Samples) 
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Table 8.14 provides the recognition rates of the FDI methods. Both cumulative 
and capable recognition rates of the individual FDI methods are extremely poor, 
varying from 24% to 68%. Only expert system has a high capable recognition rate 
(~96%), but its cumulative recognition is extremely low (~37%) since it is specially 
designed to identify only some specific faults. Table 8.14 clearly demonstrates that 
significant improvement in recognition rate (>93%) can be obtained through D-S 
based fusion.  
Table 8.14: Cumulative and Capable recognition rates in Case Study 2 




Method 1 45.17 26.67 
Method 2 53.86 30.41 
Method 3 59.52 39.22 
Method 4 96.33 37.09 
Method 5 65.36 33.00 
Method 6 41.21 41.21 
Method 7 45.95 45.95 
D-S based fusion 95.18 95.18 
 
8.5 Discussion 
In this work, we propose a framework for hierarchically distributed fault detection 
and diagnosis in chemical processes. Based on the process flow diagram and 
knowledge of operating objectives and procedures, faults are organized hierarchically 
following the compositional decomposition of the process into primary processing 
sections, subsections, equipment, and instruments. Two types of FDI methods are 
deployed to supervise the plant at varying levels of granularity. One class of FDI 
methods, called specialists, detects and diagnoses atomic fault classes. Another type, 
typically used at higher levels of the process hierarchy and operating at a more 
granular scale detect abnormal operations even though they may not be able to 
diagnose its precise root cause. A D-S evidence theory based fusion scheme, which 
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endows flexibility in the manipulation of partial knowledge and combine evidences 
from the different levels of abstraction, is used to meaningfully combine the outputs 
of the various FDI methods. The results of the two case studies clearly demonstrate 
several benefits of the proposed approach: (i) the use of the fault classes hierarchy 
allows propagation of belief for atomic faults up the process hierarchy and derive a 
coherent explanation of the state of the entire plant; (ii) all the known faults can be 
detected and diagnosed very quickly with shorter detection and diagnosis lags; (iii) 
significant improvement in overall recognition rate (>95%) and complete fault 
coverage can also be achieved; (iv) unknown faults can also be successfully localized, 
not only when their effects are confined to one node but also when the effect 
propagates through the process due to heat and mass integration. These benefits 
require a small investment in defining the plant and fault hierarchy, which given the 
various benefits above would be worthwhile especially for large-scale chemical 
plants.  
The main contribution of this chapter is the application of D-S evidence theory in 
combining multiple hierarchically distributed FDI methods meaningfully. The 
proposed D-S based fusion scheme satisfies all the constraints that a suitable scheme 
for combining hierarchical classifiers must meet since D-S evidence theory has great 
flexibility for the manipulation of partial knowledge, and ability to represent and 
combine evidences at different levels of abstraction. Unlike classical decision tree 
combiner, used extensively for fusing the decisions of hierarchical classifiers, the 
proposed fusion scheme provides effective combination of classifiers even in the 
situation where classifiers do not exactly match the class hierarchy and each interior 
node in the tree can have more than one or even no classifiers associated with it. 
Furthermore, in the proposed scheme the decisions from all the classifiers across the 
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hierarchy are taken into account. Therefore, a misclassification in the higher level 
classifier can be rectified if the decision made by the lower level classifier is correct 
which is not possible in traditional decision tree combiner. Hence, the D-S fusion 
scheme proposed in this chapter can be used to combine any kind of hierarchical 
classifiers seamlessly and is expected to provide superior classification accuracy over 
other fusion schemes. 
Nomenclature 
Indices 
i, j Fault ID 
k, l FDI method 
  
Parameters 
K Total number of FDI methods 
M Total number of classes  
kM  Number of classes recognized by k
th
 FDI method 
  Threshold value  10    
Variables 
  Empty set 
  BPA that the combination assigns to the null subset,    
 MCCC ,,, 21   Frame of discernment containing all the known M classes 
 kMkkk kCCC ,...,, 21  Frame of discernment of k
th
 FDI method  
k  Set of classes in  that are not in k  
A,B,C Any subset of 2  
 ABel  Belief committed to hypothesis A 
KBel ,,2,1   Combined belief of K FDI methods 
Cj j
th





 class of fault identified by k
th
 FDI method 
CM
k Confusion matrix for kth FDI method 
 xE
iC
 Classification results of the classifier associated with node 
iC  in the class hierarchy for sample x 
Ek(x) Classification results of k
th
 classifier for sample x 
 xE K,,2,1   Combined classification results of K FDI methods for sample 
x 
 Amk  BPA assigned to hypothesis A by k
th
 FDI method 






Km ,,2,1   Combined BPA of K FDI method 
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k
jiN ,  Element of CM
k
, = number of samples belonging to class ‘i’ 
that are classified as class ‘j’ by kth FDI method 
kC
N  Number of samples correctly classified by k
th
 FDI method 
TN  Total number of samples 
kT
N  Total number of samples from the classes that the k
th
 FDI 
method can identify 




 APl  Plausibility of hypothesis A 
CAP
kRR  Capable recognition rate of k
th
 FDI method 
CUM
kRR  Cumulative recognition rate of k
th
 FDI method 





Chapter 9 Conclusion and Future Work 
9.1 Conclusions 
Process monitoring and fault diagnosis deals with online identification of 
process states, detection of abnormal process behaviors or fault, and diagnosis its 
possible root causes. Early detection and precise identification of process faults is 
essential to prevent off-spec products and also in many cases to prevent serious 
accidents. A majority of the FDI methods proposed in the literature employ single 
monolithic motoring strategy for process monitoring and fault diagnosis. Due to the 
sheer size and complexity of modern chemical processes, single centralized 
monolithic monitoring strategies are not always well suited for detecting and 
identifying faults. Each FDI method has its own strengths and shortcoming in all 
practical applications. It is therefore necessary to develop new FDI schemes based on 
multiple methods where instead of relying on a single method, multiple methods are 
deployed to monitor the system, so that the strengths of these multiple methods can be 
brought together and their individual short comings can be overcome. This thesis 
sought to develop effective process monitoring and fault diagnosis schemes by 
combining multiple methodologies. Several multiple methods based FDI schemes 
involving both homogeneous (of same type) and heterogeneous (of different type) 
FDI methods organized in different (flat or hierarchical) architectures were proposed. 
The thesis was divided into five major sections covering these various developments.  
First, a parameter based scheme was proposed to generate multiple 
homogeneous detectors using immune system inspired NSA for process monitoring 
and fault diagnosis in chemical processes. In the proposed approach, a collection of 
hyper-spherical detectors generated through immune system inspired NSA was used 
for process monitoring, wherein the key parameters - location of centre and size 
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(radius) of each detector was different from those of the others. A scheme for 
estimation of self radius, an important tuning parameter for generating the detectors in 
NSA, directly from the training data was also proposed. The proposed FDI approach 
was a generic one and could be applied for monitoring and fault diagnosis of both 
continuous as well as batch processes and transient operations since it does not 
require that the underlying data stems originates from a specified statistical 
distribution. Extensive testing of the proposed approach using three case studies 
clearly demonstrated its ability to provide good monitoring and diagnosis 
performance.  
Second, the importance of variable selection as a determinant of monitoring 
performance of PCA based statistical process monitoring method was explored. It was 
shown that monitoring performance of PCA based methods could be improved 
significantly by focusing only on the most relevant variables, also called key variables 
that are affected by the faults and hence, carry useful information about the faults. The 
set of key variables are fault specific. A metric was proposed to systematically 
evaluate the monitoring performance of any set of variables for a given fault directly 
from some representative (or training) data from normal and that fault operations. The 
metric calculation requires minimum computational effort since it is based on 
determinants of the cumulative and normal covariance matrices. This metric was used 
to effectively obtain a small number (2 or 3) of key variables of a fault by complete 
enumeration. The excellent ability of the proposed metric in identifying the right key 
variables was demonstrated through the benchmark Tennessee Eastman Challenge 
problem. 
Third, based on the insights in Chapter 5, two schemes for efficient process 
monitoring based on reduced PCA models that use only the selected subset of 
284 
 
variables (key variables) were proposed in Chapter 6. First, a single reduced PCA 
based monitoring model using a set of key variables was developed. The main idea 
was to select only the most important and relevant variables that contain useful 
information about all the faults and then use only these key variables to construct a 
single reduced PCA model which offers improved monitoring performance for all 
faults. A stochastic optimization based variable selection scheme was proposed in this 
paper for making this selection. GA was applied to identify the subset of the available 
variables that minimizes the cumulative error for the validation data, while 
simultaneously minimizing the number of selected variables. The framework for 
variable selection described here is general and can be used with other monitoring 
methods as well as other optimization techniques (such as simulated annealing, 
particle swarm optimization, and tabu search). The effectiveness of the proposed 
variable selection scheme was demonstrated on the benchmark Tennessee Eastman 
process challenge problem. Then, a multiple reduced PCA models based monitoring 
approach to achieve superior detection performance for all known faults was also 
proposed, wherein each reduced PCA model uses the key variables of a fault. In this 
scheme, first the key variable set of each fault was identified using the inseparability 
metric (Mins) proposed in Chapter 5. Various fault-specific reduced PCA models, each 
with the key variables of a fault was developed after identifying the key variable of 
each fault. Such multiple reduced models was deployed simultaneously for process 
monitoring and their outputs was combined through simple AND logic in which a 
sample is classified as normal if all the models assign it as normal, otherwise it is 
classified as abnormal or fault. Application of such multi-model based process 
monitoring scheme in TE process case study results in further improvement in MDRs 
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for most of the faults, than that can be obtained through individual fault specific 
reduced PCA models alone. 
Fourth, the relative benefits of utility-based voting and evidence-based 
weighted voting, Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer decision fusion strategies in 
combining the outputs from multiple heterogeneous FDI methods organized in flat 
architecture was studied. Particularly, we were interested in situations where the 
individual FDI methods are highly diverse, with strong disagreement among them and 
the overall performance of each FDI method is inadequate. When the individual FDI 
methods have varying performance for different faults, disagreements among them 
then come to the fore. Our results indicated that the maximum benefit in terms of FDI 
performance improvement can be achieved in such situations where the overall 
performance of any one method was inadequate. Here, evidence-based methods 
perform significantly better than utility-based ones. Performance of both Bayesian 
and Dempster-Shafer based fusion schemes were essentially the same in the two case 
studies evaluated here. Both can effectively resolve conflicts among multiple 
heterogeneous FDI methods and yield excellent results with (i) high prediction 
accuracy (overall recognition rate> 95%), (ii) complete (100%) fault coverage, (iii) 
short detection and diagnosis delay, and (iv) remarkable monitoring performance. 
Utility based methods performed poorly in such situations because they treat all the 
FDI methods equally without considering their class-specific performance.  
 Fifth, a framework for distributed fault detection and identification was 
proposed, wherein the process was decomposed hierarchically into sections and 
subsections based on process flow diagram. Multiple hierarchical FDI methods at 
varying levels of granularity were deployed to monitor the various sections and 
subsections of the process. The results from the individual FDI methods contain 
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mutually non-exclusive fault classes at different levels of granularity and such results 
cannot be combined suitably through conventional voting or Bayesian based fusion 
schemes. An adaptation of the Dempster-Shafer evidence theory to combine these 
diagnostic results at different levels of abstraction was proposed. The results of the 
two case studies clearly demonstrated several benefits of the proposed approach: (i) 
the use of the fault classes hierarchy allowed propagation of belief for atomic faults 
up the process hierarchy and derive a coherent explanation of the state of the entire 
plant; (ii) all the known faults can be detected and diagnosed very quickly with 
shorter detection and diagnosis lags; (iii) significant improvement in overall 
recognition rate (>95%) and complete fault coverage can also be achieved; (iv) 
unknown faults can also be successfully localized, not only when their effects were 
confined to one node but also when the effect propagated through the process due to 
heat and mass integration. These benefits require a small investment in defining the 
plant and fault hierarchy, which given the various benefits above would be 
worthwhile especially for large-scale chemical plants.  
9.2 Future Work 
This thesis thus offers various multiple methods based approaches for process 
monitoring and fault diagnosis. Next, some suggestions for future research are 
recommended. 
Ensemble learning: As discussed in Chapter 7, and also in Chapter 7, the benefits of 
multiple methods base approach In Chapter 4, diversity among multiple hyper-
spherical detectors is achieved by varying their centre and radius parameters. In 
Chapter 6, diversity is achieved by using multiple PCA models with different subsets 
of variables, whereas use of entirely different (heterogeneous) FDI methods 
contributes to the diversity in Chapter 7. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in the general 
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pattern classification literature, other ways to achieve classifier diversity through 
resampling of the training data (such as bagging, boosting, and stacking) have been 
widely studied. Although such techniques are theoretically more tractable, in the 
process plant context, there is generally a paucity of data from fault states. Hence, the 
adequacy of training data for deploying an ensemble of a single data-driven FDI 
method (such as PCA) would be an issue. The trade-offs involved can be explored in 
the future work.  
Peer learning and Self Learning: Research could focus on establishing learning 
schemes among monitoring and diagnosis methods which would make each method 
more intelligent with time. In multiple FDI methods based system each FDI method 
can be designed to learn from the others. Thus peer-learning can improve the 
performance of each individual FDI method. As a result, their combined performance 
can also be improved. This peer-learning can be accomplished from the final decision 
level results of the other methods or by using the some intermediate results of the 
others. Again, each individual FDI method can keep track of its own results as well as 
the finally accepted ones (actual results) and eventually can learn by its own. Both 
peer-learning and self-learning schemes can be explored in future work.  
Additional Fusion Schemes: In this thesis some popular utility and evidence based 
decision fusion strategies such as voting, weighted voting, Bayesian and Dempster-
Shafer to evaluate their performances to combine multiple heterogeneous FDI 
methods. Several evidence-based fusion schemes for combining the multiple pattern 
classifiers have been proposed such as decision templates (Kuncheva 2001) which 
compute a similarity measure between the current decision profile of the unknown 
instance and the average decision profiles of instances from each class, called 
decision templates and the class whose decision template is closest, in terms of 
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similarity measure, is chosen as the ensemble decision; Hung  and Suen (1993) 
proposed a fusion scheme which keeps track of the class assigned by individual 
classifiers as well as the true class label for each sample for combining the outputs of 
multiple classifiers; Liu et al. (2007, 2008) introduced Multi-agent decision fusion 
scheme in which multiple classifier agents are combined through integration of both 
Bayesian belief and majority voting. These fusion strategies can be explored further 
for combining multiple FDI methods. 
Further extension of hierarchical FDI: Recently, diagnostic capabilities are also 
being built into smart sensors, instruments, and equipments. This capability can be 
naturally incorporated in the proposed framework by considering them as additional 
FDI methods. Sensor faults and biases can lead to poor performance of FDI methods. 
In the future, the proposed framework for hierarchical fault detection and diagnosis 
can be extended to develop a methodology that automatically discounts the basic 
probability assignments of the FDI methods that rely on faulty sensors. Also, 
industrial processes evolve over time which would affect the diagnostic performance 
of some of the FDI methods. This has to be accounted for during evidence fusion. The 
current fusion scheme, specifically the confusion matrix, is static and derived from 
historical performance information that may not be reflective of the evolved process. 
Hady and Schwenker (2009) proposed a trainable fusion method which integrates 
statistical information using a Radial Basis Function neural network. Such adaptive 
fusion schemes can also be explored in future work. 
In future work, the following aspects of immune system-based approach can 
be explored. 
Online training and fault recovery: The proposed immune-inspired NSA based FDI 
framework can be trained online by updating the fault database through the addition 
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of a new detector-set whenever a new or unknown or novel fault is encountered. In 
the fault database store the information regarding recovery actions of each fault can 
be stored additionally. So, upon successful detection and identification of a particular 
type of fault the recovery actions stored in the fault database corresponding to that 
fault can be executed for process recovery and to bring the process back its normal 
operating conditions. The proposed immune-inspired NSA based FDI framework can 
be further extended for online training and fault recovery. 
Fusion detectors obtained through positive and negative selections: Positive 
Selection Algorithm (PSA) (Stibor and Timmis, 2007) is conceptually just the reverse 
of NSA. The detector set obtained through PSA are complementary to that of NSA. 
On of the major drawbacks associated with PSA algorithm is that it usually suffers 
from high false negative and low true positive, while NSA usually yields low true 
negative and high false positive. Therefore, a meaningful and judicious combination 
of these two complementary dual detector sets is expected to provide better 
classification accuracy compared to any single detector set. In future work, various 
decision fusion schemes can be applied to combine the results obtained from these 
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Appendix A: Process model of CSTR 
The dynamics of the reactor and jacket are described by the following non-
linear ODEs which are derived from mass balance for substance A and B in the reactor 
and from energy balance for the reactor and jacket. 





                                   (A.1) 






21                                                (A.2) 





































                            (A.4) 
Following assumptions have been made to derive the above equations: (i) 
perfect mixing in reactor and jacket, (ii) constant volume reactor and jacket, (iii) 
constant parameter values. The reaction rate constants 3,2,1, iki  are assumed to 
depend on the temperature via Arrhenius law:  



























expexp                            (A.5) 
where, 3,2,1,/  i
R
E
E ii are the activation energies for the different reactions 
occurring in the system. 
The values of the chemical and physical parameters in the equations of this 







Table A.1: The values of the chemical and physical parameters of the CSTR model 
(Klatt and Engell, 1998) 
Parameter Value Unit 








Frequency factor of reaction DA2 , 30k  9.043 X 10
9 
hmolL  
Activation energy of reaction BA , /1E  9758.3 K 
Activation energy of reaction CB  , /2E  9758.3 K 
Activation energy of reaction DA2 , /3E  8560.0 K 
Heat of reaction of BA , 1H  4.2 molkJ /  
Heat of reaction of CB  , 2H  -11 molkJ /  
Heat of reaction of DA2 , 3H  -41.85 molkJ /  
Density of reactor fluid,   0.9341 kg/ L 
Heat capacity of reactor fluid, pc  3.01 KkgkJ /  
Reactor volume, V 10 L 
Overall heat transfer coefficient, U 4032.0 2/ mKhkJ  
Heat transfer area, A 0.215 m
2 
Mass of the coolant in jacket, jM  5.0 kg  
Heat capacity of coolant, pjc  4.186 KkgkJ /  
 
The parameters – volumetric feed flow rate (F), feed concentration (CAf), feed 
temperature (Tf), coolant mass flow rate  jm  and jacket inlet temperature  jinT  are 
considered as input to the process, whereas concentration of A and B  BA CC ,  in 
reactor and temperature of reactor  rT and jacket  jT  are regarded as process states. 
The reactor is operated with the following values of process inputs (shown in Table 
3.7). 
 
At steady-state derivatives (LHS) of Eqn. (3.8) to Eqn. (3.11) are set equal to 
zero. i.e. 
   0231  AAAAf CkCkCC
V
F
      (A.1a) 
021  BAB CkCkC
V
F
       (A.2a) 
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     (A.3a) 











                            (A.4a) 
Table A.2: Values of process inputs for two operating states 
Input Operating State 1 Operating State 1 
Volumetric feed flow rate, F 141.9 L/h 141.9 L/h 
Feed concentration, CAf 5.1 mol/L 6.4 mol/L 





Coolant mass flow rate, jm  6.5 kg/ h 6.5 kg/ h 








A Heat transfer area (m
2
) 
CA Concentration of reactant A in CSTR (mol/ L) 
CAf Concentration of A in feed (mol/ L) 
CB Concentration of product B in CSTR (mol/ L) 
pc  Heat capacity of reactor fluid (kJ/ kg K) 






1 ,, EEE  Activation energies of the reactions 1, 2 and 3 (K) 
F Feed flow rate to the CSTR (L/ h) 
321 ,, HHH   Heat of reaction for the reactions 1, 2 and 3 (kJ/ mol) 
321 ,, kkk  Rate constants of the reactions 1, 2 and 3 (h
-1
) 
302010 ,, kkk  Frequency factors of the reactions 1, 2 and 3 (h
-1
) 
jM  Mass of the coolant in jacket (kg) 
jm  Mass flow rate of the coolant through the jacket (kg/ h) 
Tf Feed temperature (
0
C) 
jT  Jacket temperature (
0
C) 
Tmax Maximum number of detectors to be generated 





rT  Temperature of CSTR (
0
C) 
U Overall heat transfer coefficient ( 2/ mKhkJ ) 
V Volume of the CSTR L 
  
Greek Letters  































Appendix B: Distillation Column Model 
Differential Algebraic Equations for modeling the dynamics of start-up 
operation of a binary distillation column 
Differential Equations: 








 11  






dx 11121   







  11 , where i = 2, 3 and 4 






dx 55645   







  11 , where i = 6, 7 and 8 






dx 9989   
Algebraic Equations: 
 Dxy xfy 0  
    211 1 yxfy TxyT     
 310 
 
    322 1 yxfy TxyT     
    11   iTixyTi yxfy  , where i = 3, 4,…, 8 
 99 xfy xy  
where, xyf  is a polynomial function which relates liquid phase composition of binary 
ethanol water to its equilibrium vapor phase composition. 
 









 FxTFb xfT  , where, xTf  is a polynomial function which relates liquid phase 
composition of binary ethanol water to its bubble point temperature. 
 FvFvF xHxHH  121  











 Fsr QFVV  1  
 DxTDb xfT   
 DvDvD xHxHH  121  




















      inwoutwpwwDDbDvv TTCmTTCVVyHyH .,111211 1    
1RVLD   
DDr LQL   
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Frs FQLL   
rr LVD   
DFB   
Output Equations: 




B  Molar flow rate of bottom from the column (moles/h) 
1C  Specific heat of ethanol (kJ/mole 
0
C) 
2C  Specific heat of water (kJ/mole 
0
C) 
DC  Specific heat of distillate (kJ/mole 
0
C) 
FC  Specific heat of feed (kJ/mole 
0
C) 
pwC  Specific heat of cold water (kJ/kg 
0
C) 
D  Molar flow rate of distillate from the column (moles/h) 
F  Molar flow rate of feed to the column (moles/h) 
DH  Heat of vaporization of distillate (kJ/mole) 
FH  Heat of vaporization of feed (kJ/mole) 
1vH  Heat of vaporization of ethanol (kJ/mole) 
2vH  Heat of vaporization of water (kJ/mole) 
DL  Molar flow rate of liquid reflux to the column 1
st
 tray (moles/h) 
rL  Molar flow rate of liquid phase in the rectifying section of column (moles/h) 
sL  Molar flow rate of liquid phase in the striping section of column (moles/h) 
BM  Molar hold-up of reboiler (moles) 
DM  Molar hold-up of condenser (moles) 
TM  Molar hold-up of trays (moles) 
wm  Mass flow rate of cold water (coolant) to the condenser (kg/h) 
DQ  Distillate quality 
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FQ  Feed quality 
lossQ  Heat loss from the column (kW) 
rebQ  Reboiler power (kW) 
R  Reflux fraction 
DbT  Bubble point temperature of the distillate (
0
C) 
FT  Temperature of the feed (
0
C) 
FbT  Bubble point temperature of the feed (
0
C) 
iT  Temperature in i
th
 tray  (
0
C) 
inwT ,  Cooling water inlet temperature (
0
C) 
outwT ,  Cooling water outlet temperature (
0
C) 
1V  Molar flow rate of vapor phase leaving the 1
st
 tray ( top tray)  (moles/h) 
rV  Molar flow rate of vapor phase in the rectifying section of column (moles/h) 
sV  Molar flow rate of vapor phase in the striping section of column (moles/h) 
Dx  Mole fraction of ethanol in the distillate 
Fx  Mole fraction of ethanol in the feed 
ix  Mole fraction of ethanol in liquid phase in i
th
 tray 
iy  Mole fraction of ethanol in vapor phase leaving i
th
 tray 














Appendix C: Process model of CSTR-Distillation 
Column  
 
The dynamics of the jacketed CSTR can described by the following non-linear 
ODEs which are derived from mass balance for substance A and B in the reactor and 
from energy balance for the reactor and jacket. 





1                                        (C.1) 






1                                               (C.2) 
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                      (C.4) 
Following assumptions have been made to derive the above equations: (i) 
perfect mixing in reactor and jacket, (ii) constant volume reactor and jacket, (iii) 
constant parameter values. The reaction rate constants 3,2,1, iki  are assumed to 
depend on the temperature via Arrhenius law:  






















101 expexp                      (C.5) 
where, 3,2,1,1/1  i
R
E
E are the activation energies for the different reactions 
occurring in the system. 
 
Differential Algebraic Equations are used for modeling the dynamics of a 
binary distillation column 
 
Differential Equations: 










 11  






dx 11121   
 







  11 , where i = 2, 3 and 4 






dx 55645   
 







  11 , where i = 6, 7 and 8 
 






dx 9989   
Algebraic Equations: 
 Dxy xfy 0  
    211 1 yxfy TxyT     
    322 1 yxfy TxyT     
    11   iTixyTi yxfy  , where i = 3, 4,…, 8 
 99 xfy xy  
where, xyf  is a polynomial function which relates liquid phase composition of binary 














 FxTFb xfT  , where, xTf  is a polynomial function which relates liquid phase 
composition of binary ethanol water to its bubble point temperature. 
 FvFvF xHxHH  121  











 Fsr QFVV  1  
 DxTDb xfT   
 DvDvD xHxHH  121  




















      inwoutwpwwDDbDvv TTCmTTCVVyHyH .,111211 1    
1RVLD   
DDr LQL   
 
Frs FQLL   
rr LVD   
DFB   
Output Equations: 
 ixTi xfT  , where, i = 1, 2, 3,…, 9 
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The values of the chemical and physical parameters in the equations of this 
model are shown in Table A.1. 
Table C.1: The values of the chemical and physical parameters  
Parameter Value Unit 




Activation energy of reaction BA , /1E  -8930.3 K 
Heat of reaction of BA , 1H  -11 molkJ /  
Density of reactor fluid,   0.9942 kg/ L 
Heat capacity of reactor fluid, pc  3.01 KkgkJ /  
Reactor volume, V 0.2 L 
Overall heat transfer coefficient, U 4032.0 2/ mKhkJ  
Heat transfer area, A 0.00108 m
2 
Mass of the coolant in jacket, jM  0.1 kg  
Heat capacity of coolant, pjc  4.186 KkgkJ /  
Heat of vaporization of A, vAH  33.99 kJ/ mol 
Heat of vaporization of B, vBH  40.66 kJ/ mol 
Sp. Heat of A, ApC ,  0.01309 kJ/ mol K 
Sp. Heat of B, BpC ,  0.00754 kJ/ mol K 
Molar hold up in reboiler, BM  325 moles 
Molar hold up in Condenser DM  0.5 moles 
Molar hold up in tray, TM  1.0 moles 
Tray efficiency, T  0.7  
Reflux fraction, R 0.9  
Heat loss from the column, lossQ  250 W 




A Heat transfer area (m
2
) 
CA Concentration of reactant A in CSTR (mol/ L) 
CAf Concentration of A in feed (mol/ L) 
CB Concentration of product B in CSTR (mol/ L) 
pc  Heat capacity of reactor fluid (kJ/ kg K) 
pjc  Heat capacity of coolant (kJ/ kg K) 
/
1E  Activation energies of the reactions 1, 2 and 3 (K) 
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F Feed flow rate to the CSTR (L/ h) 
1H  Heat of reaction for the reactions 1, 2 and 3 (kJ/ mol) 
1k  Rate constants of the reactions 1, 2 and 3 (h
-1
) 
10k  Frequency factors of the reactions 1, 2 and 3 (h
-1
) 
jM  Mass of the coolant in jacket (kg) 
jm  Mass flow rate of the coolant through the jacket (kg/ h) 
Tf Feed temperature (
0
C) 
jT  Jacket temperature (
0
C) 
Tmax Maximum number of detectors to be generated 
jinT  Jacket inlet temperature (
0
C) 
rT  Temperature of CSTR (
0
C) 
U Overall heat transfer coefficient ( 2/ mKhkJ ) 
V Volume of the CSTR L 
B  Molar flow rate of bottom from the column (moles/h) 
1C  Specific heat of ethanol (kJ/mole 
0
C) 
2C  Specific heat of water (kJ/mole 
0
C) 
DC  Specific heat of distillate (kJ/mole 
0
C) 
FC  Specific heat of feed (kJ/mole 
0
C) 
pwC  Specific heat of cold water (kJ/kg 
0
C) 
D  Molar flow rate of distillate from the column (moles/h) 
F  Molar flow rate of feed to the column (moles/h) 
DH  Heat of vaporization of distillate (kJ/mole) 
FH  Heat of vaporization of feed (kJ/mole) 
1vH  Heat of vaporization of ethanol (kJ/mole) 
2vH  Heat of vaporization of water (kJ/mole) 
DL  Molar flow rate of liquid reflux to the column 1
st
 tray (moles/h) 
rL  Molar flow rate of liquid phase in the rectifying section of column 
(moles/h) 




BM  Molar hold-up of reboiler (moles) 
DM  Molar hold-up of condenser (moles) 
TM  Molar hold-up of trays (moles) 
wm  Mass flow rate of cold water (coolant) to the condenser (kg/h) 
DQ  Distillate quality 
FQ  Feed quality 
lossQ  Heat loss from the column (kW) 
rebQ  Reboiler power (kW) 
R  Reflux fraction 
DbT  Bubble point temperature of the distillate (
0
C) 
FT  Temperature of the feed (
0
C) 
FbT  Bubble point temperature of the feed (
0
C) 
iT  Temperature in i
th
 tray  (
0
C) 
inwT ,  Cooling water inlet temperature (
0
C) 
outwT ,  Cooling water outlet temperature (
0
C) 
1V  Molar flow rate of vapor phase leaving the 1
st
 tray ( top tray)  
(moles/h) 
rV  Molar flow rate of vapor phase in the rectifying section of column 
(moles/h) 
sV  Molar flow rate of vapor phase in the striping section of column 
(moles/h) 
Dx  Mole fraction of ethanol in the distillate 
Fx  Mole fraction of ethanol in the feed 
ix  Mole fraction of ethanol in liquid phase in i
th
 tray 
iy  Mole fraction of ethanol in vapor phase leaving i
th
 tray 
Greek Letters  
  Density of reactor fluid (kg/ L) 






Appendix D: An illustrative example of Voting, 
Weighted Voting, Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer 
based fusion  
 
In this section, we will illustrate Voting, Weighted Voting, Bayesian and 
Dempster-Shafer based fusion schemes through an example in which decisions from 
three FDI methods will be fused. 
Let us assume that there are three FDI methods namely, A1, A2 and A3 which are 
used to classify an input to three possible classes (Class C1, C2 and C3). The class C1 
corresponds to normal mode of operation while other two classes (Class C2 and C3) 
corresponds to abnormal modes. The confusion matrices of three methods (A1, A2 and 
A3) are shown in Table 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
Let us further consider, for an input x the output of three FDI methods 
are   11 CxEA  ,   12 CxEA  and   33 CxEA  respectively. That is, both methods A1 and 
A2 assign the input to normal class (Class C1) while the input is assigned to an 
abnormal class (Class C3) by the method A3. It can be seen from the confusion matrices 
(shown in Table D.1 to D.3) that method A3 can correctly classify all the 100 samples 
belonging to Class C3. Therefore, for a given input if the output from method A3 is class 
C3, then it is most likely that the input actually belongs to class C3. The final 
consolidated results obtained through Voting, Weighted voting, Bayesian and D-S 
fusion are presented in Table D.5, D.6, D.7 and D.8 respectively. It can be seen from 
these Tables that voting method cannot utilize the a priori class specific performance of 
each method and incorrectly assigns the input to normal class (Class C1) since two out 
of three methods vote for class C1. On the other hand, weighted voting, Bayesian and 
D-S fusion can correctly exploit the a priori class specific performance of each method 
stored in confusion matrix and assign the input to its most likely class C3.    
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Table D.1: Confusion Matrix of Method A1: 
 C1 C2 C3 None 
C1 90 5 5 0 
C2 20 80 0 0 
C3 30 0 70 0 
 
Table D.2: Confusion Matrix of Method A2: 
 C1 C2 C3 None 
C1 80 20 0 0 
C2 10 80 10 0 
C3 30 10 60 0 
 
Table D.3: Confusion Matrix of Method A3: 
 C1 C2 C3 None 
C1 70 30 0 0 
C2 30 70 0 0 
C3 0 0 100 0 
 
 
Table D.4: Results of Combination through Voting: 






Table D.5: Results of Combination through Weighted Voting: 








C1 0.6429 0.6667 0 1.3096 
C2 0.1429 0.0833 0 0.2262 
C3 0.2143 0.2500 1 1.4643 
 
C1 is winner 
Ecom, voting(x) = C1 
C3 is winner 
Ecom, WV(x) = C3 
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Table D.6: Results of Combination through Bayesian: 










C1 0.6429 0.6667 0 0 0 
C2 0.1429 0.0833 0 0 0 
C3 0.2143 0.2500 1 0.4643 1.0 
 
 
Table D.7: Results of Combination through Dempster-Shafer: 
Class Individual BPA values Combined BPA values 
321
,, AAAm  1Am  2Am  3Am  
C1 0.6429 0.6667 0 0 
C2 0.1429 0.0833 0 0 
C3 0.2143 0.2500 1 1.0 
321 CCCU   0 0 0 0 
 
 
C3 is winner 
Ecom, Bayesian(x) = C3 
C3 is winner 
Ecom, DS (x) = C3 
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